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ABSTRACT

THE APPEARANCE OF THE OTHER EGO IN EDMUND HUSSERL’S
PHENOMENOLOGY

By
Paul F Zipfel
May 2020

Dissertation supervised by Professor Lanei Rodemeyer
In this work I investigate Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of the
appearance of the other ego in order to elucidate the essential components of the sense of
the other ego: co-constitution, inaccessibility, and a unique process of verification.
I open with an example illustrating the way in which other egos appear to me as
different from ordinary objects in the world. When one looks outside in a storm and sees a
branch rapping on the window, it is not an alarming experience. However, were another
person to be rapping at the window, the experience would be quite different. This is because
there is a difference in the way that animate and inanimate bodies are given to me.
Elucidating this difference in givenness is the goal of the dissertation, and I conclude
Chapter I by clarifying some phenomenological topics that will be used throughout the rest
of the analyses: the lived body, appresentation, and association.
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In Chapter II, I argue that the other ego appears first and foremost in her coconstitution, which is given to me in two ways: in my experience of the world as coconstituted by others and in my experience of her active engagement in the world. First,
Husserl emphasizes the appearance of the world as there for more than just me, as shared.
In the appearance of the world as such, the other ego is experienced in her constitutive
accomplishment: I experience objects as constituted by more than just me, as given to other
constituting activities of consciousness in addition to my own. Second, these other
constituting consciousnesses are given as centers of constituting activity. I experience the
world as constituted by other egos and oriented around the bodily center of that
constitution. In other words, just as the world is oriented around the “here” of my
constituting activity, so does the other ego appear as a “there”, which is a “here” for her,
around which the world is also organized. In this way, the other ego appears in her coconstituting the world and in the world as co-constituted by her. The clarification of this
two-fold sense of co-constitution allows for a description of the transcendental sense of coconstitution at play in my constituting consciousness. Following Zahavi’s analysis of
Husserl’s concept of open intersubjectivity, I argue that the sense of the other ego as a coconstitution is operative in my objective constitution of the world. This means that, within
my very experience of the world, the other ego’s constitutive contribution is already at
work. Thus, in my experience of the objective world, the co-constitution of the other ego
appears.
In chapter III, I argue that what distinguishes my stream of constitution from the
stream of constitution of the other ego, her stream of co-constitution, is accessibility. My
experiences, my constituting activity, are given to me as accessible, and the co-constituting
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of the other ego appears to me as inaccessible. Phenomenologically speaking, accessibility
is a special type of originality, which is best understood in relation to Husserl’s distinction
between direct and indirect givenness. Husserl says that a phenomenon is given directly to
consciousness when it gives itself; in other words, something is given directly to me when
its appearance is not mediated. This means that a phenomenon is given indirectly when it
is not itself given; rather, an indirectly given phenomenon is given through something else.
This is important in the discussion of the appearance of the other ego in her inaccessibility,
because Husserl says multiple times that the other ego is directly given. However, he also
says that I cannot have a direct perception of the other consciousness. I argue that Husserl’s
distinction means that I have a direct experience of the accomplishment of the other ego’s
constituting consciousness, but I experience her conscious activity solely as enacted. What
is not directly given to me, because it is only indicated, is the enacting of this conscious
activity. Thus, the other ego is directly given to me in her co-constitution, but the enacting
of this co-constitution is indirectly given to me. That the other ego’s enacting of her
constituting consciousness cannot be directly given to me comes down to originality. My
consciousness is given to me as original because it has a unified temporal context: my
experiences are given such that they belong to me and can be ordered as temporally related
within my experience. The consciousness of the other ego, that is, the enacting of her coconstitution, is structurally incapable of being given in such a unified temporal context.
Because her experiences have a different temporal context than my own, they are
unoriginal. While I do have a direct and original experience of her consciousness, it can
only accord with my unified temporal context insofar as it is an experience of her enacted
conscious activity. The enacting of her consciousness indicated in my direct experience of
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her conscious activity cannot be unified with my temporal context. Thus, the other ego
appears in her inaccessibility, because if the enacting of her consciousness were directly
given to me, or if her experience were given as unified with my temporal context, that is,
originally my experience, then her consciousness would simply be a mode of my own
consciousness, as is the case for my past and possible future consciousnesses. Thus, the
sense of the other ego as a co-constitution must always appear to me as inaccessible.
In Chapter IV, I argue that the final component of the sense of the other ego is the
unique process of verification through which the inaccessible co-constitution comes to its
full givenness. I show that Husserl has a tripartite structure of verification: an empty
intention comes to a coincidence with an intuition, which can be fulfilling, disappointing,
or somewhere in between. I then demonstrate that this tripartite structure is operative at all
levels and in all of the various ways in which the process of verification occurs. For
Husserl, the way in which the process of verification plays out depends upon the content
being verified and the level of consciousness at which this process occurs. I specifically
focus on the unique type of verification that Husserl calls corroboration (Bestätigung), or
a secondary verification, because this horizonal verification occurs on the periphery of
experience. As I attend to this or that object, my continuing experience is given to me as
unified because the horizon of my stream of consciousness is harmonious. Accompanying
my experiences, then, are empty intentions aimed at the horizon of my experiences – the
background noises, the colors and lighting, the emotions and embodied sensations of living
in the world. These empty intentions are largely ignored, such that I do not attend to their
strivings. However, were I to suddenly have a change in my horizonal experience, the
corroboration of said experience would be broken. The process of verification in
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corroboration is unique because the corroborating empty intentions need not coincide with
fulfilling intuitions proper; rather, the empty intentions of corroboration coincide with
empty intentions aimed at the same sort of fulfillment. Thus, the unity of my experience
arises in the continuing corroboration of what is strived for in horizonal empty intentions.
This same sort of verification is at play in the appearance of the other ego, because the
intuitive fulfillment of the other ego cannot arise in the same way as what is strived for in
other verifying syntheses, such as judgment verifications. Rather, the inaccessible coconstituting of the other ego is always verified in the continuously harmonious appearance
of what can only be intended emptily. In this way, the verification of the other ego is a
horizonal corroboration of my intersubjective experience. I cannot verify the appearance
of the other ego through an intuitively fulfilling synthesis, which is obvious from the
analysis of inaccessibility. But, through continuously harmonious intersubjective
experience, the appearance of the other ego becomes verified in the corroboration of the
empty intentions aimed at her inaccessibility.
These three components, then, give the full sense of the other ego as an inaccessible
co-constitution uniquely verified in harmonious syntheses. I end my investigation by
asking how this sense arises. Specifically, I aim to clarify whether or not one must have a
concrete experience of the other ego’s embodied presence in order to constitute the full
sense of the other ego. In order to answer this question, I first look at the static analysis of
the sense of the other ego, which shows that, within my own constituting consciousness,
there is what I call a “structural sense” of the other ego. Because my own stream of
constitution includes the constitutive accomplishment of the other ego, the components of
co-constitution and inaccessibility are given within the structure of my experience of the
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world. However, after exploring Rodemeyer’s genetic analysis of the generation of the
sense of the other ego, I argue that this structural sense is insufficient for the constitution
of the full sense of the other ego because it lacks the unique process of verification. The
verification necessary for the full constitution of the sense of the other ego arises only after
my being affected by the inaccessible co-constitution of the other ego in a concrete
experience of her lived body. Such an experience cashes in the structural sense of the other
ego by unfolding the corroborating intentions that occur in the verification of
intersubjective experience. Without this verification, the structural sense of the other ego
cannot be fully constituted as such and remains merely a structural component of my own
consciousness. Therefore, the constitution of the full sense of the other ego occurs only
when a concrete experience of the other ego cashes in the structural sense of the other ego.
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Chapter I: Description of the Problem
The goal of this work will be to clarify the sense with which the other ego appears in
Husserl’s phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity. Specifically, I am concerned with the
way that Husserl describes the constitution of the sense of the other ego, which means that the
focus of my analysis will be the structures of consciousness in which the other ego appears. Thus,
my concern is how an other ego appears at all, as opposed to how I know specific information
about the appearing other ego. In other words, I am not concerned with how I know that someone
else is happy or sad; rather, the question that I will seek to answer in this following chapters is how
is it that I experience other people at all?
This first chapter will explore the appearance of the other ego as it is distinguished from
the appearance of other things in the world. First, I will explore an example of a Fremderfahrung,
which will show the uniqueness of the appearance of the other ego while offering some basic
phenomenological considerations regarding the experience of world. Next, I will discuss the
importance of the lived body, appresentation, and association. The exploration of these three topics
will show the need for further analysis of the three specific ways in which the appearance of the
other ego is set apart from the appearance of other objects, namely as having a sense of coconstitution, its givenness as accessible through inaccessibility, and its unique verification.
Fremderfahrung, the experience of the other ego, is omnipresent in my general experience
of the world. I am surrounded by other people in my daily life, and even in my isolation, I am
surrounded by the products and possibilities of other egos. There is nothing in this world given to
me such that it does not refer in some way to other egos, either as crafted by or related to them, or
as possible objects for their consciousness. It is the most basic philosophical truism, however, that
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what is closest to us is often the furthest from our understanding. 1 When asked how one
differentiates people from objects, one struggles to give an account. 2 Phenomenology’s answer to
the difficulty of knowing those most intimate yet mundane parts of our experience is to turn to the
things themselves in order to investigate exactly what is given in my experience. 3 Thus, this
investigation into the appearance of the other ego must begin with a description of an encounter
with the other ego. Beginning with this lived experience will allow for the explication of the
manner in which the other ego appears and will serve as a reference point for the subsequent
phenomenological analyses.
Imagine being alone in an unfamiliar house late at night. It is stormy outside, the lights are
flickering, and suddenly you hear a tapping on the window. There are essentially two possibilities
as to the source of the tapping: either there is a natural explanation for the noise (the storm is
rattling the window or a branch is rhythmically rapping against the glass pane) or there is someone
making the noise for some reason. When I go to check the window and see a tree branch bouncing
back and forth in the storm, I am relieved that the sound is nothing to worry about. Were I to notice
someone outside under that branch, I would be quite alarmed. A tree branch brushing against a
window is far less menacing of a threat, because it is not trying to come in and get me. Even if the
branch breaks through the window for some reason, as long as the branch does not land on me, I
am not in danger. The branch cannot try to get me again. A person outside, however, has motives
that I cannot discern, and thus she could be a danger. In considering the possible sources of such
a sound, then, it is quite easy to see that people appear differently to me than mere things. In other
1

For instance, Descartes says that my own mind is traditionally considered the most difficult to know, before then
showing that the mind is the most clearly known thing of all. Even the founding principle of Western philosophy, the
Delphic imperative to “know thyself,” stems from this often overlooked epistemic gap.
2
Often, one struggles to even understand the question. The difference between the appearance of animate and
inanimate objects seems so obvious to most that explaining the focus of my research to anyone outside of the discipline
(and a few in it) occasions a lengthy discussion as to why such a question needs to be asked.
3
All phenomenological dissertations must include this phrase at least once. Check.
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words, I experience objects in my world either animate or inanimate, and this differentiation occurs
immediately. 4
If I discover that the sound is made by an errant branch blowing in the wind, I do not
wonder if that branch is out to get me. Without any thematic thought or complex reasoning, I
understand that the branch is quite obviously a natural phenomenon, moved by natural forces. I
can wonder if the branch is a threat to me, in that the branch could be large enough to break the
glass and injure me in some manner, but such considerations do not posit some malicious intent
on the part of the branch. On the other hand, if I see some stranger outside, my experience of the
source of the sound is quite different. If I wonder about the cause of this person’s rapping on my
window, I do not consider the physics of her motion or the skeletal-muscular apparati that allow
her to create such a sound. I wonder about her intentions: Why is she tapping on the window? Is
she trying to get in? What does she want? All of these considerations also occur without an explicit
reflection on the type of “object” that this stranger is. In other words, I do not have to ask myself
whether or not the thing outside rapping on the window is animate or inanimate, an other ego or a
mere object.

I.1 The lived body and co-constitution
This separation of my world into animate and inanimate objects is a functional part of my
everyday experience. I interact with objects that I can treat as useful or as simply material in certain
ways: I utilize them, move them, ignore them, and do so without any regard for how my actions
impact the object outside of their effect on the object’s utility. The same cannot be said for people,
as I interact with them in an entirely different manner all together. I do not simply utilize or move

4

This is, of course, not to say that there cannot be further classifications of objects, such as between the ideal and the
material.

3

or even ignore animate bodies without realizing that my actions impact them as objects who 5 are
aware of their situation. Of course, this realization could be after the fact, willfully ignored, or
even completely missed, but my experience of an animate body is the experience of a body who
also experiences, even if I pay no attention to said experiencing. So, we can distinguish the two
ways in which these different bodies are given.6
To begin, both appear to me as bodies, in that both are there before me, sensibly
experienced. Both the branch and the stranger appear as bodies extended out into the world and
are given according to my perspective of them. The branch, for instance, reaches out from the tree
trunk to the window and blows in the wind. In the shadows, it is mostly dark, of course, but in the
flash of lightening, I can see that it is covered in bark, wet from the rain, etc. I can see it only from
my perspective, but it is obvious that it has other sides beyond what I can see at the present moment.
The stranger is also given as a body in the same manner: her body has seen and unseen sides,
textures, colors, and other qualities that I can perceive. In other words, both bodies are given to
me as sensible in the same manner.
There is a difference in the way in which the movement of these bodies is given to me,
however. In the case of the branch tapping on the window, there is only a physical, causal system
that can be explained in a natural way: the branch has a certain weight and position, and the wind

5

Notice, further, that we have different pronouns to distinguish these objects, and if I were to put “that” here, as
Microsoft Word so desperately desires, it would read awkwardly. While I am able to ignore desires in the case of any
object, the ignoring of the program’s desires is not a matter of ethical concern. The response to the desires of an
animate object, however, is at the core of ethical investigation.
6
The difficulty in clarifying this sense is magnified when one considers the limits of who we consider to be other
egos. For instance, biologically speaking, plants and animals are animate, in that they are living and moving beings.
Does this mean that we can say plants and animals are other egos? Husserl obviously considered animals to be other
egos. In Ideas II, he uses a cat for an example in his exploration of the naturalistic way we encounter other egos
(Husserl 1989, 183-197). Of course, there are limitations to the egoic activity of animals and plants. My cat, for
instance, cannot write poetry, but neither can my two year old nephew. The determination of how much of a person,
or how highly functioning, is not at stake here. That we can entertain variations on the scale of being an ego already
places them within the class of other egos.
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blowing with such a force is able to move the branch such that it forcibly impacts the glass pane
of the window. 7 The force of the impact causes the branch to bounce back into the blowing wind,
starting the process over again. The branch is not trying to get my attention, nor is it trying to get
inside. The branch is incapable of trying anything, as there is nothing more to its appearance than
meets eye. On the other hand, were a stranger outside, the same causal explanations could be at
play (her bodily mechanisms causing her hand to rap on the window, for instance), but there is
something more accompanying these motions that turns them from movements into actions. She
wants something; she is doing something. Her movements have intentions to them that aim at some
goal or another. She experiences the situation with me. This is precisely what the branch is lacking,
the “more” that accompanies these movements.
In German, this distinction is easily evidenced by the usage of two words for the human
body: Körper, which is a merely material body, and Leib, which is often translated as “lived
body”.8 The branch, which appears as mechanically moved, is not a lived body; it does not move
itself or engage its environment in a spontaneous manner. The stranger, on the other hand, moves
in a different manner. First, the stranger sees me see her (or even if she does not see me seeing her,
she could turn at any moment and see me there). Both she and the branch are wet, but I can tell
that stranger feels wet in the same way that I would. Her body appears as sensing the world,
experiencing it bodily in the same manner that I do. The wind blows against the branch and the
stranger equally, but the branch does not brace itself against the wind. In other words, the branch

7

Husserl also calls this mechanical movement in (Husserl 1989, 159/152).
The technical philosophical usage of these terms in this way originates with Husserl. I will now use the term lived
body to distinguish the animate body of an ego from inanimate bodies to conform to the literature. It is awkward,
though, to maintain this terminology in all cases.
8
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does not feel the wind on its body. 9 The body of the stranger, on the other hand, gives itself as
enduring the wind, feeling its chill, which is why the stranger appears as having a lived body.
Second, the stranger also appears as bracing herself against the wind, as wanting to get out
of the rain, as trying to get into the house; in other words, the stranger is given as a body that senses
the world and acts within it. Of course, it is possible that I misread her intentions. It could be that
she is enjoying the rain or basking in the wind. What I am not able to misread, however, is that the
stranger is engaged in some way with the world. I cannot think the stranger is suffering the rain
only to find out that the rain does not affect her. Even if she ignores the rain, her inattention to it
is a way of engaging the world. A lived body, then, is given as experiencing the world as I do. It
moves intentionally, focused on objects in the world and oriented towards goals accomplished by
utilizing those objects. If the inanimate body of the branch is moved causally, mechanically, the
lived body of the stranger is given as motivated.10 Phenomenologically, motivations are what pull
consciousness one way or the other in its living stream of experience. For example, Husserl talks
about prominences in our sensible fields motivating the constitution of objects: the outline of a
person illuminated by the flash of lightening motivates me to constitute someone outside. 11 In a
similar way, the perspectival givenness of an object leads me to investigate its other sides to fully
flesh out its appearance. 12 I am motivated, then, to experience my world in this or that way as my

9

Of course, plants are living beings, as well, even if their engagement with the world is so vastly different from our
own. While the fine distinction between a plant’s vital activity and animal activity is not up for debate in this scenario,
it is important that we do recognize the vastness of possible foreign conscious experience. So, let us imagine this
branch to be detached from the tree and simply wedged among other branches, a lifeless piece of wood.
10
The difference between causality as the natural relation between bodies and motivation as the relation between
intentional acts is explored in (Husserl 1989, 241-247/229-236). Husserl distinguishes relations between real subjects
and objects from relations between subjects and things “as such”. This may seem unimportant, but such a distinction
uncovers vastly different systems of dependence and relation. Further, these different systems of relation appear to
me differently, such that the object of our intention is treated in completely different manners.
11
The relation between prominence and affection, and this relation’s role in constitution, is explored in Chapter II of
APS.
12
This path of following the motivations that lead to the constitution of the other ego is the real work of CM5, and
Husserl says as much from the outset: “We must, after all, obtain for ourselves insight into the explicit and implicit
intentionality wherein the alter ego becomes evinced and verified in the realm of our transcendental ego; we must
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conscious life unfolds. This is also how the movements of a lived body appear: as motivated toward
some aim or another. The stranger is given as trying to get into the house for some reason or
another, which means that her actions appear as motivated. Thus, when a body moves in a
motivated as opposed to mechanistic manner, that body appears as a lived body. 13
The lived body, that is, a body that senses the world and is motivationally engaged in the
world, is described by Husserl as a governed body (Husserl 1999, 91/123, 120/148-149).14 The
appearance of a body that feels wet and wants to get out of the rain is the appearance of an
embodied ego oriented towards the world in a certain manner. She wants to get out of the rain, to
change her position, which gives me her lived body as another center of experience. My own ego
is given to me as the center of my consciousness, the center from which my engagement with the
world goes forth. Thus, Husserl refers to the center of my consciousness as a midpoint, in that all

discover in what intentionalities, syntheses, motivations, the sense “other ego” becomes fashioned in me and, under
the title, harmonious experience of someone else, becomes verified as existing and even as itself there in its own
manner” (Husserl 1999, 90/122, emphasis added).
13
In this quick exploration of motivation, it is important to note that I am not distinguishing between what Husserl
calls the motivations of reason and passive motivations (Husserl 1989, 231-239/220-228). This is because in both
cases, the motivation is one of content as opposed to structure, and this is the general motivation at play in the
appearance of the other ego. When we speak of a part of a painting motivating me to concentrate my attention on it or
change my view, we are speaking of rational, thematic, and active motivations, what could be called motivations of
choice. Passive motivations, such as the association of prominences according to similarity or homogeneity are not
actively chosen, but I think these can still be grouped under what Husserl calls the “in consequence of”, which I am
calling motivations of content. Such motivations can be unearthed (he refers to the work of psychoanalysis and
unconscious motivations), but they are arguably dependent upon content to drive them – the similar shapes of the
objects on the wall show me a collection of signs and not disparate objects, for instance. In contrast to this, there are
some motivations that are not “in consequence of” a driving content, and I call these structural motivations.
Specifically, Husserl mentions the formal motivations of internal time consciousness, as when there is an unexpected
occurrence (like a loud sound outside). These structural motivations seem to function in both motivations of reason,
“the judgmental [and thus thematic] positing ‘Now this is’ conditions the futural positing ‘Something will be,’ or
again, ‘Now I have a lived experience’ conditions ‘It was a lived experience previously,’” and passive motivations,
“prior to the judgment [and thus in passivity] the temporal forms themselves motivate each other” (Husserl 1989,
239/227). I do not employ this distinction in these investigations because the other ego appears as a system of
motivations of content, and such motivations of content seem to also give structural motivations of inner time
consciousness. However, as I will explore throughout the work, the other ego is given as having such conscious
structures through its having the contents of such structures. The relationship of the givenness of one implying the
givenness of the other, of a unity of givenness even though one side (the other’s egoic structures) are properly unable
to be given, is the underlying focus of this work, and no easy answer can be given as to this relation. In fact, any
answer may only be hinted at in the end.
14
Rodemeyer ties governing with affectivity to show the importance of affectivity in the constitution of the other ego
(Rodemeyer 2006, 192).
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experiences of the world flow through me as the essential node of the experiential world (Husserl
1989, 6/116).15 Given to me as the center of this engagement with the world is my own lived body;
every experience is experienced as or in reference to my lived body as my here.16 In the case of
the tapping of the window, I have an auditory sensation locates the sound as coming from
somewhere else. This “somewhere else” is in relation to the “here” of my body, specifically the
“here” of my ear hearing the sound over there. If I turn to look at the window and see the branch
or the stranger, I see them from where I am, from the “here” of my lived body.
An inanimate body does not appear as if it is governed, and thus is not the center of
experience. The branch does not appear as if it is trying to tap on the window or attempting to get
in from the storm. It appears over there, but with nothing more to it. The unfortunate person
standing in the rain, on the other hand, appears with intentions, mysterious or otherwise. She sees
me from where she is, hears my scream of surprise at finding someone outside in the rain. In other
words, she appears as a center of experience, a lived body over there with its own “here”. The
lived body of the other ego, then, appears as a “there” that is also a “here” (Husserl 1999, 117/146).
Thus, the lived body of the other ego appears to me as a center of an other consciousness motivated
to engage in the world in an entirely different although structurally equivalent manner. As a
midpoint for my world, the other appears to me first as a surrounding point – an object for me in
my experience of the world; however, Husserl notes that this surrounding point is experienced as
another midpoint also, albeit a midpoint for itself (Husserl 2006, 6/116).

15

Phenomenology departs from some other philosophical traditions, in particular German Idealism, in its privilege of
the first-person experience (I) over some detached, second- (we) or third-person (one) perspective. Such a move is
necessary, according to Husserl, because the subjective component of all inquiry, philosophical or scientific, is often
overlooked, if not ignored entirely. See also (Husserl 1969, 33-39/29-36); (Husserl 1970, 353-378).
16
See (Husserl 1989, §41); (Husserl 1999, §53-55); (Husserl 2006, §4-5).
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The appearance of the other ego as another midpoint, as a “there” that is also a “here”, is
the appearance of another stream of constituting consciousness in the world. Thus, the other ego
appears with the sense of “co-constitution”. In Chapter II, I argue that Husserl employs a two-fold
sense of the co-constitution of the other ego. The other ego appears both in her co-constituting the
world and in my experience of the world as co-constituted. I then show, using Dan Zahavi’s work
on transcendental intersubjectivity, that this two-fold sense of co-constitution supports what I call
a transcendental sense of co-constitution. In order to clarify this transcendental sense, that is, in
order to show that the constitutive contribution of the other ego is a structural component of
consciousness, I must show the unique manner in which this sense of the other ego is given. As
stated above, both animate and inanimate bodies are given as having other aspects not immediately
seen, as adumbrated. In addition, animate bodies have something more, the appearance as
governed, as a center of another experience. This “something more” is not given in the same way
as the other aspects of bodies.

I.2 Appresentation and inaccesibility
I have experiences of “something more” because of the very structure of experience. 17
Phenomenologically speaking, all spatial objects are more than what is immediately presented
because perception is always perspectival, i.e., I only properly have one side of the object in any
particular perceptual activity. As described above, a body is given in simple, static perception
through adumbrations that depend upon my spatial location relative to the body, and my
17

The following analysis is primarily based in my reading of Husserl’s APS and CM5. However, Lampert explores
this concept as developed in Husserl’s Logical Investigations, particularly as the demand for supplementation
(Ergänzungsbedurftigkeit) (Lampert 1995, 81-83, 140-142 has a wonderful analysis of Husserl's example of a
patterned tapestry partially blocked by a piece of furniture). I find Lampert’s analyses of the demand for
supplementation in Logical Investigations to closely mirror Husserl’s work on the inner and outer horizons of
perception. It would be interesting to trace the development of this concept from Husserl’s early work through his socalled transcendental turn and his analyses of passive synthesis.
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perspective can change depending upon my kinesthetic movement or the movement of the object
itself. I never sensibly perceive my water bottle in one fell swoop; rather, I see it from a perspective,
or multiple perspectives over time, and constitute these multiple perspectives as those of a unified
spatial object, this water bottle. Phenomenologically, I am presented the side facing me and
appresented18 the other sides, the interior, its contents, etc. – all of these are given as part of the
same object, the water bottle, although not immediately presented in this given perspective. The
relation between the presented and the appresented is not one of indication or signaling, because I
do not see my current perspective of the bottle as signaling some other side that I can explore
further through subsequent acts of consciousness. Instead, these multiple perspectives are copresent for me; I perceive my individual perspective of the water bottle, and the other sides
accompany this perception are carried with it. 19 They are given in the same experience of the
object, which Husserl describes as a community of perception: presentation and appresentation
“are so fused that they stand within the functional community of one perception, which
simultaneously presents and appresents, and yet furnishes for the total object a consciousness of
its being itself there” (Husserl 1999, 122/150-151). This is why I experience things as opposed to
the mere perspectives of physical objects.

18

The functional importance of apperception for the phenomenological method writ large cannot be understated. As
Husserl writes, apperception is “a consciousness that is not only conscious of something within itself in general, but
at the same time intends this something as a motivation for a consciousness of something else; thus… a consciousness
that points to this other one as the one that belongs to it, as what is motivated through it” (Husserl 2001, 627/339).
Apperception accompanies all grasping of content as a grasping of the “more” given with the explicit content: the
backside of a spatial object or the temporal path, both traveled and to come, of any temporal entity. This
phenomenological broadening of perception through apperception, as perception is overrun with more than what is
merely perceived, gives a phenomenological experience that is not exhausted by the mere perception of objects as
present. Rather, phenomenological experience is of the absent, the fleeting, the just missed, and to some degree, as we
shall see, the unperceivable proper. This ability for phenomenology to investigate a varied experience, what in the end
is a living experience, not merely human, affords it a place in the investigations of science as well as religion and art,
realms of the perceivable and realms of the ineffable.
19
For a description of apperception in relation to the appearance of the other ego, see (Husserl 2006, 150/225).
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These appresented sides are given such that they are capable of being made the object of
perceptions proper. If I see my water bottle and notice, upon closer inspection, that it has a scratch
in it, I can focus on that scratch to investigate its depth or color. The apperceived scratch can
become the object of my perception, such that I can investigate it further and make it come to a
fuller givenness. 20 I move my face closer toward the scratch or rub my finger over it; thankfully,
it was just a smudge, and my bottle is not permanently damaged. In all of these cases, the bottle
gives itself in presentations of aspects that I perceive and appresentations of further possible
aspects that I apperceive. 21 This goes for all spatial objects, even the body of the other ego. If I
only see the branch outside rapping against the window, its other sides, unseen by me, are
appresented to me; I see it as an object with depth. When I see a stranger outside, I am also given
appresented sides, as she too appears with depth. If the front of her coat is wet, the backside of her
coat is given as likely wet as well. 22 The same perceptual structures are at play even in my
perception of my own lived body. When I perceive my legs, they are given as more than just the
skin covering a quad muscle. My hamstring is co-given, apperceived. 23
All of these appresentations of “something more”, however, can be transformed into
presentations in some manner. I can see the other side of my water bottle by moving it or moving
myself in relation to it. I can see the other side of the stranger’s coat. I can even find the interior

20

Husserl calls this the exploration of inner horizons (Husserl 2001, 43/7). I can also explore more fully the outer
horizon, as when I see an odd line of paint on the ground, and I realize that the parking lot in which I am standing also
serves as a hockey rink.
21
Husserl does not employ a rigorous distinction between “apperception” and “appresentation” in his work.
Rodemeyer, following Held, uses “appresentation” to discuss the presentation of aspects given along with the
immediately given aspect of an object and “apperception” to discuss “meanings indicated in the broader horizons of
the object” (Rodemeyer 2006, 120). I attempt to maintain this distinction, but Rodemeyer also notes in the same
passage that Husserl himself confuses these two uses in his discussion of the apperception of the other ego in CM5.
22
And the backside of her coat is appresented itself.
23
An example of co-given consciousnesses of the lived body comes from the sensations of touch and pressure. When
I sit on a chair, I feel the pressure of the resistance of the chair and the texture of the fabric on my legs. These sensations
are co-given, and I often ignore one or the other, or even both, in my experience of the chair.
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of my body presented to me if I were to have a serious accident or a sharp enough knife with a
devil-may-care attitude. In other words, the “more” given in the perception of any external object
can always be made into the merely perceived.
The other ego, however, resists any and all such attempts to be presented as such, to be
made the object of a perception in the strict sense. There is no presentation that could be given to
me through which the other ego becomes present to me in the same way as is possible for the other
side of my water bottle. There is no scientific instrument that can break open the stranger outside
or any other person such that their egos would be revealed. The appresentation through which the
other ego is given is, thus, special in the sense that it cannot be made a presentation, which is
unique to the givenness of the other ego (Husserl 1999, 109/139).24
This does not mean that the other ego is merely inferred or supposed, as what is apperceived
is as much phenomenologically given as that which is perceived (Husserl 2001, 624-627/336-340).
Nor does this mean that we can say nothing of the other ego or that it is beyond our
phenomenological reach. Rather, the other ego has a special mode of givenness, in that it is always
apperceived as in some manner beyond our grasp; Husserl calls this the inaccessibility of the other
ego. The normal understanding of inaccessibility causes me to distinguish between the
inaccessibility of the other ego and what can be called the not-readily-available of other inanimate
bodies. In both the body of the branch and the body of the stranger, taken purely as physical things,
I can conceivably enumerate the parts and boundaries of their body, separate the molecules into
different types, and eventually make visible or in some conceivable way physically discernable
the various components that “make up” the interiority of each. Even if we think that this is difficult,

24

That Husserl did not explore this special sense of apperception with regards to what makes its special was bemoaned
by Fink in a discussion with Schutz. I agree with Fink, although I think Husserl has left us the tools and ample analyses
of his own that can be used in such an exploration.
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the appresented interiorities of the branch and the stranger’s body are able to become presented.
In some way, I can grasp every material bit of both as being there before me. However, there is a
second sense of interiority that a rock or any other merely physical body lacks in its essence,
because it can never be made available in the way possible for atoms or other particles that make
up physical bodies, no matter the level of skill or technology. 25 This interiority is given as absolute
and, thus, inaccessible to me, and further, it is given as such in every experience of an other ego.
Thus, I can break open a branch to see the wooden flesh inside, but I cannot break open the stranger
to find out what she is doing. 26 With this insight, Husserl gives us the wonderful paradox of the
other ego’s being given as accessible in her inaccessibility, which will be the focus of Chapter III.

I.3 Association, pairing, and a unique type of verification
Finally, this paradox presents an obvious difficulty: how does that which is given as
inaccessible distinguish itself from that which is simply not given? In other words, how can I know
that the figure I see outside is a person standing in the rain as opposed to a shadow or a figment of
my imagination? This problem shows that the clarification of the sense of the other ego as coconstitution and the givenness of the other ego in her inaccessibility do not adequately account for
the appearance of the other ego, because there is a unique sense of verification that must be in play
in the appearance of this inaccessible sense of co-constitution. In other words, the special

25

Even if consciousness is physically based, and I am by no means arguing that it is or is not, there is no physical
component that “represents” it such that it could be physically manipulated. If there were to be some eventual science
that could physically manipulate consciousness in some manner, and one could argue that such a science has been in
existence since the discovery of fermentation, it would still not allow the lived experience of the other ego to be
accessible to me. Rather, it would merely consist of a causal manipulation on the physical situation of the
consciousness, whose lived experience would still remain at a distance from the manipulators. Sartre makes a similar
point in Being and Nothingness (Sartre 1984, 337).
26
The film Gone Girl begins with the husband looking down at his wife as she rests her head on his chest, and he
contemplates how he can figure out what she’s really thinking. He even ponders if he could bust open her skull in
order to actually figure it all out. This illustrates quite strikingly, especially as the movie progresses, the inaccessibility
of the other ego.
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givenness of the other ego (as inaccessible) requires a unique accomplishing of sense-bestowal
and constitution. In order to understand this accomplishment, I must clarify the way in which
association functions for Husserl. Because association is at play in many facets of the constitution
of the other ego, clarifying this concept now will make it easier to undertake the work of later
chapters.
Husserl uses association in various ways depending upon the level of consciousness at
which he is operating. He discusses the grouping of various objects or cultural predicates as
associative synthesis at the active level of consciousness, and at lower levels of consciousness, the
passive structure of association is at play in the very constitution of objects as individuated. Thus,
the way in which association functions at different levels, particularly with regard to what contents
are associated, varies according to the level at which Husserl is operating. As Husserl explains in
APS:
The most general connections of prominent objects that are determined with respect
to content are obviously similarity or uniformity and non-similarity; or let us say
more concisely: connections of homogeneity and connections of heterogeneity.
…Where real objects are concerned, there are surely good reasons for contending
that mere similarity does not create any kind of connection, any real connection
between them. That two people are similar to one another, for example, with respect
to their noses, does not produce any real bond between them. However, we are
speaking about immanent data, for example, about concrete color-data in the unity
of a streaming preset, thus, that are given to consciousness in immanent coexistence
under some longer constituting duration. But these necessarily have a unity through
consciousness, a unity of kinship, as similar to one another or uniform with one
another… This kinship has its degrees and according to them it unites them now
more strongly, now more weakly. (Husserl 2001, 175/129)
Thus, for Husserl, at the lowest levels of consciousness, association functions according to,
primarily, the kinship of the contents of my experience, the similarity. At higher levels, association
occurs also in terms of “mutual pertinence”, “connection”, “arrangement”, and, as Lampert
discusses prominently, “forward and backward references” (Husserl 1976, 273-274), (Lampert
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1995).27 However, when speaking of the role of association in the constitution of the other ego,
Husserl has in mind the lower, passive levels of consciousness discussed in the citation above. At
this level, the associative synthesis functions in phenomenology as the synthesis of identity and
individuation in the constitution of the world (Husserl 2001, 162-167/117–122). To further
distinguish the difference in association across levels, I will explore Lanei Rodemeyer’s analysis
of associative acts as being grouped into three types: reproductive, motivated, and primordial
associations (Rodemeyer 2006, 92-100).28 Doing so will allow help to clarify the special form of
association that occurs in my experience of the other ego, pairing.
Reproductive association is the act in which the content of the living present is intuitively
(or even non-intuitively) given such that it brings to mind similar content, as in a memory. For
instance, as I am waiting out the thunderstorm in the spooky house, I am reminded of a horror
movie that I saw with a very similar setting. The sound of the rain battering the roof and the flashes
of lightning outside are eerily similar to those used in the climatic scene of the film. So, my present
experience of being in a spooky house during a storm causes me to reproduce my experience of
watching the film; the one reminds me of the other. Rodemeyer calls this an immediate association,
because similar experiences in different situations, in this case, the flashes of lightning and the
sound of the rain, become linked (Rodemeyer 2006, 93). It is also possible, however, that one

27

Thank you to Jay Lampert for pointing out the passage in the Logical Investigations wherein Husserl talks about
association generally. While Lampert still focuses on association through difference in his work with Husserl, I do
think that the importance of similarity underlying the individuation accomplished by difference is more important,
especially as the passive levels of consciousness. Husserl calls this underlying similarity a fusion at-a-distance
(Fernverschmelzung). As Husserl says, “Each term of the multiplicity is a term for itself through contrast, but they are
not opposed to each other; indeed, they are especially united with one another by a fusion without contrast, for
example, red specks on a white ground. Alternately, inherent in every contrast that remains a phenomenon of
homogeneity, there is something of fusion that unites the concrete data homogenously and at the same time disturbs
concretion by rupturing its continuity. …Since data that are prominent for themselves become united in a
discontinuous fashion, fusion here is a fusion at-a-distance” (Husserl 2001, 185-186/139).
28
I am glossing over further distinctions Rodemeyer makes between immediate and mediate reproductive associations,
and between primordial associations of presently given contents as a whole and primordial associations of a content
as this or that experienced type. This latter type of primordial association, wherein an object is constituted as a certain
type, will become important in later discussions on verification.
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experience reminds me of a completely dissimilar experience. If the lightning flashes and sound
of the rain remind me of the horror movie, I can also recall with whom I watched that movie, such
that the present situation has reminded me of an old friend. Rodemeyer calls this a mediate
reproductive association, because I am still reproducing the consciousness of an old friend, though
she is not here in the present experience as the source of an immediate association. In both cases,
reproductive association awakens some other conscious act, which Husserl summarizes in an
“essential law”:
Every awakening goes from an impressional present or a present that is already
non-intuitively or intuitively reproduced toward another reproduced present. This
relationship, or as we can say forthwith, this synthesis presupposes a ‘bridging
term’, something similar; from here the bridge arches across as a special synthesis
by means of similarity. Transmitted in this way, a present enters into a universal
synthesis with another past present, correlatively a full consciousness of the present
enters into a universal synthesis with another submerged consciousness of the
present, a synthesis which serves as the framework for special syntheses of
awakening and for special reproductions. (Husserl 2001, 168/123)
In the case of reproductive associations it is not a clear matching of one content to another, as I
never relive the exact same experience. When I see a cat on a street, there is a relation that comes
about between my immediate seeing of this cat in front of me and my memories of my own cat .
Husserl describes this relation as a pointing towards or referring from the one to the reproduced
other, but a relation that lacks signs and designation (Anzeige und Bezeichnung) (Husserl 2001,
166/121). That which refers and is reproduced is prominent, and these prominences act as the
bridging term. 29 When two contents share a similar prominence, this similarity functions as a
bridge between them, associating them as related. As Husserl notes, these associations need not
always be explicit, such that the bridging term may not always be available to me consciously or

29

It is important to note that this bridging is common to all associations, even though it is first introduced in Husserl’s
analyses of reproductive associations. Husserl also discusses the way in which objectivities can be grouped according
to different bridging terms such that I can associate shapes, colors, or other qualities together to make different
groupings out of the same given set of things (Husserl 2001, 177-178/131-132).
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only so with great effort. For example, the red of the leaves in autumn can remind of me of the
color of my wife’s hair, but this need not be an explicit connection. Thus, when I see the trees
changing outside my window and I remember that I forgot to fill the car with gas, the implicit
chain of the color of the leaves to my wife’s hair to her need to drive the car to work in the morning
need not all come to the fore. 30 Thus, in reproductive associations something prominent in my
living present is linked with a prominence in a different consciousness, 31 but I need not be
explicitly aware of these connections.
Rodemeyer shows that if one generalizes the linking of experiences that occurs in
reproductive association, there is a different type of association that underlies most of our
experiences, which she calls “motivated associations” (Rodemeyer 2006, 93-94). Not all present
experiences remind me of other specific experiences. For instance, when I hear the storm raging
outside, I do not necessarily think of the last storm I was in, nor do I recall some other specific
storm from my past in a reproductive act. Still, I know that the thunder occurs after the lightning
strikes and both are connected to the rain and the wind as part of the storm. This is because my
experience of this particular storm brings to mind what Rodemeyer calls “general memories” that
inform the way in which I expect situations to unfold (Rodemeyer 2006).32 Through my numerous
experiences of storms, I have developed a general type of storm that allows me to group similar
events together. 33 Storms have cloud cover, generally rain, and sometimes thunder and lightning.

30

I particularly enjoy Husserl’s example of this, as he describes listening to a talk when suddenly a “magnificent
seascape” springs to mind (Husserl 2001, 167/122). When he dwells upon this association, he realizes that the talk
caused him to recall something discussed while he was vacationing at the sea over the summer.
31
Husserl calls the “pointing towards” of what is present to what is associated a tendency of the ego to be directed
from the present to something reproductively re-presented (reproduktiv Vergegenwärtigte) (Husserl 2001, 166/121).
This tendency works in conjunction with the prominence of the associated content to explain the motivation for the
associating.
32
These general memories will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V.
33
Nietzsche calls this the equaling of the unequal and attributes it to the rational activity of consciousness (Nietzsche
1954, 46)
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Often storms are windy, and there can be hail, tornadoes, a darkening of the sky. Of course, there
are ways in which this appearance can vary and still fit into my type of experience that is a storm, 34
but were the earth to shake, the experience would not be a storm. This, then, is what Rodemeyer
means by a general memory, and motivated associations occur when a present experience awakens
a general memory that shapes the way in which I expect the experience to unfold. As Rodemeyer
says, motivated associations “give us general expectations about the experience we face now,
because of their similarities with the current situation” (Rodemeyer 2006, 94).
There is one final type of association necessary to explain the way in which my experience
unfolds. Within my immediate experience, associative structures are at work. As I encounter this
or that object, motivated associations are awakened that frame the way objects are seen, both
figuratively, in that I may value certain objects or be afraid of others based on past experiences
that typify things in certain ways, 35 and literally, in that I notice various aspects or components of
an object based upon my familiarity with its kind. This is what Rodemeyer means when she says
that “[f]ar retentions, through motivated association and with the activity of apperception, guide
my protentions and expectations in a much wider sense. They are the source of my anticipation of
certain patterns and structures, not only in physical objects but also in my own activities, in ideas,
in social interrelations, and so on” (Rodemeyer 2006, 96). However, in order for these motivated
associations to pertain to experiences in my immediate present, there is an originary type of
association that links what is immediately given in the now with “originarily retained structures,
causing me to perceive objects as belonging to certain types, and thereby awakening my motivated

34

For instance, in Pittsburgh, because of some weird topographical feature, you can be standing directly in a ray of
sunshine while being rained on.
35
The exploration of the formation of such typfications and the motivated associations awakened in our experience of
race and gender are one of the major phenomenological contributions to critical race and gender studies. As an
example, see (Nethery IV 2018).
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associations of similar structures in past experiences” (Rodemeyer 2006, 98). Rodemeyer calls
these primordial associations, and they function primarily as a basis for the motivated and
reproductive associations, in that they allow for the structures of consciousness to participate in
the building of experience. For instance, she describes the experience of a table, saying that I have
“a certain active association so that I see that table automatically as a typical whole… as opposed
to seeing it as several elements or as part of a different structure. My primordial association, in
other words, causes me to see that table as one entity in itself, immediately” (Rodemeyer 2006,
98-99). Further, one could say that there is an associative link between the unified entity that is the
table and the general memories within far retention that allows for the awakening of motivated
associations based on those general memories.
I will utilize these latter two types of association and their function in the constitution of
objects in Chapter V. For the moment, it is important to note that association acts according to the
similarity (or dissimilarity) of the prominences brought into relation, and these connective
associations with respect to the data of sensation “have a unity through consciousness, a unity of
kinship, as similar to one another or uniform with one another” (Husserl 2001, 175/129, emphasis
added). However, association need not be total, as in the case of identity; rather, association admits
of a gradation. As Husserl points out, “[i]n comparing matters with similar characteristics we find
two things that stand out, (i) the synthetic coinciding in a commonality, that is, in a sameness, and
yet (ii) the synthetic conflict of particular matters of this commonality that repress one another
reciprocally in the process of overlapping” (Husserl 2001, 176/130). That association is a synthesis
of coincidence and conflict is particularly important in Husserl’s discussion of the special
associative syntheses in which the other ego appears, the act of pairing.
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When I encounter another lived body in the world, it is given to me as moving, and thus
behaving, in the same way that I do. The similarity 36 of the movements between my own body and
the body of the other gives rise to an associative link between the bodies, specifically a motivated
association (Husserl 1999, 112-113/141-144). I know that my body is a lived body, the locus of
my motivated constitution of the world. I encounter the lived body of the other ego as moving and
engaging in the world in a similar way. I see both the branch and the stranger outside getting wet
in the rain, but only the stranger is suffering through it. Both are rapping at the window, but only
the stranger is trying to get in. When I see the body of the stranger move in ways that appear to be
similar to my own movements (orienting and engaged in the world), the association between the
two bodies gives both bodies a new layer of sense. Husserl calls this an “apperceptive transfer of
sense,” because in my apperception of the other ego, which is given in one perception with the
other ego’s body, the sense of egoic living is transferred from my own lived body to the body of
the other ego (Husserl 1999, 110-111/140).37 This assertion, presented in CM5, is the basis for
many critiques of Husserl’s analyses of the appearance of the other ego, because many argue that
Husserl is reducing the other ego to the appearance of my own ego, that is, limiting the other ego
to a mere reproduction of my own ego. 38 However, we must be careful to consider why Husserl
discusses the appearance in this manner.

36

Recall that at this level of association, the passive level, what is associated is based not on conscious activities of
recognition and reflection but on the grouping of similar prominences together.
37
It is important to note that this is a mutual transfer or sense, as Husserl notes that “we find… a living mutual
awakening and an overlaying of each with the objective sense of the other. This overlaying can bring a total or partial
coincidence, which in any particular instance has its degree… As a result of this overlaying, there takes place in the
paired data a mutual transfer of sense” (Husserl 1999, 113/142). This transfer of sense, however, is not symmetrical,
in that what is transferred from on to the other is a totally new sense in each case. Thus, there is a beautiful mutual
asymmetry, which will be further explored in Chapter V.
38
The first such example of this as a student of Husserl’s, Theodor Celms. Celms studied with Husserl prior to the
writing of Cartesian Meditations and anticipated this potential problem in Husserl’s analyses of intersubjectivity. For
a discussion of Celms’s critique and the problematic reading upon which it is based, see (Parker 2013).
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Husserl is trying to describe the appearance of a phenomenon that is given only as
inaccessible, and yet in its inaccessibility, there is an abundance of sense – other people do not
appear as wonders to me, as if I always thought that I was the only one with a conscious
engagement in the world. So we have the paradox mentioned above: there is so much given in
what is not given, or at least in what does not appear in the usual manner. Husserl looks at what is
given, and the answer is the body of the other ego. This body has an appresented layer of sense
that does not come to presentation like all other aspects of objects. But, there are associative
structures that bestow such sense in my normal flow of experience, and these are operative in my
experience of other egos as well. Husserl says that the association of my body with the body of the
other ego and the apperceptive transfer of sense that occurs in this association leads to an
“analogizing apprehension” of the body of the other ego as a lived body (Husserl 1999, 111/140).
Of course, he is careful to separate this analogy from an inference, as it is based upon the
apperceptive structure of consciousness and not on a higher level of inductive thought. Rodemeyer
makes the same point in clarifying the operation of motivated associations: “the ‘analogy’ is a
similarity between similar objects, and then a certain expectation is ‘awakened’ upon my new
experience of a similar object” (Rodemeyer 2006, 93).39 So, the other ego as encountered bodily
is linked in its co-constituting through a motivated association with my own embodied
consciousness, such that its body appears as a lived body that is the zero-point of an inaccessible
stream of consciousness. 40 This is why Husserl describes the appearance of the other ego as a

39

Of course, Rodemeyer is discussing the usage of analogy by Husserl in a completely different text, but I do not see
why the clarification would change because of this.
40
This assertion leads to the critique that the lived body of the other ego does not appear to me in the same way that
my own lived body does, which would make such an association impossible. To my knowledge, this was first raised
by Schutz: “The other body is visually perceived, but my body is not, as a rule, visually perceived by me, and even if
it is, then only partially. My living body is, to be sure, always present and given as the primal instituting organ. But it
is present in inner perception of its boundaries and through the kinaesthetic experience of its functioning. It is thus
present precisely in a way which is as dissimilar as possible from the external perception of an animate body other
than mine and therefore can never lead to an analogical apperception” (Schutz 1975, 63). Rodemeyer makes a similar
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“there” that is also a “here”, and does so in CM5 by working through the associations at work in
the constitution of the other ego (Husserl 1999, 116-117/146-147).
However, as noted previously in the passage from Rodemeyer above, these associative
structures are at play in all of my experiences, so they are not unique to the appearance of the other
ego. While these structures will be explored with more depth, what is unique to the appearance of
the other ego is the process of verification. When I am given this or that object, there are numerous
motivated associations at play that give rise to various expectations. However, in the experience
of the other ego these expectations cannot be fulfilled in the same way as in the experience of
inanimate objects. Thus, Chapter IV will explore the unique form of verification that allows for
the co-constitution of the other ego that is given as inaccessible to distinguished from something
that is not given. In other words, Chapter IV explores the verificatory structures that allow me to
be sure that the stranger I saw in the flash of a lightning was not, in fact, just an oddly shaped bush.

******************************

The path for this dissertation, then, will investigate the three necessary parts of the
appearance of the other ego, co-constitution, inaccessibility, and verification, in separate analyses.
After fully elucidating these components of the sense of the other ego, I end with a question about
the generation of the sense of the other. Specifically, I will clarify whether or not one must have a
concrete experience of the other ego in order to generate the sense of the ego. Further, it must be
determined whether or not there must be a primally instituting experience of the other ego’s

point (Rodemeyer 2006, 163). However, I argue that what is associated in pairing is not my body with the other ego’s
body; rather, the association is between the engagement of the other ego’s body and my own embodied engagement.
In Chapter II, I will discuss this with more depth as the co-constituting of an other ego, and the constituting activity
itself, as embodied, is what is associated.
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embodied presence. In order to answer this question, I will look at Rodemeyer’s genetic account
of the intersubjective experience in her monograph Intersubjective Temporality.
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Chapter II: Co-constitution
The appearance of other egos is distinguished from the appearance of mere objects in that
other egos appear as inhabiting the world with me. That other egos inhabit the world with me
means that I experience the world as shared with them, as there for them as well. The objects in
my world, including my own body and the bodies of other egos, are also objects for other egos.
So, I live in a shared world with other egos who appear to me through their living engagement
with the world. However, my experience of their living in the world is not the same as my
experience of my own living engagement, 41 in that our experiencing and thinking is not a
participation in the same, identical act. Rather, the other ego appears as having her own perspective
of the world, her own interests, and the world appears as having aspects that pertain to the other
ego. Thus, the other ego appears through what Husserl calls co-constitution, that is, an
experiencing of the world that accompanies my own experiencing of it: 42
We human-monads, we all, co-constituting subjects, co-bearers of our world, coexperiencing, co-thinking, not each absolutely, but rather in a certain harmony of
which each co-bearer is conscious and indeed becomes experienceable as not
merely delivering the same results of experience and thought, but rather as
reciprocally the same, complementarily [in Ergänzungen] determining the same
objects, in an acceptance that must propagate from subject to subject by
overreaching itself. (Husserl 1973c, 162)43
The co-constitution of the other ego is given to me in two ways. On the one hand, we have the coconstituting, the co-bearing, the co-experiencing, and the co-thinking in which we all engage. This
means that I constitute the world, and that the act of co-constituting as performed by the other ego

41

This will be explored with more depth in Chapter III with a look at inaccessibility.
Even the question of animal consciousness boils down to the ability of animals to co-constitute the world. “[W]enn
die Tiere verstanden sind als sich auf die Welt beziehend, dieselbe, die die unsere ist, sie auch gelegentlich als Welt
mitkonstituierend fungieren können” (Husserl 1973c, 167).
43
“Wir Menschen-Monaden, wir alle, mitkonstituierende Subjekte, Mitträger unserer Welt, Miterfahrende,
Mitdenkende, nicht jeder überhaupt, sondern in der Weise einer gewissen Harmonie, die jedem Mitträger bewusst,
und zwar erfahrbar wird als nicht nur dieselben Erfahrungs- und Denkergebnisse liefernd, sondern als wechselseitig
dasselbe, dieselben Gegenstände in Ergänzungen bestimmend, in einer Geltung, die sich durch Übernahme von
Subjekt zu Subjekt fortpflanzen muss.”
42
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is experienceable by me in that she is acting in the world in such a way that her activity is there
for me, a part of my world. In other words, there is a performance of the act of co-constituting that
is given to me, a bodily enaction of a constituting that is not mine and yet experienced by me. On
the other hand, this performance is a co-constituting of the same objects that I constitute, but one
that supplements and informs my own determinations of the world. As co-bearers of the world,
the activity of other egos and my own activity are also given to me in my experience of the world,
which is experienced as having meanings and determinations that exceed my own. The objects of
my world, then, appear as co-constituted.
Thus, in order to fully grasp Husserl’s description of the other ego’s appearance as a coconstitution, it is necessary to clarify the way in which the other ego is given to me both in its
constituting activity and in the world given to me as co-constituted. These two senses are evident
in Husserl’s analysis of the appearance of the other ego in the CM5. In effecting the primordial
reduction, Husserl abstracts from that which “makes its appearance as co-determining the sense
[sinnmitbestimmend] of the world” (Husserl 1999, 95/126, translation altered). This includes that
which “gives men and brutes their specific sense as, so to speak, Ego-like living beings” and “their
determinations of the phenomenal world that refer by their sense to ‘others’ as Ego-subjects and,
accordingly, presupposed these” (Husserl 1999, 95/126-127). In bracketing the other ego, Husserl
is also careful to bracket the intentional performances and accomplishments of the other ego, i.e.
the acts of co-constituting and the co-constituted contents. It is clear for Husserl that the
determinations of the world refer back to other egos as constituting them, and these spiritual
determinations, as Husserl calls them, are omnipresent in my experience, such that everything
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surrounding me is constituted by and for egos.44 Even the most pristine wilderness is given with
such spiritual determinations, as it is pristine in so far as it is not touched by a human ego. 45
In this chapter, I will elucidate this double sense of co-constitution and investigate the way
in which both of these senses are at play in the appearance of the other ego. I begin with an analysis
of Husserl’s work on the appearance of the other ego through the appearance of the world as
objective, which is a look into the world as co-constituted. I then investigate the way in which the
other ego appears in her act of co-constituting, as another center of co-constitution. I end with an
investigation into the way in which the co-constitution of the other ego is at play in my constitution
of the world. Using Zahavi’s work on open intersubjectivity, I argue that there is a transcendental
sense of co-constitution that must be clarified in order to account for the generation of the sense
of the other ego. Building on this work in the following chapters, I will argue that the
transcendental sense of co-constitution is a part of the structural sense of the other ego found in
my own constituting consciousness. However, the full constitution of the sense of the other ego is
only given in an experience that cashes in this structural sense.

II.1 The appearance of the other ego through the co-constituted world
The sense of co-constitution that I will discuss first comes from my experience of the world
as shared. To say that the world is given to me as shared is not merely to say that I experience
other egos engaged in the world with me, constituting it with me. The other ego does not only
appear in her performance of the constitutive act, because I also experience the other ego through
44

Of course, these meanings, or maybe one should say the intersubjective aspects of these meanings, are abstracted
from in the primordial reduction. This does not mean, obviously, that these meanings fade away. Just as the suspension
of the natural positing of the world does not mean objects do not appear to me as actually existing, the abstraction to
the primordial sphere does not prevent these meanings from being given with their intersubjective underpinnings.
45
However, it should be noted that, even in the most isolated of terrain, spiritual predicates attach to everything as
possible places for animals to hide or from which they may strike. Enough bear warnings and horror stories make the
most well-kept trail appear as Teutoburg Forest to Varo.
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the accomplishment of her performance, in the experience of objects that are experienced by her
as well. The table at which I sit, the computer on which I type, and even my body as it types, are
all objects that transcend my own experience. They are all there for me and everyone else.46 Even
my own private thoughts, my innermost determinations or feelings, are given as shareable. In fact,
a desire for privacy or feelings of shame 47 and embarrassment are only possible because the world
is given with this sense. Thus, my experience of the world as shared (or, properly, shareable) is an
experience of the world as the accomplishment of co-constitution, as the product of the
performance of other egos that complements my own constitutive performance. The clarification
of this experience begins with the way in which the world appears as objective in Husserl’s
phenomenology. In CM5, Husserl describes my experience of the shared world as follows:
Within myself, within the limits of my transcendentally reduced pure conscious
life, I experience the world (including others) – and, according to its experiential
sense, not as (so to speak) my private synthetic formation but as other than mine
alone, as an intersubjective world, actually there for everyone, accessible in respect
of its Objects to everyone. And yet each has his experiences, his appearances, and
appearance-unities, his world phenomena; whereas the experienced world exists in
itself, over against all experiencing subjects and their world-phenomena. (Husserl
1999, 91/123)
In my own experience of the world, I find that my experience is not of something private 48 or
limited to my subjective appearances. Rather, the world is given to me as there for more than just

46

My favorite movie as a child had a song called “Somewhere Out There” about a lost mouse wondering if his family
was looking at the same moon in the same night sky. That Feivel the mouse could wonder such a thing at all is only
possible because the moon and the night sky are given as there for more than just me.
47
For Sartre, it is in my experience of shame (and pride) that the other ego is most manifest: “Shame is the revelation
of the Other not in the way in which a consciousness reveals an object but in the way in which one moment of
consciousness implies on the side another moment as its motivation” (Sartre 1984, 365).
48
It is rare for Husserl to describe something as “private”, and in this case, he does so in order to contrast the way in
which my experiences are of contents, in this case the world, that are not mine alone; in other words, what I experience
is not reducible to my own experiencing of it. This is an admittedly odd way to describe what is private. However, if
we think of what is private as what is not available in some manner to other people, or maybe simply what is only
made available to those people I choose, then phenomenologically speaking, nothing is private. Later in the same text
Husserl notes: “That my own essence can be at all contrasted for me with something else… presupposes that not all
of my own modes of consciousness are modes of my self-consciousness” (Husserl 1999, 105/135). This means that
my experiences include the experiencing of other egos as a constitutive component, and this implies that my
experiencing of the world is also included in the constitution of the world by other egos. Thus, insofar as the
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me, even in my own experience of it. This means that my experience of the world is inherently
intersubjective: I experience a world that is not limited to my own experience, and thus a world
that exceeds my own experiencing of it. My world and the objects within it are given with aspects
and senses that are not mine and yet are included in my constitution of any object.
The shared character of my experience of the world is illustrated, for example, in the
experience of a stain on my shirt. If I am eating lunch and the mustard from my sandwich falls
onto my shirt, I immediately check to see if a noticeable spot is left. If it is obviously noticeable
and I have a meeting and need to look presentable, I try to wipe it off with some soap and water. I
cannot, after all, appear unkempt or sloppy if I am trying to appear professional and competent. If
I am working around the house, however, I may either change the shirt or just not care that there
is a spot of mustard. In this situation, I do not care if my wife, daughter, or cats see me in a dirty
shirt. If we disregard the social meanings at play, what sticks out is the intersubjective appearance
of my stained shirt: I experience my shirt and the new blemish as appearing to more than just me.
If I try to clean the stain or hide it under a jacket, this is because the stain appears as something
that others can see that might negatively affect their opinion of me. If I do not care about the stain
while I am at home, it is not because my shirt is not also an object for my family; rather, when I
look down and see the mustard on my shirt, I know that my wife will not be bothered by it because
she neither wears my shirt nor washes it. In both situations, however, once the mustard hits my
shirt, I take into consideration the way in which my shirt appears to others. This is because no
matter the cultural rules at play, I experience my shirt (and the body that it covers, which is why I
wear the shirt in the first place) as an object that is there for other egos, as constituted by other

constitutive accomplishment of the other ego is a constitutive component of my experience, there are no private
experiences. In order to discuss privacy phenomenologically, then, we have to discuss ways in which experiences are
given as experienced and experienceable by other egos of varying familiarities.
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constituting acts outside of my own. Even if I am alone when the shirt is stained, I still experience
it as an object for other egos: I may need to change it before my meeting later or try to treat it so
that it does not ruin the gift my mother got me for Christmas. In any case, even if no other egos
are around to see the mustard on my shirt, it is still given as an object that is there for more than
just me, a shared object in a shared world. 49 This is the phenomenological basis for objectivity. 50
As Husserl says:
The ‘true thing’ is then the Object that maintains its identity within the manifolds
of appearance belonging to a multiplicity of subjects, and specifically, again, it is
the intuited Object, related to a community of normal subjects, or, abstraction made
from this relativity, it is the physicalistic thing, determined logico-mathematically.
(Husserl 1989, 87/82)
The intuited object and the object that persists through the multiple subjective experiences of the
members of a constitutive community are one and the same object. 51 The latter are, properly
speaking, objects for me in that they exceed my individual experience of this or that intuited object.
In other words, the mustard stain and the shirt are objective because they are constituted by me as

49

When I was a child, my mother bought me a very trendy Starter jacket for Christmas, an expense that was normally
not allowed, and I proudly wore it for the first time on the first day of school after break. While sitting alone in the
cafeteria waiting for classes to begin, I devoured my breakfast sandwich. Somehow, the mustard from this sandwich
got on my prized new Starter jacket, and it refused to come off. Sitting there alone in the cafeteria, I felt the
intersubjective constitution of the world more than at any other time in my childhood. As this example illustrates, the
proximity of other egos is unnecessary for the givenness of the world as there for more than just my own ego.
50
This conception of objectivity is the basis for phenomenology’s claim to be transcendental philosophy. As I will
explore more fully in the following, Dan Zahavi convincingly argues that phenomenology is transcendental
philosophy through an investigation of the constitution of objectivity in his Husserl and Transcendental
Intersubjectivity. For another discussion of phenomenology as transcendental philosophy, see Nicolas de Warren’s
analysis of Husserl’s project in CM5. According to de Warren, Husserl’s attempt to situate phenomenology as
transcendental idealism in the Kantian sense necessitates a transcendental account of the appearance of the other ego.
Such an account allows for the transcendental constitution of space and objectivity, which is necessary for any
transcendental idealism (de Warren 2013).
51
Rodemeyer argues that this makes the “objective world… reducible neither to individual moments of perception
nor to intersubjective discourse. Rather, it is a negotiation between the two” (Rodemeyer 2017, 324). At this moment,
I am merely attempting to show that the appearance of the world as objective contains the appearance of the other ego
with the sense of co-constitution. However, Rodemeyer’s point is important, as the givenness of the world as coconstituted means that my individual experience and intersubjective constitution stand in a relation through which the
world is given to me as objective.
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being constituted by other egos with me; thus, what is given to me as objective is what is given to
me as co-constituted.
It should be noted that Husserl also outlines the possibility for the solipsistic constitution
of objectivity; that is, the possibility of an objectivity outside of (or prior to) intersubjective
experience. In Ideas I, Husserl calls this the “noematic core” or “objective sense:” in the various
types of intentional acts that I can have of something (a perception, memory, or imagining of
something), there is that something itself that remains unchanged in all of them (Husserl 1983,
221-222/189, 244/209). For instance, if I view the moon from within my office and remember
seeing the same moon last night as I was out for a walk, I do not intend two different celestial
bodies. Rather, I intend one and the same moon in two different acts. However, it is possible that
my various experiences of something give contrasting senses or meanings: as I see the moon from
my office, I can remember it looking bigger on my walk or having a different hue. When I have
an experience of a thing that, upon further experiences of the same thing, seems to have been
deficient or distorted in some way, I posit an “objective” thing “as it presents itself to me under
‘normal’ conditions, in opposition to all other thing-like unities which, constituted under
‘abnormal’ conditions, are degraded to ‘mere semblance’” (Husserl 1989, 82/77). That the moon
looks different one night than it does on another night motivates the constitution of the moon as a
thing itself. This primordial or immanent transcendence is the transcendence of an object to my
individual intentions of it, a solipsistic objectivity, which Zahavi calls subjective transcendence
(Zahavi 2001, 31).52 The moon is given as having a proper appearance that can be clarified and
investigated, and thus appears as persisting outside of my individual and continuing experience of
it.

52

I will discuss Zahavi’s analysis of the different types of transcendence and the constitution of objectivity with more
depth later in this chapter.
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However, if I (as a solipsistic subject) did not have these abnormal experiences, then the
motivation to distinguish between the subjectively experienced thing and the objective thing would
not arise (Husserl 1989, 83/78). In other words, without abnormal experiences, the solipsistic ego
would not experience things as objective. This is not a concern, however, as Husserl notes that
solipsistic constitution is an abstraction, and the constituting subject is always “one among many”
(Husserl 1989, 83/79). Of course, the experience of my own constitution of an object as abnormal
can occur through intersubjective experience, and this also demonstrates the way in which I
experience the world as there for more than just me. In an example of the relation between my
experience of the world and the experience of the world had by other egos, Husserl notes:
As I communicate to my companions my earlier lived experiences and they become
aware of how much these conflict with their world, constituted and continuously
exhibited by means of a harmonious exchange of experiences, then I become for
them an interesting pathological Object, and they call my actuality, so beautifully
manifest to me, the hallucination of someone who up to this point in time has been
mentally ill. (Husserl 1989, 85/80)
In order for me to be a pathological object, or in order for my view of the world to be corrected,
my own experience must be given to me as abnormal in relation to a normal experience. In some
cases, I only find out that my experience is abnormal when I subject it to intersubjective
verification: I communicate with other egos and find out that my experience is not considered valid
in some manner. That this can happen at all shows me that I must experience the world as shared,
as exceeding my own possible experiences of it, and not merely because of the communication.53
For instance, when I was young, my parents pointed out a funny license plate while we were
outside having ice cream. I was unable to read the license plate, and that is when we knew that I
needed glasses. The world, which had previously been given to me as adequately seen, was now

53

As I show more fully in the following, such a correction of my abnormal experience can occur only if the world is
experienced as given to more than me, because I am incapable of experiencing a thing in two contrasting manners
simultaneously.
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given to me as blurry and capable of being sharpened. My constitution of the world was now
supplemented with meanings that did not belong to my original 54 constitution of it, and these
supplemental meanings showed my experience to be deficient in some way, abnormal. Those
meanings did not originate from my own experience of the world, and yet they informed my own
constitution of the world. 55
We can clearly see the way in which the other ego appears in the co-constitution of the
world: I experience the world as referring to acts of constituting like mine, but acts which belong
to other egos; in other words, I experience the world as appearing to and intended by egos beyond
my own. The world, then, is experienced as co-constituted and as referring to those who constitute
it with me. In the experience of the world as objective, as co-constituted, I experience the other
egos with whom I share the world.

II.2 The other ego in her activity of co-constituting
My experience of the world as co-constituted is the experience of the world as
corresponding to other egos as constituting it, so that the other ego appears to me through the
accomplishment of her performative act. So, there is a further sense of co-constitution at play here
that must be explored: within the world as co-constituted, certain bodies appear to me as sharing
the shared world with me; in other words, the other ego appears in her act of co-constituting. It is
important to clarify this second sense of co-constitution in order to fully grasp the way in which
the other ego appears. With regard to the first sense discussed above, I experience the world as co-

54

The originality of my constitutive stream will be discussed in the next chapter.
One could argue that my own experience could give the world as blurry and clear based on proximity of the object
to my eye or whether or not I was wearing my glasses, and that this variation of normal experience would allow for
the subjective constitution of objectivity in the abstract manner described by Husserl above. However, when seeing
an object as blurry, that same object is given as clearly seeable by someone with better vision. It is only with this
added layer of co-constitution of something that it can be said to be truly objective.
55
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constituted by other egos, which means that I experience the co-operative production of these other
egos, but these other egos are not merely implied in my experience of the world. I find them
referenced by the world in my world. Thus, without describing how they appear within my world,
in their co-constituting activities, the appearance of the other ego according to the sense of coconstitution is incomplete.
The givenness of this co-constituting is analyzed in detail by Husserl in Ideas II and CM5,
but it is discussed from within various attitudes and at various levels throughout his work on the
lived body and intersubjectivity. The binding thread of all of these analyses is that the appearance
of an other ego is the appearance of a “there” that is another “here” in my world, which is Husserl’s
description of the other ego as a center of a co-constitutive system; in other words, the other ego
appears as a co-constituting over there. I show how this description operates across the levels by
first working through Husserl’s analysis in CM5 of the associative synthesis in which the body of
the other ego is given as a lived body. Then, I show how the experience of a lived body is the
experience of a center of constitution; as the stream of consciousness is centered in embodied
experience across the levels of consciousness, the ego is always oriented from and according to its
lived body. Phenomenologically, this means that the lived body is given as the “here” of
consciousness. The other ego appears as such a here, a center of consciousness, but one that is not
mine. Thus, the other appears as another embodied center of constituting activity, which is given
to me as a “there” that is also a “here.”
The appearance of the other ego takes place, first and foremost, through the material
appearance of a body in the world. The other ego “stands before us there in person (leibhaftig)”
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(Husserl 1999, 108-109/139).56 However, this body is not merely any physical body (Körper);
rather, the body of the other person is given as a lived body like mine (Husserl 1999, 109/139).
First, we must ask: how does the body appear such that it is given as having constitutive systems?
Husserl’s answer lies in the “mediacy of intentionality”57 that necessarily occurs as “going out
from the substratum, ‘primordial world’, (which in any case is the incessantly underlying basis)
and making present a ‘there too’, which nevertheless is not there and can never become an ‘itself
there’” (Husserl 1999, 109/139). Husserl is describing an appresentation of a special sort, a “type
of making ‘co-present’” (Husserl 1999, 109/139).58 The other person’s physical body is given as
a lived body through an appresentation of her living through it, an appresentation of her ego. This
appearance occurs through a special form of appresentation, and thus a special kind of association,
which must be clarified. 59
Appresentation is an essential part of the presentation of an external object. For instance,
in the case of external experience, when a physical object is given to me (my tablet for instance),
it is given as having other sides that I cannot see (the backside of the tablet is given to me whenever
I see the front, as are the bottom and sides). These other sides are not given to me in the same way
as the side of the object that is facing me, 60 but are nevertheless given originally in my experience:
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The usage of leibhaftig is more akin to the English usage of “in person”, but in using this colloquial phrase, the term
Leib is lost. In this passage, Husserl is beginning his analysis of the appearance of the other ego, and his opening
statement emphasizes the embodied appearance of those with whom one shares the world.
57
Which is necessitated because the body of the other is not a product of my sensuousness (Sinnlichkeit) alone. There
must, then, be another sensuousness at play in its constitution: the sensuousness of the other ego.
58
Frustratingly, as noted by Fink in response to a paper by Schutz, this special form of appresentation is not adequately
explored here (Schutz 1975, 85).
59
This allows Husserl to pursue the analyses in CM5 from the starting point of the primordial reduction, even though
within the reduction all that is related to the foreign has been abstracted. The sense of the other ego is not, in this case,
merely given in my encounter with some other person. Rather, the egoic sense comes from the activity of a specific
body being given as relating to my own bodily activity in an associative synthesis, that is, passively. I utilize the
analysis in CM5 because it best shows the way in which the other ego appears as co-constituting the world with me. I
will argue that what is associated in the synthesis of pairing is the appearance of an other embodied center of
constitution in the world.
60
A common way of differentiating between the presented and appresented sides is to talk of what is presented as
being given directly and what is appresented as being given indirectly. However, direct and indirect givenness are
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it is the reason I experience my tablet as having three dimensions as opposed to being continually
surprised by its depth or the appearance of its other sides. I am also able to make the appresented
sides given to me in a presentation: I can see the back when I turn it over. I can move it in various
ways in order to see all of its various appresented sides as presented sides. Just as there is no way
to make all sides presented at once because my perceptive act is perspectival, there is no way to
be appresented a side of a physical object that cannot be made into a presentation proper. The
backside of an object can always be turned into the front side in that I can move my body, the
object, or both, so that my perspective of the object changes. The appresentation of the other
person’s ego, however, does not function in this way. No matter how I manipulate the body of the
other person or my perspective of them, I cannot make it so that their ego, their lived experiences,
become given to me in the same way that I can make the other side of my tablet be given to me
(i.e. accessibly) (Husserl 1999, 109/139). Thus, Husserl asks the question: “How can [the]
appresentation of another original sphere, and thereby the sense ‘someone else’, be motivated in
my original sphere and, in fact, motivated as experience – as the word ‘appresentation’… already
indicates?” (Husserl 1999, 109/139).
There must be an original perception that gives rise to the appresentation of the other ego. 61
The originary perception that Husserl identifies as motivating the appresentation of the other ego
is the perception of my own primordially reduced world (Husserl 1999, 110/140). That is, the body
of the other ego is given in such a way that it appears to have a primordial world just as I do. In
my experience of an other ego given in person (leibhaftig), there is an associative synthesis

technical terms for Husserl, which will be explored in depth in the third chapter, along with a discussion of
accessibility. For now, it can be said that the object itself is given to me directly, including both its presented and
appresented sides, as the object gives itself as having this dimensionality.
61
“[A] non-originary making present [the making present of the lived body of the other person] can [motivate the
appresentation] only in combination with an originary presentation, an itself-giving proper; and only as demanded by
the originary presentation can it have the character of appresentation” (Husserl 1999, 109/139).
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between my primordial experience of the world as centered on my own lived body and the
givenness of an other body experiencing a primordial world. This can be best clarified by showing
the way in which the givenness of my own body as a center of constitution, a here, gives rise
through an apperceptive transfer of sense to the givenness of the other ego as a center of coconstituting, a there.
I begin with Husserl’s analysis of the lived body as a zero-point of orientation, 62 in which
he says that my body is, first and foremost, the “medium of all perception,” and as such, is tied up
with sensible contents by which things in the world appear to me (Husserl 1989, 61/56). For
instance, focusing my attention on the tactile field, I am seated on a chair at my desk; I feel the
keyboard of my laptop under my fingers, the floor under my feet, the chair under my rear end, and
air being pushed down upon me gently by the fan above. Further, I sense the fatigue of my wrists
as they rest upon the laptop, heavy from a long day of typing. More than merely having touch
sensations of various objects in the world and even of my own lived body, I also have sensations
of my lived body as heavy, as tired, as warm, etc.; thus, I have tactile sensations of objects in my
world and also of my body as a sensing thing and as a thing sensed. 63 These tactile sensations are
localized in the various parts of my body at which they occur, and in this way my body is
constituted as the seat of my sensible perceptions to which “all that is thingly-real in the
surrounding world of the Ego has its relation” (Husserl 1989, 61/56). Thus, Husserl says that the
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It is important to note that this analysis occurs from within the naturalistic attitude as opposed to the
phenomenological, which means that Husserl is taking my body to be a thing that I consider to be an existing part of
nature, and doing so at an active, objective level of consciousness. The analysis is still useful, however, as it is here
that my lived body is most clearly given as a center of constitution.
63
Sartre disputed the ability of the lived body to touch itself, as the for-itself cannot be simultaneously the in-itself,
much as it may long to be so. Zahavi convincingly refutes this assertion as reestablishing (contrary to Sartre’s aim)
the mind-body dualism with a lived body-perceived body dualism (Zahavi 2002, 277). It seems that one could also
handle Sartre’s criticism with a description of the sense organ sensing its own weight and movement in the world.
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lived body is the “bearer of the zero point of orientation, the bearer of the here and the now, out of
which the pure Ego intuits space and the whole world of the senses” (Husserl 1989, 61/56).
We can say, then, that my lived body is given to me as the “here” of my sensible
experiences, the center of my spatial constitution. All sensible appearances of things in the world
appear to my body and are oriented around me. If I consider the overlap of the visual field with
the tactile field, I feel my feet touching the floor beneath the desk on which I am resting my hands.
The desk in front of me, the floor below me, the water bottle to my right, and the cat meowing in
the other room are all oriented in relation to my lived body as the center of my sensible experience.
This is why Husserl can say that the lived body has, for its particular ego, the unique distinction
of bearing in itself the zero-point of all of these orientations (Husserl 1989, 166/158). As
experienced sensibly by me, the world appears to me as oriented around my lived body, upon
which are localized the sensations of that which appears to me. 64
However, this localization of sensation in the lived body does not correlate with the same
localization of the psyche, as considered in the natural attitude. The sensible textures of the
keyboard on my fingers orient the sensation of the textures as under my fingers, as spatially related
to and oriented around my living body; however, the conscious act of perceiving the keyboard as
an object is not localized in the same way. 65 Thus, Husserl distinguishes between the localization
of the sensations in the lived body as a lower stratum and the apprehensions of objects as a higher

64

Husserl discusses the localization of sensation in my lived body with more depth in Ideas II §36, 37, and 39. What
is truly interesting is the double sensation that occurs in the tactile field of the body being touched by itself, such that
it is constituted as a material thing and as a localization of sensation. The tactile field is unique in this way, as the eye
cannot see itself seeing, nor can the ear hear itself hearing.
65
There is no part of my body in which the conscious act can be found, such that were I to remove that part of my
body, I would no longer have that conscious act while still having others. When I use my mouse, my tactile sensation
of feeling the mouse is localized in my hand. If I were to lose that hand, I would lose the tactile sensations of touching
the mouse that are properly localized to said hand. Naturally considered, what Husserl calls the “hyletic substrate” are
these tactile sensations that are localized to my hand, that is, before the localization, which requires at least a passive
organization of sensation, the sense experience, to a sense organ.
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stratum built upon these sensations. While these apprehensions are tied to the impressional data of
sensation, “the intentional lived experiences themselves are no longer directly and properly
localized; they no longer form a stratum on the lived body” (Husserl 1989, 160-161/153,
translation altered). This would seem to be a problem for my assertion that the embodied ego
appears as the center of all constitutive experience, for if the sensational stratum is all that appears
as centered within the world while the intentional apprehensions (the judgments, the perceptions,
the rememberings, etc.) cannot be centralized in the same manner, then the ego as a unified whole
is not experienced as the center of constitution.
Although my perception of objects cannot be localized in the same way as my sensations
of them, Husserl does in various manners describe the psyche as the orienting point of
consciousness, especially when discussing acts of consciousness as having ego and object poles.
Because all conscious acts are always a consciousness of something, an act of consciousness can
be discussed in terms of its ego-pole and object-pole (Husserl 1989, 111/105). As the pole from
which all of my intentional acts originate, the ego is the “center of all affects and actions, of all
attention, grasping, relating, and connecting” (Husserl 1989, 112/105).66 This is, of course,
different from the experience of the lived body as the medium of sensation, although Husserl
admits that the “structure of acts which radiate out from the Ego-center, or, the Ego itself, is a form
which has an analogon in the centralizing of all sense-phenomena in reference to the lived body”
(Husserl 1989, 112/105, translation altered). So the psyche, as having its ego pole, is experienced
as a constitutive center, if not a spatial center. Husserl shows this by considering a series of
attentive acts. When grasping any object in a series of conscious acts, there is a series of
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The paragraph also discusses the ego as the referential center for the relations of the object: “in theoretically
interested experience there is the working toward the Object, appropriating it, penetrating into it; but there is also here
constantly the being incited by the Object, being captivated, thrilled, determined” (Husserl 1989, 112/105). Acts that
radiate from the ego find their “terminus a quo” in the ego as well.

38

“orientations” taken toward the object that bring it “closer” to clarity. For instance, if I am trying
to understand triangularity and I consider the various aspects I know of a triangle, all of these
attentive acts string together as a series in my stream of consciousness. Starting from the basics,
that a triangle has three sides and that its interior angles add up to 180°, I can progress deductively
through the other geometrical aspects, such as the differences between an obtuse and acute triangle.
I progress through a series of clarifying, or possibly muddying, intentions of the object. If all goes
well in my investigation, the object becomes grasped “ever more richly and more perfectly”
(Husserl 1989, 112/106). In each individual conscious act, I attend to some aspect of the object
being investigated. I attend to the interior angles of the figure of the mathematical ration of its side
when it has a right angle. That which is oriented to the object in each of these contemplative acts,
whose attentive rays flow out and into my object, is my ego: “these rays emanate in lived
experience from the one single point of departure, the identical Ego” (Husserl 1989, 113/106). The
localization of sensations on the lived body give my body as the center of my spatiality, and in the
same way, the succession of conscious activities focusing on the same ideality also gives the ego
as a center of all intentional activity, the locus of constitutive activity. 67
Thus, my intentional life is in its own way oriented around the ego-pole at its center, and
because it is built upon the stratum of localized sensations of the lived body, Husserl speaks of an
“indirect localization” of the psyche in the lived body. 68 The localization of sensation in the lived
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Husserl says something similar in CM5: “[The stream of subjective processes] is given in an orientation around the
primordially constituted lived present, from which everything else outside it (but belonging to immanent temporality)
is accessible” (Husserl 1999, 134/161). In Ideas II while speaking of the soul from the personalistic attitude, he says:
The soul is not there as extended over the lived body in the manner of being ‘localized’ in the proper sense; it does
not offer itself as something like a complex of ‘psychic fields’ – thought in analogy with sense fields – which would
come, immediately or mediately, to phenomenal components of the lived body” (Husserl 1989, 185-186/176,
translation altered).
68
This is an example of the way in which Husserl employs levels in his analyses of consciousness such that the
consideration of consciousness at one level is different than at another. Rodemeyer argues that Husserl’s usage of
levels leads to difficulties in evaluating his conclusions. Some of his analyses lead to universal claims, while others
are merely meant to pertain to a specific level of consciousness (Rodemeyer 2018, 1). Rodemeyer also shows that
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body, which is part of the constitution of the lived body as a zero-point in the spatial world, is not
the same as the givenness of the ego as an orienting point in the flow of consciousness. However,
considered phenomenologically, sensations and higher-level conscious acts both give me the lived
body as the constitutive center of experience:
What also is there [in the lived body] are such and such groups of states of
consciousness, such and such representations, stirrings of thought, judgments, etc.
As acts and states of, e.g., this cat, which has, by means of its lived body, its position
in Objective space, everything that is really one with the cat has position, even
though it may have per se nothing to do with extension. Just as consciousness loses
the apperceptive apprehension as psychic state, as stratum in the lived body, and
just as it is purely posited as itself in the phenomenological (even if not at the same
time an eidetic) reduction, so it loses its empirical insertion in Objective space.
Which can also be expressed this way: consciousness in itself, for example this
individual cogitatio in its nexus, is thinkable without a nature, and the apperception
of nature itself can be posited in itself as “That there!” (Husserl 1989, 187/177-178,
translation altered)
Phenomenologically considered, the intentional life of the ego is given as embodied, 69 as it
obviously includes sensory experience, the constitutive sensation-intentions of its lived body, in
addition to the higher-level passive and active levels of consciousness. Thus, at the level of
sensation, consciousness is localized in the lived body, because as Husserl says, everything that is
really one with my body has position. At the level of attentive consciousness, the ego is centered
as the origin of my intentive rays. All of these intentional activities across the various layers of
consciousness, which include sensations, are given as a unity. Husserl arrives at this discovery by
showing that the various levels of consciousness are all experienced as coinciding in the same
center of experience. The psychic life of a person, including its subjective contents, is experienced

there are cores of experience that appear throughout various levels, such as the lived body, that build on itself across
levels (Rodemeyer 2018, 19) The way in which the other ego appears to me, I think, is one of these cores.
69
In this example, even the intentional life of an animal other ego is given as embodied.
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as one with the sensations of the lived body. 70 Outside of objective space and independent of nature
in the natural sense, the unified stream of consciousness is experienced as localized, a point of
orientation, a position. My surrounding world 71 and the objects within it appear to me as having
an orientation to my lived body (Husserl 1989, 166/158). Nature is there for me, even if I no longer
posit its existence or consider it as the object of natural science. Correspondingly, I am here, with
my embodied intentional life, which is constituted through the sensations of the lived body, my
passive acts of consciousness, and my higher-level attentive acts in which I apprehend this or
that.72 In all of these acts, in the entire flow of my conscious life, I am given as a “here” oriented
to the “there” of the natural world as much as to the “there” of intentional objects of purely
theoretical acts. Thus, Husserl describes the experience of the lived body as, at base, the experience
of the “here” of consciousness, a “here” that remains “here” even as everything else in the world
changes its position:
The lived body of the subject “alters its position” in space; the things appearing in
the environment are constantly oriented thereby; all appearances of things preserve
their fixed system according to form. The form of intuition, the lawful character of
the adumbrations, and, therewith, the form of the order of orientation around a
center, all this is necessarily preserved. But whereas the subject is always, at every
now, in the center, in the here, whence it sees the things and penetrates into the
world by vision, on the other hand the Objective place, the spatial position, of the
ego, or of its lived body, is a changing one. …I have all things over and against me;
they are all “there” – with the exception of one and only one, namely the lived body,
which is always “here.” (Husserl 1989, 166/158-159)
While this passage is found in Husserl’s analysis of the constitution of the lived body in the
naturalistic attitude, one can plainly see that abstracting from objective place leaves one with the
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Husserl even speaks of the soul being stimulated in the natural sense, motivated in the phenomenological sense, by
the sensible appearance of objects in the world (Husserl 1989, 198-199/188-189). Such motivations also give the unity
of the various levels of consciousness as centered in the lived body.
71
The surrounding world (Umwelt) of the personalistic attitude is contrasted in Ideas II with the natural world.
72
In a very interesting argument in CM5, referenced in an above footnote, Husserl even states that my primordial
world acts as the center of the objective world along with my lived body, in that my lived body and subjective
experiences of the world give rise to my experience of objects as there for more than just me (Husserl 1999, 133134/161-162).
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“here” of the experiencing and the “there” of the experienced. The “here” of the ego, occurring at
all levels of consciousness, is the center of the constitutive activity of consciousness from which
the constitutive rays of the experiencing ego radiate. Thus, Husserl’s uses “here” always to mean
a center of constitution, such that any ego, as a constituting stream of consciousness, must always
have its “here.”
Consequently, the experience of an other ego, an other stream of consciousness, must in
some way be the experience of an other “here,” although obviously a “here” that is experienced as
a “there.” 73 Unlike the “there” of the world, though, it is important to emphasize that the “there”
of the other ego is a “there” that is also a “here.” Husserl describes the appearance of the other ego
this way in many places, and it is important to clarify how this occurs. Returning to the associative
synthesis by which I experience the body of the other ego as an other lived body, my own lived
body as a “here” serves as the basis for the association of the other ego’s lived body with my own.
In other words, my experience of my lived body as a “here” motivates the appresentation of the
other ego’s lived body as a “there” that is also a “here” in an associative synthesis. In the
association, there occurs a transfer of sense 74 that is not unique to intersubjective experience. In
fact, every experience I have of an object undergoes a similar sense bestowal.
[E]very apperception in which we understand their sense and its horizons forthwith,
points back to a “primal instituting”, in which an object with a similar sense became
constituted for the first time. Even physical things of this world that are unknown
to us are, to speak generally, known in respect of their type. …each everyday
experience involves an analogizing transfer of an originally instituted objective
sense to a new case, and with its anticipative apprehension of the object as having
a similar sense. (Husserl 1999, 111/141)

73

The distinction by which my stream of consciousness is given as “here” and separate from any other stream of
consciousness will be clarified in the next chapter.
74
This transfer of sense will be discussed with more depth in Chapter V, as will the formation of types and their
motivational influence discussed in the following analysis.
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Thus, every perception of a table involves the apperception of the underside of that table because
I have seen tables and their undersides before. More generally, I have seen physical objects before
and already have a type for three dimensional objects. I have prior experience (and thus a
developed type of physical objects) that motivates my perception of the object as more than the
surface given to me straightaway. I also apperceive its other sides (as likely the same or similar
color, material, and dimension as the perceived surface) along with it. The egoic activities that I
find in myself, the governing of a lived body and the constituting of a world, are accessible to me,
understandable by me, graspable according to their transcendental structure. As such, when
encountering things in the world, these structures of my experience through which I know myself
come into play as types in the same way.75
When a body enters into my perceptual field, it can be experienced in the same way as the
drip of water from a pipe or a tumbleweed blowing through a town in the old west: the movement
is simply the movement of bodies. However, when it looks for something or expresses an opinion,
there is a movement that appears to be different. The movement of a body looking or speaking is
a movement that is given to me as a movement like my own bodily movement, and as such it is
associated with my own bodily movements. In a way, we can say that it fits the type of movements
that I grasp as belonging to a lived body. In this associative synthesis, there is what Husserl
describes as an intentional overreaching (intentionales Übergreifen):
On a more precise analysis we find essentially present here an intentional
overreaching, coming about genetically (and by essential necessity) as soon as the
data that undergo pairing [in this case, my own Leib and the Leib of the other ego]
have become prominent and simultaneously intended; we find, more particularly, a
living mutual awakening and an overlaying of each with the objective sense of the
other. … As part of this overlaying, there takes place in the paired data a mutual

75

Husserl says as much: “All of that [the previous descriptions of my ego] – with the grouping under types that arises
in experiential life and the familiar forms of flow and combination – is at our disposal” (Husserl 1999, 140/110). One
again is inclined to wonder how static this description really can be.
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transfer of sense – that is to say: an apperception of each according to the sense of
the other. (Husserl 1999, 112-113/142)
The movements of the other lived body give themselves as the movements of a lived body purely
in their kinship to my possible movements. The movement of a body in the world that appears to
me to have similar orientations, or orientations at all, engenders an apperceptive transfer of the
sense of my own lived body onto this other body given as lived. In other words, the sense of lived
embodiment (Leiblichkeit) given by other ego’s lived body comes from its association with my
own lived embodiment.
Since, in this nature and this world, my lived body is the only physical body that is
or can be constituted originally as a lived body (a functioning organ), the physical
body over there, which is nevertheless apprehended as lived body, must get this
sense from an apperceptive transfer from my lived body here, and in such a way
that excludes an actually direct, and thus primordial, showing of the predicates of
lived embodiment specifically, excludes a showing through a proper perception.
(Husserl 1999, 110/140 translation modified)
Husserl terms this associative act pairing (Paarung): my “ego and the alter ego are always
and necessarily given in an original pairing” (Husserl 1999, 112/142). The body of the other ego
appears in a pairing with my own lived body, so that her body appears as governed, as living in
the world as well. In this perception of her body as lived, I apperceive the other ego as a mirror
that is “not a mirroring proper” (Husserl 1999, 94/125). The other ego’s body is given as like mine,
similar to mine, and as such is given as paired with my lived body as also a lived body. This
pairing is not unilateral, however, as my lived body is not alone in imbuing the other’s lived body
with sense; my own lived body too receives a new sense, a new layer of meaning. It becomes
situated in the world as a complete body – I see my own body as a whole in the way that I see the
body of the other. 76

76

This is notably discussed by Sartre and de Beauvoir, among other later phenomenologists.
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The concept of pairing is often problematized by Husserl’s critics, 77 whose critiques I will
only be able to adequately address after the analysis of Chapter IV, where I fully investigate the
sense of verification at play in the appearance of the other ego. For now, I offer a different
phenomenological argument for taking the appearance of the other ego to be a center of
constitution. My argument comes from Husserl’s always surprising discussions of ghosts.
Although a seemingly odd topic, Husserl sprinkles in the occasional reference to ghosts when
discussing the embodiment of consciousness. This is helpful for the current endeavor, for Husserl
notes that in order for a ghost to appear, it must have a ghostly body, even though neither the ghost
nor its ghostly body is an actual material thing (Husserl 1989, 100/94). If we allow that such a
bodily appearance is possible (which Husserl calls an “entirely empty” possibility), then “a psychic
subject without a material lived body is indeed thinkable” (Husserl 1989, 101/95).
However, in order for this ghost to be experienced as a ghost, i.e., as a psychic subject
engaged in the world, Husserl argues that it must still animate its non-material body. If the ghost
is actually a mistaken perception of a physical thing, as when I think I see a ghost but really it is
just a towel hanging off of the bathroom door, then there is no need for an animate body; a towel
hanging off of the door is not given as animated. If it is just a spatial phantom, as Husserl calls it,
a figment of my imagination, then it also requires no animation. However, if it is to appear as a
spirit, it must be animating its ghostly lived body, whatever sort of immaterial lived body that it
may have (Husserl 1989, 101/95-96). Thus, for there to be the appearance of a lived body, even an
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Schutz, for example, took exception to the possibility of such a pairing: “The other body is visually perceived, but
my body is not, as a rule, visually perceived by me, and even if it is, then only partially. My living body is, to be sure,
always present and given as the primal instituting organ. But it is present as inner perception of its boundaries and
through the kinesthetic experience of its functioning. It is thus present precisely in a way which is as dissimilar as
possible from the external perception of an animate body other than mine and therefore can never lead to an analogical
apperception. …Husserl’s assumption that an analogical apprehension of an Other’s living body takes place on the
basis of a similarity to my own living body contradicts the phenomenological finding that my living body ‘stands out’
in my primordial perceptual field in a manner which is fundamentally different from the manner in which the allegedly
similar body of the Other stands out in this field” (Schutz 1975, 63, 64).
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immaterial one, it needs to be an animated appearing. 78 Admittedly, the appearance of this
animating could be an illusion, but even an illusory appearance shows the structural requirement
that a lived body be engaged in the world. If I am to be haunted by a ghost, it must in some way
appear to me as engaged in the same world as I am: if I experience a non-animated material body,
I am no more haunted by it than I am by the table on which I write. 79 This animating, as an
engagement in the world, appears precisely as a “there” that, in its appearance as such, is a “here”
for the other ego.
Husserl makes this point in multiple places. In GP, Husserl describes the appearance of
other egos as surrounding points of my midpoint that are originally their own midpoints (Husserl
2006, 6-7/116-117). In CM5, he describes the same appearance from within the primordial
reduction in more familiar terms:
The Other is appresentatively apperceived as the “Ego” of a primordial world, and
of a monad, wherein his animate organism is originally constituted and experienced
in the mode of the absolute Here, precisely as the functional center for his
governing. In this appresentation, therefore, the body in the There, which presents
itself in my monadic sphere and is apperceived as another’s live body (the animate
organism of the other ego) – that body indicates “the same” body in the mode Here,
as the body experienced by the other ego in his monadic sphere. (Husserl 1999,
117/146)
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“Every other I that I can experience – it can be experienced because in the realm of nature of my possible experiences
there is a thing that can present itself as its lived body, hence it can become a substrate of empathy” (Husserl 2006,
155/228).
79
Yet, Husserl also notes that the haunting of a ghost with an immaterial body cannot in any way actually be a haunting
of me or the world: “In order to establish a material relationship between myself and an other, in order to communicate
something to him, a bodily relation, a bodily connection by means of physical occurrences, must be instituted”
(Husserl 1989, 176/168). Without an experienceable lived body, I cannot encounter the other ego. Thus, the
appearance of an other ego of any sort in the world requires at the very least the animating of a material lived body.
He makes a similar point when discussing primary and secondary qualities, although in relation to the need for a
similar sensibility as opposed to just a material body: “subjects who in general share a common world of things, to
which they actually relate… can in principle be relatively ‘blind’… as regards individual senses which provide their
own particular sorts of sense qualities… But in principle, subjects cannot be blind as regards all the senses and
consequently blind to space, to motion, to energy. Otherwise, there would be no world of things there for them; in any
case, it would not be the same as ours, precisely the spatial world, the world of nature” (Husserl 1989, 91/86). Thus,
a ghost would need a material lived body that senses the world in a way that is at least similar enough to my own
sensibility that we could then share the world in order for her to haunt me and me to be haunted by her.
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The other ego appears first as a lived body that is engaged in the world we share, a “functional
center” of constituting. This functional center is, for me, a “there” that is in relation to my own
“here.” Yet, as a functional center of the other ego’s governance over her own lived body, the lived
body appears precisely as a “here” for her own stream of consciousness. In her governing over her
lived body, her engaging in the world, her lived body appears as a “here” for herself, and this
appearance of the lived body as a center for the governance of her ego is not removed from the
appearance of the other ego to me. Her lived body appears to me, apperceptively, as a unity of
conscious activity, a unity with the sense “other ego,” a unity of constituting consciousness
centered in the world. 80 The appearance of the other ego as a “there” is the appearance of a stream
of consciousness that is constituting the world with me; it is the appearance of an other constitutive
system to which the co-constituted world refers, a co-constituting. 81

II.3 Two-fold sense of co-constitution
It is now clear that there are two ways in which the other ego appears as a co-constitution:
every other ego that I encounter is given to me both in my experience of the world as co-constituted
by her and in her activity of co-constituting the world. This duality is present in Jean-Paul Sartre’s
well-known analysis of my experience of other egos 82 in Being and Nothingness, and an

80

Husserl also discusses the unity of the appearance of the other ego in Ideas II (Husserl 1989, 246/234-235, 252/240,
253/241).
81
In GP, Husserl describes it in this way: “it has, as other subjectivity, its own system of appearings. The subjectivity
here is no posited as an other human being within nature, which he and I experience, but rather as other ego ‘related
to nature,’ i.e., as an other ego, it has certain constituting systems of appearing in itself, which stand in motivational
connections with those systems of appearing that can be manifested in me; and they also stand in connection with the
rightful identification of what is one and the same intentionally and rightfully posited thing” (Husserl 2006, 160/231).
82
It must be noted that Sartre avoids using the word “ego” as much as possible, reserving it for the reification of the
cogito. This is a central sticking point for Sartre in the evaluation of Husserl’s work, in that Sartre thinks that Husserl’s
reliance on the ego causes him to overlook the actual activity of consciousness in its activity – which Sartre often calls
pre-thematic consciousness. I think this shows Sartre’s lack of familiarity with Husserl’s work on passive synthesis,
which Husserl explicitly equates with non-thematic consciousness (Husserl 1989, 15/13). I have no such issues using
the term, and because I am exploring Husserl’s work on the appearance of other consciousnesses, in which Husserl
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investigation of this analysis will show how both senses of co-constitution are at play such
experiences.
Sartre’s analysis of the look comes after his critique of previous philosophical accounts of
other people, particularly phenomenological and Hegelian accounts. 83 Specifically, Sartre
problematizes the way in which others are taken as objects in the world. When I am sitting in a
park and see another person walking, I see her both as an object and as a person. That she appears
as more than just an object means that I “register an organization without distance of the things in
my universe around that privileged object” (Sartre 1984, 341).84 What appears is an organization
of the world according to this special object, an organizing that is other than my own. Were this
person to appear as some other object than a person, “as being only a puppet, I should apply to
him the categories which I ordinarily use to group temporal-spatial ‘things.’ …His relation with
other objects would be of the purely additive type; …no new relation would appear through him
between those things in my universe” (Sartre 1984, 341). But in the appearance of a person there
are new relations between this object and the world, relations that I do not inaugurate. She relates
to her world, organizes it according to her experiences: she notices the shaded patch of grass under
the tree and chooses to sit there as opposed to the sunnier spot; or she notices nothing as her
attention is wrapped up entirely in her phone. In both instances, she engages the world as useful
for her, and her engagement is there for me in the world, not like any other object, but “without

himself uses the term “other ego” frequently, I will continue to use “other ego” to refer to the appearance of a flow of
consciousness that is not mine, an other living in the world.
83
For Sartre’s problematic understanding of Hegel’s work on the relation between subjects while writing Being and
Nothingness, see (Daigle 2011, 8).
84
Sartre’s discussion of the other ego as an object without distance closely mirrors Heidegger’s discussion of Dasein’s
de-severance, and Sartre’s discussion of the other ego as an other orientation and situating of the world parallels
Heidegger’s analyses of the directionality and the making-room of Dasein (Heidegger 1962, 138-148/104-113).
Heidegger, however, never evaluates these existentiales in terms of their appearance in others to Dasein; rather, he is
only concerned with the role that they play in the structure of Dasein. Husserl, on the other hand, investigates
something similar to Sartre both in its appearing to an ego and as a structure of the ego, which is much closer to
Sartre’s project and also likely the basis for Heidegger’s analysis.
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parts, given at one stroke, inside of which there unfolds a spatiality; for instead of a grouping
toward me of the objects, there is now an orientation which flees from me” (Sartre 1984, 342).
Sartre’s description of my experience of an individual bears similarities to Husserl’s
description of the other ego’s appearance as a “there” that is another “here”, as a center of coconstituting. What has appeared in his example is an other organizing act centered on a body: “a
center of autonomous and intra-mundane references in my world” (Sartre 1984, 391). However,
this is a new organization of my world, which shows it to be in fact the world as opposed to just
my world: “suddenly an object has appeared which has stolen the world from me” (Sartre 1984,
343). The appearance of the other ego de-centers me. I encounter in the world an object that also
encounters the world with me. For example, when I am grading papers in my office, I often have
exams spread out on my desk in various piles, a snack to make me feel that I am more efficiently
utilizing my time by eating and working, a computer to distract me from my task, and various texts
to aid in the grading. If I set my water bottle down on the table, there is no reorganization of the
objects on my desk centered on my water bottle. I do not worry that my water bottle will read my
email. However, if a student darkens my door, all of the objects on my desk become suddenly
organized around her experience of them. My organization becomes otherwise organized. I close
the laptop so that my emails and grade spreadsheet are not viewable by the student. I arrange the
exams so that the work of her fellow students is not visible to her. My world and its relations
become supplemented, or supplanted according to Sartre, such that the organization of the world
centered around my student “appears as a pure disintegration of the relations which I apprehend
between the objects of my universe” (Sartre 1984, 342). Before the student walks into my office,
everything is in order; as soon as she appears, the previous relations are recast because the objects
related become relatable to someone else. Thus, in the appearance of the other ego as an object,
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there appears a drain within my world, sucking it away, pulling the world in to itself (Sartre 1984,
343). And this drain is given to me as worldly, as this object here, as this other ego before me. 85
However, because such an experience is not simply of an object within my world, Sartre
argues that the appearance of the other ego as a drain inadequately addresses the givenness of the
other ego. Because of the exclusivity of being-in and being-for for Sartre, the experience of the
other ego as an object in the world excludes the experience of the other ego as co-constituting the
world and as being the reference to which the co-constituted world refers. In other words, the
appearance of the other ego as a drain, for Sartre, is an erroneous description that reduces the
consciousness of the other ego to her materiality.
Thus, Sartre speaks of the appearance of an individual other ego as only probable: while I
certainly experience other egos, as will be discussed in his analysis of the look, it is only probable
that my experience of this or that particular object is an other ego because an object in the world
cannot be given apodictically (Sartre 1984, 369).86 To put it differently, there remains no definite
difference between the appearance of a causally moved thing and a motivationally moved thing,
between mechanics and behavior, such that I could identify this object as an other ego and that
object as not. Any difference would depend upon experiencing the other ego as more than an object
in my world, which is the point of Sartre’s analysis of the other ego’s appearance as an object: my
experience of a body in the world that appears to be constituting the world with me does not give
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For Sartre, this is the appearance of a competitor, but this is not the case for Husserl. The other ego is an orientation
of the world that could be mine were I to occupy that position, but as a constituting it can never be mine: the appearance
of the other ego as a “there” precisely limits the ability for it ever to appear as a “here” for me. While this requires
further explanation, which will be undertaken in the next chapter when discussing the inaccessibility of the other ego,
the key point here is that the other ego does not appear as a drain in the world for Husserl. Rather, the other ego is an
upsurge of constitution, a geyser of meaning saturating the world with possible constitutive perspectives. The
appearance of the other ego as co-constituting is the appearance of a sense-bestowing upon which I also bestow a
sense, the constitution of a constituting that enriches my own experience of the world.
86
Yet, the probability of my experience of an individual other co-constituting does refer to a fundamental connection
between me and the other ego (Sartre 1984, 340). Arguments like this make one wonder how Sartre could deny the
possibility of a transcendental intersubjectivity.
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the other ego to me as a co-constituting other ego. If the other ego only appears as an object to me,
then according to Sartre the subjectivity of the other ego, her co-constitution, becomes merely an
interiority (Sartre 1984, 384).87 Taking the other ego as an interiority posits her as a split being
that both inhabits this world in a way that I can experience and escapes this world in a way that I
can never experience. Thus, as an interiority, Sartre argues, the constitutive activity of the other
ego is negated, rendered ineffective, and remains only “a quality relative to the being-other with
which I have affected him. It no longer touches me; it is an image of me in him” (Sartre 1984, 385).
In short, discussing the other ego’s appearance as an object in the world removes her impact on
the world.
For this reason, Sartre wants to offer a description of my experience of the other ego as she
appears in what Sartre calls the free assertion of her subjectivity. This is accomplished by his
analysis of the look, which is Sartre’s name for the experience of being-seen, an experience of the
other ego as a subject, i.e., in her act of co-constituting, but a co-constituting that is not centered
in this or that worldly body. Although pride is also an experience of the look, his primary example
of this experience is shame, specifically the experience of being possibly discovered spying
through a keyhole and listening through a door (Sartre 1984, 347-352). When I am looking through
the keyhole or pressing my ear against the door in order to catch a glimpse or a word of someone’s
private moment, I am entirely engaged in the act; thus, as Sartre emphasizes, his description here
is on the level of what he calls non-thetic consciousness: I am immersed in the world, not reflecting
upon it. In the next moment, I hear the footsteps of someone else or feel their gaze penetrate the
back of my head. Immediately, I am no longer the orienting center of the world, determining the

87

In a wonderful turn of phrase Sartre says: “The Other-as-Object ‘has’ a subjectivity as this hollow box has ‘an
inside’” (Sartre, Being and Nothingness 1984, 384). For all of his flaws, Sartre saw the absurdity of theory-theorist
and simulation-theorist denials of a direct experience of the other ego decades before they were made.
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world in its temporal unfolding. Rather, I am unfolded, discovered in my bodily existence by
someone else: I am stumbled upon. I experience acutely my objectivity as the possibility-of-beingseen. This experience is a modification of my own experience, an upending of my constituting
consciousness: “I am conscious of myself as escaping myself, not in that I am in the foundation of
my own nothingness but in that I have my foundation outside myself” (Sartre, Being and
Nothingness 1984, 349). Instead of experiencing myself as the constituting center of the world, I
experience myself as a constituted object in some other constituting center’s world: “I am my Ego
for the Other in the midst of a world which flows toward the Other” (Sartre 1984, 350).88 Thus,
my experience of the look is the experience of a co-constituting through an experience of beingconstituted. This is Sartre’s great insight, and one reason for his focus on shame: I cannot
experience the other ego’s constituting activity, because it is precisely not mine; however, I do
bodily experience the effect of the other ego’s constitution, being constituted by her activity as an
object (of shame) for the other ego. 89 What I think Sartre shows equally well, is that my experience
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That Sartre describes the experience as the experience of an ego shows that he is experiencing himself as a thing
experienced, a second constituting of being first constituted by an other constituting.
89
Because of this bodily exposure to the other ego, Sartre notes that the look leaves me vulnerable, such that being in
danger is a constitutive component of my being for others. For Sartre, the encounter with the other ego is inherently
one of conflict, “because even the closest encounters between individuals are tainted by this dread of being absorbed
into the immanent” (Daigle and Landry 2013, 99). Sartre’s language mimics his outlook in No Exit when he famously
declares that “Hell is other people”, but such a dour outlook does not mean that intersubjectivity is structurally marked
by danger. I hold that the appearance of the constitution of the world by the other ego is not against my own
constitution; it is with my constitution. My relation to the other ego is not first one of conflict or risk but rather one of
coincidence. Sartre himself declares simultaneity to be possible only on the grounds of intersubjective experience, and
this simultaneity of experiencing, of temporalizing, is precisely the extent of my vulnerability. I am not first open to
risk because of the other’s look; rather, I am first open to the other because of her look. This openness can be
experienced as a risk, certainly, as when I am caught doing something shameful, as Sartre notes. It is also experienced
as a danger if I am subject to external forces that put me in harm’s way. It is this way with a skittish cat who jumps
when you touch her, because what touches you can harm you, especially when you do not see it coming. However,
this openness as a risk of danger, as a negative vulnerability is materially conditioned, not structural. Animals that do
not know the risk of human or predatorial contact do not run from people; they investigate them, are curious about
them, walk to up them, give them space, etc. The openness to others can manifest as a risk of danger, but also as a risk
of enrichment. Lampert even argues that the possibility of conflict is itself also possibly enriching: “It is only when
the deepest conflicts are set in motion that multi-cultural interpretations come into contact and a common world of
possibilities is opened up” (Lampert 1995, 364). For Lampert, the conflict of intercultural relations is what makes
possible enrichment, and this insight need not be limited to the interactions of different societies and communities.
However, Lampert still agrees with Sartre that openness to others is inherently conflictual. I would argue that while

52

of being-constituted by the other ego is also an experience of being constituted in a world that is
also constituted by someone other than me. As he says: “with the other’s look a new organization
of complexes comes to superimpose itself on the first [on my own]” (Sartre 1984, 353). It is not
only my own self that is given to me anew by the other ego; I also experience my self as an object
situated in other object relations, specifically relations that are not my own relations. It is no longer
the case that the keyhole is at such a height that I can kneel and peer through it or that the door is
thin enough for me to hear what is said on the other side. Instead, when I experience the look of
the other ego, I experience the keyhole and the door as relations to my body that someone else can
observe: I experience my body and the door as shamefully close, as embarrassing; I experience
my body as being in a compromising position, as an object of ridicule. In short, I experience objects
in the world and my own self as an object as constituted by someone else.
It is important to note here that, according to Sartre, the flow of the world that runs toward
the look does not run toward an object that appears in my world as in his description of the other
ego as a drain. That would render the look an object, which is precisely what Sartre is seeking to
avoid; it would turn the other-as-subject into the other-as-object, an interiority. 90 Rather, this is the
experience of being-constituted, the experience of a world constituted elsewhere, flowing without

this openness does leave one vulnerable to others in that one is open to the constitution of the other ego, the other’s
freedom, as Sartre would say, this openness is not structurally dangerous. Husserl says that people in a communicative
surrounding world, in the social association of sharing a surrounding world that is agreed upon, are companions,
counter subjects, not opposed objects, “who converse and are related to one another, actually or potentially, in acts of
love and counter-love, of hate and counter-hate, of confidence and reciprocated confidence, etc.” (Husserl 1989,
204/194). Conflict and enrichment possibly arise out of one’s openness to others, and possibly in tandem as Lampert
argues, but the freedom of the other ego does not immediately place me at risk, even if I cannot escape her freedom.
There is no exit from my wife’s gaze, but I derive comfort from this, not a sense of danger. Thus, Sartre’s pessimism
should be always in the back of one’s mind when reading his melodramatic phenomenological analyses.
90
For Sartre, there is an unbridgeable gap between the experience of the other ego as object and the experience of the
other ego as subject, in that the other ego as subject, as looking at me, is incapable of being seen, of being apprehended
by me as a subject. In fact, Sartre notes that the experience of being-seen is a destruction of the object that is (probably)
doing the looking: “The Other’s look hides his eyes; he seems to go in front of them” (Sartre 1984, 348).
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limit not toward some localized other ego, some other lived body, but merely away from me. 91
Again, this is why Sartre argues that my experience of any object as an other ego is only ever
probable, as any attempt on my part to localize the other ego that sees me automatically negates
her by turning her into an object (Sartre 1984, 369). Here we again see the importance of the
exclusivity of the in-itself and the for-itself. However, following Husserl, I argue that I do not
phenomenologically experience other egos as probable; when the other ego, as a system of
relations that is not my own, walks into my office and might possibly see the work and evaluations
of her peers, her appearance as a center of co-constitution is not accompanied by the disclaimer,
“but only if she is actually an other center of relations constituting the world with me.” 92 For this
reason, Husserl is correct to include both descriptions of co-constitution in the appearance of the
other ego.
Sartre misses the role that this plays in his analysis, which is particularly evident in his
arguement that an experience in which I mistakenly believe myself to be looked at by someone
else is still evidence of the appearance of the other ego. If my experience of the other ego is an
illusion, the illusory experience still elucidates the structural givenness of the other ego as a coconstitution. For instance, if while I’m grading papers the door is darkened not by a student
blocking the light but by a gust of wind blowing the door closed or a flicker of light, I still realize
that all of my papers and the grades up on the computer are experienceable by the other. In other
words, the experience offers phenomenologically the necessary evidence of the appearance of the
other ego in her co-constitution. What is no longer given, or is now given as having been
erroneously conceived, is merely “the contingent connection between other and an object-being in
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One is reminded of Heidegger’s work on anxiety and the nothingness opened by the retreat of beings from me which
reveals being-as-such (Heidegger 1993, 100-106).
92
Such an issue is already bracketed in the phenomenological reduction, but let us pretend that the existence of the
other ego as an actual other ego is of concern.
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my world” (Sartre 1984, 370). The world is still experienced as co-constituted, and the coconstitution is centered on where the body of the other ego would have been had one walked in.
There is a contingent connection between the world and a specific object, which allows Sar tre to
correctly say that “the fact of being looked at can not therefore depend on the object which
manifests the look” (Sartre 1984, 369). However, there is a necessary relation between the world
as co-constituted and the center of co-constituting to which it necessarily refers. I do not experience
the world as co-constituted by an omniscient being who constitutes the world in its totality. Rather,
the world as referring to other egos refers to other constitutive systems centered in a lived body.

II.4 The transcendental sense of co-constitution
The illusory experience of the other ego offers an important insight into the structure of the
appearance of the other ego: the appearance of the world as co-constituted is not merely given as
co-constituted by specific other egos within my current field of experience. As stated, the world is
experienced as shared with more than just the other egos given in my immediate experience. In a
passage from GP, Husserl discusses how such other egos appear through the propogation of the
appearance of co-constitution:
And the index is as manifold as there are other I’s given to me in empathy. And in
‘indirectly imagining’ (‘indirekten’ Vorstellen) that one or the other of the I’s
encounters a number of fellow men, whom I do not encounter, and have not
encountered, I also think and recognize that one and the same nature is experienced
by each and everyone of these people. In the phenomenological reduction (that
exercise), nature ‘as such’ is an index for all the pure I’s as correlated to all human
beings, that is, it is an index for the systems of possible experiences belonging to
them as the I’s of human beings. (Husserl 2006, 155/228)
In my experience of the world as co-constituted, I experience actual other egos around me as coconstituting the world with me, but I also experience possible other egos that are not actually there
with me. This is not merely other egos whom I mistakenly believe to be there, such as the student
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who is not actually standing in the door. In grading my papers, the students whose papers I grade
are given to me as having written the exam; the people who manufactured the paper booklets, ink
pens, office furniture, and other objects utilized by me in my grading and surrounding me in my
office are given to me as well. I do not come across ungraded exams and red pens and wonder
what physical natural process brought them about. I experience the world as an index of the other
egos involved in its creation, including past generations that came before me, and the other possible
egos who will encounter the shared world long after I am gone. 93 In fact, Husserl explains that
these other possible egos never have to come to concrete, immediate givenness nor are they
required to be able to do so:
For each man, every other is implicit in this horizon – physically, pscyhophysically,
in respect of what is internal to the other’s psyche – and is thus in principle a realm
of endless acceessibilities, though in fact most other men remain horizonal.
(Husserl 1999, 131/158,159)
I argue that the above description of the ever present co-constitution of the other ego points
to what I call the transcendental sense of co-constitution; that is, the transcendental structure of
consciousness includes in it the constitutive contribution of other egos in my very constitution of
the world. This leads to the question of transcendental intersubjectivity, specifically regarding how
the intersubjective horizon of my experience arises. There has been much debate within the
phenomenological tradition as to whether or not such a thing as transcendental intersubjectivity is
even possible; for instance, Sartre denied that one could have an intersubjective horizon without
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The intergenerational givenness of the world is an interesting phenomenological basis for responsibility, especially
concerning environmental ethics and the undoing and overcoming of systems of oppression. It could be argued
phenomenologically that one has a sort of responsibility to future egos and a responsibility (although maybe not
culpability) for the actions of prior egos. In any case, both future and past egos are given in my experience of the
world, even if they cannot escape anonymity.
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the concrete experience of the other ego, 94 and he is not alone in this position.95 Sartre and those
who deny the possibility of transcendental intersubjectivity would argue that the foundation of
intersubjectivity on the concrete experience of an other ego would negate its transcendentality. 96
Although he ostensibly argued for transcendental intersubjectivity, Husserl himself often
equivocated on the relationship between the concrete encounter with the other ego and
transcendental

intersubjectivity;

in

some

texts

Husserl

claimed

that

transcendental

intersubjectivity was founded on the concrete experience of an embodied other ego while in others
it is clear that the transcendental intersubjective structure underlies any experience of an other ego
(Zahavi 2001, 56-57). In order to address this question adequately, I must first clarify the way in
which there can be a transcendental sense of co-constitution. Next, I must look at the full sense of
the other ego, which includes her inaccessibility (Chapter III) and unique verification (Chapter
IV). Then, I will be able to investigate the question of transcendental intersubjectivity according
to its most basic point: is the concrete experience of the other ego necessary in order for the
constitution of the sense of the other ego (Chapter V)?
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It should be noted that Sartre’s view on intersubjectivity did change in his later work, although it is unlikely that
this included an openness to transcendental intersubjectivity. Rather, in his notebooks on ethics, there is no discussion
of the experience of the other ego as necessarily a relation of conflict (Daigle 2011, 7). Daigle argues that this is due
to Sartre’s limited familiarity with Hegel’s work on the relationship to others while writing Being and Nothingness
and the influence of Simone de Beauvoir and her work on mutual recognition (Daigle 2011, 8).
95
Like Sartre, Schutz viewed intersubjectivity as outside of the scope of transcendental constitutional analysis, as it is
only available to an ontology of the life-world. The whole of intersubjective experience is based on the werelationship, which means that the transcendental constitution of the world as shared and objective is for the meditating
ego. He holds that this sense is to be clarified (as opposed to created) according to transcendental constitutional
analysis, but this can only occur starting from the experience of the we-relationship, which he places with birth (Schutz
1975, 82-84). The difference Schutz identifies in phenomenological constitutional analysis between clarification,
which he says is the original meaning, and creation, the new meaning he finds problematic, is not a difference that
this work can address. However, I am confident in saying that Schutz’s foundation of transcendental intersubjectivity
on the mundane experience of the we-relationship cannot account for the appearance of other egos as more than
probable.
96
In Zahavi’s discussion of Sartre’s resistance to transcendental intersubjectivity, he describes Sartre’s position: “If
solipsism is to be truly overcome, it will not do to neutralize the otherness of the other by positing intersubjectivity as
a necessary function of our being, as something that can be disclosed a priori from the for-itself. On the contrary, the
existence of Others is a contingent fact, and our being-for-others must be understood as an existential dimension which
only arises in and through the concrete encounter with factual others” (Zahavi 2002, 268)
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First, I must clarify the transcendental sense of co-constitution, so I will turn to the work
of Zahavi, specifically Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity, wherein he elucidates clearly
what Husserl called open intersubjectivity 97 and the argument that it founds all individual, concrete
intersubjective encounters. Zahavi’s argument begins with my experience of the world as being
given to more than just me, as being co-constituted. As stated above, when I experience things, or
when I experience in general, my experience is of a shared world. Zahavi notes that even when I
undertake the transcendental reduction, the sense of the world as there for everyone remains
(Zahavi 2001, 26). Thus, Zahavi argues, “an explication of the ontological structure of the world
therefore leads us, by way of this disclosure of the sense of the world as a world to everyone, to
transcendental intersubjectivity” (Zahavi 2001, 25). In other words, it elucidates the givenness of
the other ego through co-constitution in the transcendental sense.
This, however, requires further clarification. To say that the world is there for more than
just me is to say that it is transcendent to me, but Zahavi notes that there are two different
possibilities for transcendence here (Zahavi 2001, 26). First, as discussed above with the moon
example, there is what Zahavi calls subjective transcendence: something can be transcendent to
my individual conscious act, such that it persists through other conscious acts and can be
synthesized in an identity. This primordial or immanent transcendence is the transcendence of an
object beyond my individual intentions of it. Thus, the experience of subjective transcendence
requires recollection in addition to my immediate living present. This, as Zahavi points out, is how
Husserl establishes the transcendence of an object: “the transcendence of the object is only
constituted at the moment in which its identity across different acts is ascertained. The
identification of the object is precisely the noetic correlate of the identity of the object. And it
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This term is used by Husserl, although Zahavi elevates it to a technical term in clarifying Husserl’s work on
transcendental intersubjectivity.
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would be impossible to ascertain this without recollection” (Zahavi 2001, 30). In fact, it is only
through such a synthesis of identification that one can speak of having an object: “the ‘one’
constituting exclusively in perception itself… is still not an ‘object.’ An ‘object’ is the correlate of
a cognition and this cognition lies originally in synthetic identification (Husserl 2001, 615/327, as
quoted in Zahavi 2001, 30-31).98 Subjective transcendence illustrates the difference between the
constitution of an object and the constitution of objectivity: “the possibility of identifying an object
in recollection [is] a necessary but not at all sufficient condition of the constitution of objectivity”
(Zahavi 2001, 31).
This means that there needs to be something more in order for me to constitute objectivity,
a second type of transcendence that would exceed even my possible experience, and the solution
lies in transcendental intersubjectivity: “it is only through the appresentative givenness of a foreign
I that something can be constituted as having a validity-claim that transcends my own existence,
and it is only because I experience an alter ego – an ego other than mine – that I can experience
objectivity and transcendence” (Zahavi 2001, 33). The only way that transcendental
phenomenology can account for objectivity, the givenness of objects as being there for more than
any possible act of mine, is for the other consciousness that transcends my possible and actual
experience to be a structural part of my constituting consciousness.
However, there is a difficulty in Husserl’s argument that Zahavi must address, a difficulty
that occasions the phenomenological debate on the possibility of transcendental intersubjectivity
mentioned above: since objectivity requires the constitutive performance of an other ego, it seems
to imply that the other ego must be first objectively constituted before objectivity can be
constituted. To address this issue, Zahavi makes a distinction between the experience of the primal
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Steinbock’s translation is different from Behnke’s translation, so I have preserved the latter as it is the one found in
Zahavi’s text.
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other ego, that is, the experienced other ego that makes possible the experience of objectivity, and
all subsequent experiences of other egos (Zahavi 2001, 35). Other egos “are not originally present
for me and familiar to me as objects of a particular intentionality, but rather as co-functioning in
all intentionality; as a co-present, the foreign present precedes the explicit experience of, and
encounter with, others” (Zahavi 2001, 57 my emphasis).99 The argument for the appearance of the
other ego as this co-present co-constituting is one that returns to the explication of the sense of the
world as there for everyone, co-constituted.
Zahavi begins this argument with a simple perceptive act whose object transcends the act,
as described above. When perceiving an object, there is a “horizon intentionality” by which I
intend the object as a whole as opposed to the mere aspect of the object given to me. Included in
the horizon intentionality are the apperceived sides co-given in my perception of the object, even
though they are not the profile perceived in my present act of perception. Further, there are
background objects surrounding the perceived object (or, strictly speaking, the perceived
perspective of the object) also co-given with my perception. These absent sides of the thing I am
perceiving and the surrounding objects and its relation to them are “always more or less cointended” (Zahavi 2001, 40). This constitutes the world horizon: my perception of an object shows
the world to be an “all-encompassing horizon and context of sense” (Zahavi 2001, 41). The horizon
intentionality shows that there is always more that is intended in a perception of something in the
world than what I myself properly perceive.
In addition to horizon intentionality, Zahavi also notes that an appearance has its own
structural requirements. Inasmuch as my perceiving something necessitates something to be
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Zahavi takes care to stress that this is not a hypothetical experience. The other ego “experienced in the
appresentational experience of others… is experienced, and can thus itself be verified or canceled in the manner proper
to experience” (Zahavi 2001, 60). Unfortunately for my analyses in Chapter IV, he does not discuss the way in which
this verification occurs.
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perceived, the appearing of something demands someone to whom it appears (Zahavi 2001, 42).
All appearances are perspectival, limited, which allows Husserl to say in Ideas I that, if God were
to perceive spatial objects, it would necessarily be through adumbrations (Husserl 1983, 91-95/7881, 362/315). All appearances imply that there is someone oriented towards the appearing, and
being oriented towards an appearing necessitates being spatially situated, that is, being embodied
in a body that orients towards objects. Every appearing, then, is an appearing to a lived body. As
described above, such a lived body is a moving center of orientation. According to Zahavi, Husserl
argues that the “intuition of spatial objects is a process that is made possible by our kinaesthetic
‘sensations,’ i.e., our awareness of lived bodily movements and positions” (Zahavi 2001, 43). The
object as a nexus of perspectival appearances is constituted through the various movements we
make, or can make, in our continuing experience of the object. Each perceptive act motivates
further possible perceptive acts of an object, and each act gives other possible aspects of the object.
These other possible aspects are associated with possible kinesthetic movements: I can turn my
head slightly, glance at a different part of the object, or even shift my whole body to perceive a
different perspective. The object is constituted in the continually changing kinesthesis of my lived
body, allowing for an uninterrupted synthesis of identity. However, if this kinesthetic constitution
were to exhaust the constitution of an object, we would again be left with an immanent
transcendence. In order for an object to appear transcendent itself, as objective, there needs to be
something more at play in my horizonal intentionality. In each individual act of perception, in this
case of an external, material object, what is presented is accompanied by what is appresented; the
perspective perceived is given with “absent but co-meant” perspectives of the same object (Zahavi
2001, 45). How do we account for this essential aspect of appearance?

61

Zahavi offers three possibilities. First, it is possible that the absent perspectives of the
object given in the perceptive act are “appresented as aspects that were given or could be given as
present in my past or future perceptions” (Zahavi 2001, 46). This is insufficient because an object
is given as having a front and a back side, with the backside (and other sides neither front nor back)
being absent in any specific act of perception. A back side is given precisely as co-meant, as an
absent perspective. I can, of course, turn around and view the back side, but as Zahavi notes, when
doing so, I am actually viewing a front side, as the back side is never given as a front side (Zahavi
2001, 47). Thus, the absent sides cannot be given as possible past or future experiences, because
“it lies in the sense of the object itself that at each moment, it possesses a multiplicity of actually
coexisting profiles,” only one of which is presently perceived by me (Zahavi 2001, 47). It could
also be that the other perspectives are fictive, such that they are given to “acts I could perform if I
were there (instead of here) now, with all this understood in the subjunctive mood, contrary to the
fact” (Zahavi 2001, 46). However, this cannot be the case with perceptive acts, because if one
perspective is given as actually there, then the other sides cannot be co-present as fictively there.
As Zahavi correctly states, such an explanation would “shatter the homogeneity of the perceptual
object [because]… the reality of the object is still a unitary whole – a reality that would be nullified
if the object partially consisted of fictive aspects” (Zahavi 2001, 47).
Thus, Zahavi presents a third alternative that allows for the object of my current perceptive
act to include the givenness of the co-meant, absent perspectives to a perceiving, kinesthetic
perceiver. I cannot have multiple perceptive acts of a single spatial object at one time, so the
givenness of an object as adumbrated, as having multiple perspectives co-meant in any single
perception yet absent from that particular perceptive act, means that “horizon intentionality, or the
horizonal mode of givenness of the object, is intersubjective in its very essence” (Zahavi 2001,
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45). In other words, in order for an object to be given to perception such that its co-meant
perspectives are apperceived, there must be a relation to a foreign subjectivity, an other ego, as a
possible perceiver of the other perspectives (Zahavi 2001, 49). In other words, the very act of
constitution, my act of constitution, is inherently intersubjective in nature. My constitutive act
incorporates the constitutive performance of other possible egos. In my own experience an object
is given to me as transcendent, not merely temporally persistent for me from my perspective. It is
given as transcendent to any possible or actual experience I may have. In order for such an object
to be given to my consciousness, to be constituted in my lived experience, it must be that “my
horizonal relatedness to the world contains structural references to the perceptions of possible
others” (Zahavi 2001, 51-52).
This means that the other ego appears as a constitutive component of my transcendental
structure of objective constitution. To say the same thing, the co-constitution of the other ego
appears in the very givenness of the world. Thus, the givenness of the world is simultaneous with
the givenness of the performance of the other ego as co-constituting the world with me. The
experience of the other ego at this level, which Zahavi calls the primal experience of the other, is
not of any particular other ego; rather, the appearance of the other ego is precisely an experience
of the activity of co-constituting the co-constituted world.100
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To be clear, the appearance of the other ego in my experience of the world as constituted is not a deduction. I do
not experience the world as constituted by more than my own constitution and then posit a co-constitutor that I call
the other ego. Rather, in the experience of the co-constituted world, the co-constitutor is given in a unified appearance
with the co-constituted world. In the same way that the backside of an object is given in every experience of a physical
object or a past and future are given in every experience of the now (or, to use Descartes’ example, a valley and a
peak), the givenness of the object is only accomplished in the full apperception of the appresented. Sartre makes a
similar point: “At the same time I experience the Other’s infinite freedom. It is for and by means of a freedom and
only for and by means of it that my possibles can be limited and fixed” (Sartre 1984, 362). Sartre does not experience
the limitation of what is possible for him and then deduce that the limit only comes from the other ego. Rather, in
experiencing the limitation of his possibilities, he also experiences the other ego as a freedom limiting him. The
givenness of the one does not imply the givenness of the other; the givenness of the one is the very same givenness of
the other.
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In her book Intersubjective Temporality, Rodemeyer also notes that my constitution of an
object “indicates the activity of other subjects in their co-constitution of [the object] as a shared
meaning as well as their co-constitution of related meanings” (Rodemeyer 2006, 114). She uses
this to show that the co-constitutive contribution of the other ego is at play already in my
temporalizing conscious activity. 101 As I will discuss with more depth in Chapters IV and V,
Rodemeyer shows that my experiences become sedimented through retentional modifications such
that I form “general memories” (Rodemeyer 2006, 114-115). In other words, when I have an
experience of a red burner on a stovetop as being hot, as when I burned my finger in my
grandmother’s kitchen at the age of four, this experience becomes gradually buried within my
memorial structures. When I next encounter a red burner on a stovetop, I do not need to recall that
specific memory; rather, I simply have a general memory of stovetops being hot to the touch. This
general memory, then, is carried with me and informs my future experiences through protention,
which will be explored in Chapter V. As Rodemeyer explains, my experience of the world includes
the “co-constituting activity of another consciousness besides my own, and then that indication of
co-constitution is retained as sedimented in my far retention” (Rodemeyer 2006, 124). So, the coconstitution of the other ego, which she notes as co-constituting activity but would also include
the world as co-constituted by other egos, also becomes a general memory accompanying my
experience of the world. Thus, the sense of the other ego is retained as a general memory
influencing my constitution of the world. This claim accords with my analysis of the appearance
of the other ego through her co-constitution, but the addition of the sedimentation of this sense
into far retention adds a further dimension. The structure of retention is at play in the
temporalization of consciousness, which Rodemeyer rightly notes is the level of consciousness
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Rodemeyer argues that the sense of the other ego at play at this level is genetically grounded in a concrete
experience of the other ego that becomes sedimented in far retention.
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that is most obviously solipsistic. In other words, there is an intersubjective component even at the
level of temporalizing consciousness. Thus, as she concludes:
[I]f the content sedimented in far retention indicates the co-constitution of other
consciousnesses, then the structure of temporalizing consciousness itself must
include an open support that allows for this connection. …Our “general memories”
in far retention already contain a link to intersubjectivity through their indication of
co-constituting activity and shared meanings. (Rodemeyer 2006, 125)
This intersubjective link at the level of temporalization rests on the genetic constitution of the
sense of the other ego through her co-constitution. In this way, Rodemeyer shows that the
appearance of the other ego with the sense of co-constitution is a constitutive component of my
own constitutive activity.

II.5 Further considerations for the clarification of the sense of the other ego
That the other ego is given through her co-constitution means, for Husserl, that I experience
the other ego both in the world as co-constituted and in her embodied co-constituting activity. In
other words, the other ego is given both in the accomplishment and performance of her constitutive
act. Husserl describes this appearance as an index, in that the other ego appears as referenced by
and as organizing our shared surroundings:
It is now clear that if (as has been specified in these lectures) we understand by the
phenomenological reduction the ‘disconnect’ of nature given experientially to ‘my’
I, and if we understand ‘me’ as the subject of empathy, then that which is left for
me with respect to nature’s correlate is not only the system of actual and motivated
possible experiences, namely my experiences, but also the co-bracketed nature, i.e.,
the very same nature, namely as it is given within the empathized other I, as this
nature is reduced to the experiences of this other I and the possible system of his
experiences. Hence ‘nature’ as such is not only an index for my system of possible
experiences of nature, being connected with the momentary and changing core of
actual experiences of nature, but it is also an index for corresponding systems of
experiences of the other I’s, which through empathy are eo ipso empathized
systems. And just as nature in general, so every single thing of nature is such an
index. (Husserl 2006, 154-155/228)
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After performing the phenomenological reduction, the world 102 and the objects within it refer to
my actual and possible experiences; in other words, the world appears as the constituted noematic
correlate of my actual and possible conscious acts. This is not all, however, as the world still
appears to me as shared with others, as co-inhabited; there are meanings that I constitute that do
not originate with or belong to my own ego. Husserl describes this as a super-addition of sense:
In connexion with [the constitutional level pertaining to the “other ego”] and,
indeed, motivated by it, there occurs a universal super-addition of sense to my
primordial world, whereby the latter becomes the appearance “of” a determinate
“Objective” world, as the identical world for everyone, myself included (Husserl
1999, 106-107/137).103
The appearance of the world as saturated with layers of meaning that do not originate from me is
the appearance of the world as an index for other constitutive systems, that is, other egos appear
to me as systems of co-constituting corresponding to the co-constituted world and the objects
within it. Thus, the world also appears as co-constituted by the other egos who are constituting the
world with me.
However, there are two further questions that need to be answered in order to fully clarify
the way in which this co-constitution appears to me. First, the way in which the other ego’s
constitutive activity is given to me as other than mine, that is, as a co-constitution, must be
clarified. Second, the verification of the givenness of this co-constitution, which Husserl says is a
unique verification, must be investigated. Only after these two components of the appearance of
the other ego are clarified can I answer the question at the heart of the discussion of transcendental
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In this passage, Husserl is specifically speaking of nature, which is obviously not the same as the world. For the
present analysis, however, the distinction between nature and the world does not need to be clarified, as the point is
that I experience my surroundings as referring to other egos and other egos as being referred to by my surroundings.
103
Later in the same text says that this super-addition of sense arises from my experience of the other ego’s lived body
(Husserl 1999, 124/153). This is one passage where Husserl argues that one must have a concrete experience of the
other ego’s lived body in order to have objective experience at all.
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intersubjectivity: must one have a concrete experience of the other ego prior to the constitution of
the sense of the other ego?
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Chapter III: Inaccessibility
It is now clear that the other ego appears in her co-constitution, such that my experience of
an other ego is the experience of another stream of constitution that is not mine. The next
component of the sense of the other ego, then, is the way in which this other stream of constitution
is distinguished from my own constitution. According to Husserl, the co-constitution of the other
ego is given to me as inaccessible; Thus, how this sense of inaccessibility is to be characterized
will be the focus of the present chapter. Phenomenologically, it is impossible to say that I do not
encounter other egos, as my world is filled with them. It is possible to doubt the veracity of these
appearances, but to do so is already to rush past the phenomenological evidence needed to
investigate the appearance of the other ego. Thus, something is given, and while it is inaccessible,
this inaccessibility is to be understood in a pregnant sense. The other egos appear as inaccessible
because, as Husserl notes:
neither the other I herself, nor her lived experiences [Erlebnisse], her appearances
themselves, or anything else belonging to her own essence becomes given in my
experience originally. If it were, if what belongs to the other’s own essence were
directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately
she herself and I myself would be the same. (Husserl 1999, 109/139, translation
altered)
Here, and in other passages, 104 the accessibility of the other ego is different than the way in which
inanimate objects are given, in that it is a constituting that is not originally mine and what belongs
to it is not directly accessible. Thus, it is my contention that accessibility, phenomenologically
considered, is determined by the originality of the conscious act and the directness of its
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In Ideas I Husserl speaks of the experience of the other ego in reference to its originality (Husserl 1983, 6/8). In
GP, Husserl notes that the other ego has a stream of consciousness similar to my directly given stream (Husserl 2006,
102/87), and uses direct and original to distinguish my stream of consciousness from that of the other ego’s (Husserl
2006, 142-146/220-224).
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contents.105 This terminology must be clarified in order elucidate the full sense of accessibility.
After exploring Husserl’s usage of these terms, I will employ this terminology in describing two
modes of consciousness: recollection and expectation. I then discuss originality and directness in
Fremderfahrung106 to show the way in which the experience of the other ego is different than the
above two acts of consciousness, which allows for a clear elucidation of what Husserl means by
accessibility. Through a careful explanation of these modes of experience, I argue that Husserl
uses “accessibility” to denote a special type of originality that separates the givenness of the other
ego’s conscious life from my own. I then show how the other ego is accessible to me as an other
ego through the inaccessibility of her conscious life, which is given to me directly as an object and
indirectly as an enacting of her conscious acts. I end by comparing this to another possible reading
of Husserl’s inaccessibility, which I show to be untenable.

III.1 Direct and Indirect Experience
Husserl’s use of the term “direct” is at times non-technical and applied to experience in
various manners according to its object. Such ambiguity is mirrored in the contemporary
scholarship. On one hand, direct perception is used in analytic philosophy of perception to describe
the direct grasping of the object itself as opposed to representations or appearances of the thing. 107
Further, direct is used in work on social cognition to denote theories that argue that other minds
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Accessibility for Husserl does not concern mediation, at least not in the way that the contemporary literature
discusses it. As Cairns notes, mediation can be used to denote any occurrence of a medium, even a spatial distance or
lived body, but phenomenologically my embodied experience of a spatial object is immediate (Cairns 2006, 6). This
broad sense of mediation is also used against the phenomenological approach in the debate on social cognition, as
noted in (Zahavi 2011, 547-549). That mediation can be taken in various ways according to various thinkers or
disciplines places a greater importance on clarifying what Husserl means regarding the accessibility of the other ego.
106
I refrain from using empathy here, as Husserl himself was unhappy with the term (Husserl 2006, 164/234). Empathy
is an act of a higher order that is not always at play in the experience of the other ego. That is, the associative act of
Paarung is an experience of or conscious act directed toward the other ego, but it is not empathy proper.
107
This is both in reference to analytic readings of Husserl and other philosophers in the tradition who hold that we
perceive objects immediately. See (Tostenson 2010).
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are observable. 108 In general, there is little agreement on what is exactly meant by saying an
experience or perception is direct. 109 For instance, how is the perceptual directness of spatial
objects related to the perceptual directness of other minds: assuming I have direct perception of
the cup in front of me, do I have the same direct perception of the consciousness of the server who
handed me the cup? Such differences in contemporary scholarship are informative for reading
Husserl’s work, as he uses “direct” to characterize the presentation of other egos and spatial
objects, but he also notes that the intuition of other egos is fulfilled in different ways than spatial
objects. One must be aware that there is an ambiguity here in Husserl’s usage of perception: while
his usage of perception (Wahrnehmung) often refers to the individual perceptive act, it can also
refer to the general experiencing of an object, including other modes of consciousness. This allows
him to say that I cannot directly perceive the other ego, at least not in the technical, more narrow
sense of perception, while simultaneously holding that the other ego can be given to me or
experienced by me directly.110
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As opposed to so called Theory-theory or Simulation-theory supporters whose arguments assume a basic
unobservability of other minds. For an overview of these two positions see (Ratcliffe 2012, 474-475), (Williams 2017,
194-195), (Zahavi 2014, 139-141).
109
One author writing on social cognition describes a direct experience as being “more immediate, experiential, and
intuitive” (Williams 2016, 2016). In attempting to distinguish direct perception from simulation, Gallagher refers to
direct perception as “nothing more than perception itself” (Gallagher 2008, 537). In analytic philosophy of perception,
direct perception is used more for a name to describe perceptual theories that grasp objects without representation and
are characterized by transparency of perception, i.e. they do not assert the existence or influence of constitutive data
(such as sensations of bits of color) that make up the perception of an object, rather the components of the object
perception are the components of the object itself (when looking at how one perceives a table, one finds components
pertaining to the table and not sensorial data) (Tostenson 2010). My personal favorite is Zahavi’s admittance that “one
should acknowledge that there simply isn’t any established view on what ‘direct’ means” (Zahavi 2011, 548).
110
This distinction becomes clarified through the work of the chapter, but a brief example will help at present. I
experience the other ego in so far as I am aware of them, interact with them, etc. However, I cannot grasp them as I
can a physical object. Even the apperceived other sides of a physical object can become grasped in a further perceptive
act, but this is impossible for the apperceived other ego. Thus, that I cannot perceive the other ego refers to my inability
to have the other ego as the object of an individual perceptive act. However, this does not discount the fullness of the
appearance of other egos in my experience of the world. Thus, the following discussion will focus more on the
experience or the consciousness of the other ego as opposed to the strict perception of her in order to avoid this
terminological pitfall.
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The task of this section, then, is to uncover a functional pattern to Husserl’s use of direct,
but I do not pretend that an exhaustive study of his usage of the term is likely to find a uniform
meaning.111 I begin with some considerations from the secondary literature, derived mostly from
the work on social cognition. I use the framework given in these arguments to assess passages
from Husserl that offer a picture of his usage of direct, one which influences the contemporary
usage. When possible, I attempt to find citations in which he contrasts the direct and the indirect.
In doing so, I hope to clarify the way in which certain things are given directly to consciousness
and how other things are given indirectly.
In his attempt to clarify the phenomenological position in the debate over social cognition,
Dan Zahavi offers a descriptive account of what is meant by direct. In response to other theorists
who argue that the perception of the other ego cannot be direct if it is given contextually (Jacob
2011, 528), Zahavi argues that the proper dichotomy should be between direct and indirect or
mediated. What is directly perceived is said to be:
my primary intentional object. There is, so to speak, nothing that gets in the way,
and it is not as if I am first directed at an intermediary, something different from
the other’s psychological state, and then only in a secondary step target it.
Moreover, and importantly, the state is experienced as actually present to me,
thereby making the experience in question very different from, say, reasoning that
111

That Husserl uses terms loosely while having an underlying functional distinction can also be found in Steinbock’s
analysis of Husserl’s use of fremd and andere (Steinbock 1995, 57-60). Steinbock notices a pattern of use of these
terms that, while not uniform, allows for a conceptual distinction Husserl himself did not notice or with which he was
unconcerned. Steinbock argues that fremd, as alien or foreign, is an axiological concept, while andere is a logical one.
Andere indicates the other as in the second thing under investigation, not the primary, while fremd connotes an
irreducible and irreplaceable thing separate from the originally investigated thing. His example of a foreign language
not being equivalent to a second language best exemplifies this distinction. In the case of direkt and indirekt I have
recourse to Husserliana XXIII, particularly §2 of the first Beilage, wherein Husserl lays out a functional demarcation
largely in line with the following discussion. I still hold that this usage is not entirely consistent for a few reasons: (1)
this distinction is also described as genuine and non-genuine in the same Beilage, showing that a terminological
distinction does not seem to be on Husserl’s mind; (2) the terms are sparsely used in the discussions of phantasy and
image consciousness even when it seems that he is discussing this distinction; and (3) the same conceptual distinction
in other texts is made between the direkt and the mittelbar. Again, this is not to say that Husserl was unaware of this
concept, or that this concept cannot be drawn out of his work. Rather, I am drawing out Husserl’s present but little
clarified distinction between direct and indirect givenness, which furthers the current project of clarifying the
accessibility of the other ego in its inaccessibility and offers a possible foundation for the usage of direct in the
contemporary debates on social cognition.
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the other is upset, because the letter she received has been torn up, or inferring that
the other is drunk because he is surrounded by a dozen empty beer bottles, or
concluding that the other must be furious because I would be furious if I had been
subjected to the same treatment as he has. (Zahavi 2011, 548)
I have included the final three examples because they situate nicely the atmosphere in which
Zahavi is defining “directness”. The first two examples would be standard fare for theory-theorists
who argue that our perception of the other mind is one of theoretical positing based on contextual
and cultural knowledge. The third example brings to mind simulation-theory, which argues that
we posit the other mind’s psychological state based upon how we would respond in a similar set
of circumstances. In relation to both of these theories, Zahavi defines direct as bypassing the need
for such (usually) high-level intermediary cognitive processes in favor of an unmediated grasping
of what is right there in front of me: the other ego. This other ego, or the psychological state of the
other ego, is my primary intentional object, and is thus given directly to me phenomenologically.
While this descriptive account of what is meant by “direct” is helpful in distinguishing the
phenomenological account of social cognition from its challengers, it does not offer a technical or
rigorous enough starting point because it is unclear as to what exactly qualifies as my primary
intentional object. 112 Zahavi describes my primary object as “experienced as actually present to
me”, which Husserl often calls Leibhaftigkeit, the being there in person. However, there are many
objects that are given to me in person, as actually present before me, that are nevertheless not my
primary intentional object. For instance, the desk at which I sit writing this is not the primary object
of my intention, nor is the laptop my desk supports. Rather, my primary intentional object is the
paper itself as I compose it; yet, the desk and the laptop are directly given to me, even in the
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While this is a critique of the definition offered by Zahavi, it is clear that such a rigorous definition was not his
goal in this text. His description of “direct” is helpful in distinguishing the phenomenological position regarding social
cognition from its challengers.
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background. I also have memories which are directly given, and the temporal surroundings of those
memories are directly given, although they can be understood as secondarily intended.
Zahavi also calls an experience direct when there is “nothing that gets in the way” of my
experience of the object. In a direct experience, there is nothing other than the object (no
intermediary) that facilitates my experience of the object. Husserl offers a similar description in
Husserliana XXIII when he describes the manner in which phantasy presentation is indirect:
In perceptual presentation we have one apprehended object, and this is also the
object meant. In phantasy presentation we have two apprehended objects; namely,
the phantasy image and the image subject presented to it: only the latter, however,
is meant, presented in the proper sense. Perceptual presentation presents its object
directly, phantasy presentation indirectly: phantasy presentation presents its object
in such a way that it first brings to appearance another object resembling the object,
by means of which it apprehends and means the object in image. (Husserl 2005,
122/112)
From this it is quite easy to see that directness is a function of the givenness of the object; as Dorion
Cairns describes it, in a direct consciousness the object appears itself without some intermediary,
while an indirect consciousness is of something “indicated, or represented, or signified, by
something else” (Cairns 2006, 3). The easiest example of this, and one often used by Husserl, is
an experience of a painting. When I view a painting, say of my cat, there is a double intending: I
have an intention of the image of the object, and of the object itself (Husserl 2005, 121-122/112).113
In one sense, I view the painting and think of my cat, that is to say, my actual cat and not this
painted image before me. In this intention, the painted image acts as an indication, a pointing
towards, an object that is re-presenting what is meant. 114 My cat itself is indirectly given, because
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This goes for phantasy as well as the perception of images, as illustrated by the examples Husserl offers in this
section.
114
“For the image here [in image presentations] is the ‘objectification’ of sense contents, and yet this objectification
is not a perceptual presentation. It is not the re-presenting [repräsentirende] object, the ‘mental’ image that is meant,
but the depicted object, the image subject; not this tiny little figure appearing in the colors of the photograph, but the
‘real’ child” (Husserl 2005, 121-122/112).
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it is only indicated. I do not have a consciousness of the current state of affairs concerning my cat;
rather, I have only an image of my cat, which is not the intended of the intention. 115 I can also view
the painting as an object itself, as when I focus on its brush strokes or its color palette. In this
second intention, the image of the cat is itself directly given; it is the intended of my intending.
This is not to say that a direct consciousness demands that its object be given as
simultaneous with its act. For instance, the remembering of my cat, a present act with a past object,
is a direct consciousness.116 Cairns emphasizes that this makes the remembering different from a
picturing, for the object of my recollection is itself given as my object, it is merely given as
something just-having-been. Cairns also notes that the same can be said for dreaming and
anticipation, in that their objects are the dreamt and the anticipated. 117 The directness of
consciousness, then, is not dependent upon the current existence118 of its object. Rather, the
directness of a conscious act still comes down to the way in which an object is given: a direct
consciousness is one in which the object itself is given as opposed to indicated or in some other
way presented through something else, which is apprehended but not meant.119
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See also (Husserl 2005, 126/116, 150/136).
It makes perfect sense, phenomenologically, to consider the content of a memory as directly given, as Husserl
describes the remembered content as a “past in the flesh” (Husserl 2001, 140/96). This is because what is recollected
is something that has been acquired by me in my experience: “An acquisition that we cannot have at our disposal
again is not an acquisition. An object that has been grasped in the flesh can only be there as existent for the subject
(having abiding validity in its knowledge and cognition) and can only be an actual object in its surrounding when it is
‘the identical’ to which the subject can return in iterable rememberings. Or [when it is] ‘the identical’ that the subject
can mean through rememberings as the same, time and again, or that it can possibly verify in new perceptions, but
also as what it can recognize, ‘the identical’ that it has remembered at this time, has perceived at another – which,
once more, presupposed remembering” (Husserl 2001, 141/97). Husserl even describes the act as direct in numerous
places: “Remembering…now brings the past directly to intuition as [the past] itself, [namely,] a past that was intended
in empty memory” (Husserl 2001, 124/81); “Memory is direct presentation of what is past, just as perception is direct
presentation of what is present” (Husserl 2005, 287/235 ). See also, (Cairns 2006, 5).
117
Husserl also describes recollection and anticipation as intuitive consciousnesses whose content stands before us
itself (Husserl 2005, 602/501).
118
“The fundamental error in [the belief that the object of a direct consciousness must be simultaneous with that
consciousness] is the belief that the consciousness of something involves the existence, in some manner or other, of
something that is the object of the consciousness – if not its existence in reality then at least its existence as somehow
in the mind of the person who is conscious of something” (Cairns 2006, 5).
119
It should be noted that for Cairns this givenness need not be intuitive: “In sensuously perceiving something, I am
directly conscious of it in its entirety; but I am conscious of only some parts and qualities of it as given… I am directly
116

74

Cairns offers an interesting example of physical perception to illustrate the difference
between direct and indirect givenness, specifically the way in which I can have a simultaneously
direct and indirect consciousness of the same object:
Looking into a mirror, I mean the seen images as depicting contemporary physical
events, which may well be, at the same time, objects of a direct perceiving
consciousness: I see what I take to be a mirror-image of my hand and, at the same
time, I see what I take to be my hand itself. Thus I have a direct consciousness of
something as “an image” and, simultaneously, both an indirect and a direct
consciousness of something else as “my hand”. (Cairns 2006, 4)
In viewing my hand in the mirror, I obviously have a direct consciousness of the image of my own
hand. Further, I have an indirect consciousness of my hand itself as the intended object indicated
by the mirror image of my hand. This also occurs when I look in a mirror to see if I have toothpaste
in my beard. In such an experience, I see both my face and the mirror-image of my face, but my
intention is obviously directed toward my face itself – which is indirectly given through the mirror
image. When I reach up to wipe the toothpaste from my beard, I have verification of the current
state of affairs through multiple sensual fields of experience. I feel the kinesthetic motion of my
head leaning into the mirror to get a better angle of the offending bit of toothpaste. I feel my hand
touching my face as it wipes it away. Thus, I have other consciousnesses of my body while it is
indirectly given to me in the mirror image. My face, indirectly given through the mirror image, is
presented as it currently is, verifiable through my kinesthesis and sense of touch. 120 In this way, I
have an object simultaneously given indirectly and directly. Such a double givenness is obviously
not possible in the case of the painting of my cat, for even if I am looking at the painting while
petting my cat, the painting does not offer a re-presentation of the current state of affairs with

conscious of the perceived thing as having more to it than it presents; and I am conscious of this more directly, though
not intuitively” (Cairns 2006, 7).
120
Husserl also notes this intertwining: “I see how my hand moves, and without it touching anything while moving, I
sense kinetic sensations, though as one with sensations of tension and sensations of touch, and I localize them in the
moving hand” (Husserl 1989, 158/151). In §9 of Ideas II, he calls this an aesthetic synthesis.
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regard to my cat. I can see her directly in front of me, or indirectly as the indicated painted cat.
Thus, the directness of consciousness is not dependent upon the simultaneity of the consciousness
and its object or the existence of the object. It is based purely on how the object is given to
consciousness.
Husserl discusses the directness and indirectness of consciousness in a similar manner in
an appendix to GP (Husserl 2006, 141-147).121 Here he lists both memory (later changed to
Vergegenwärtigung) and expectation as direct modes of consciousness. When I remember an
object (an event, a person, or anything else previously experienced), it is directly given as an
itself122 that has been, a thing of the past. Husserl offers an example of recalling a restaurant to
illustrate the difference between these direct modes of consciousness and an indirect one. When I
remember a restaurant that I have visited, it is a mode of direct consciousness in that the object is
given as the remembered restaurant itself. However, if I were to “posit it as present, as existing
now, then the Now and that which is objective in the Now are in no way self-given. The Roons123
is given to me as something remembered and something past… its still-existing-now and its beingsimultaneous-with the Now of perception – all that is not directly given” (Husserl 2006, 146/223).
Positing it as still-existing-now is not quite a picture consciousness, according to Husserl, and thus
slightly different than the above discussion of the painting, but in both cases the object is not given
itself; it is only indicated. In Husserl’s example, the indication comes from my past experiences as
opposed to an image proper, but the objects indicated are of indirect consciousnesses nonetheless.

121

In this appendix, Husserl also uses ownness and authenticity to describe acts of consciousness, but I will maintain
the thematic focus of the current section and limit my discussions to directness.
122
Husserl notes that this “itself” is given as belonging to “my” consciousness, which is important for the discussions
of originality in the following section.
123
The specific restaurant in Husserl’s example.
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We can now say that the directness of a conscious act is based solely on the givenness of
the object of that consciousness, now clarified as self-givenness: that which is given as itself is
given in a direct mode of consciousness, while that which is given through something else is given
in an indirect mode of consciousness. 124 This clarification will help to delineate the accessibility
of phenomena, but it is not enough for what Husserl has in mind phenomenologically when he
discusses accessibility. I have a direct perception of the other ego, as Zahavi and Gallagher have
shown, but the other ego is still accessible only in its inaccessibility. To fully flesh this out, we
must consider originality.

III.2 The originality of experience
In CM5, the accessibility of the other ego is often discussed in relation to originality: that
which is particular to the other ego’s own essence is not given to me originally. In contrast, Husserl
notes that, “[i]n [transcendental self-experience] the ego is accessible to herself originally”
(Husserl 1999, 22/62, translation altered). Husserl explores this distinction with more depth in the
same appendix to GP mentioned above, in which he investigates the way in which streams of
consciousness are given as individuated, specifically my stream as separate from the streams of
other egos.125 In my phenomenologically reduced stream of experience, I have consciousnesses of
objects that are not always given as my consciousnesses, properly speaking. For anyone who has
felt shame or embarrassment, as described by Sartre in exploring the look, this is a readily available
experience. When I fall off of the weight bench at the gym and I notice all of the much more

124

This bears a strong resemblance to Heidegger’s discussion of phenomenon as “that which shows itself in itself” as
opposed to mere semblance or appearance (Heidegger 1962, 51-55/28-13).
125
This argument is reconstructed from Appendix 7 of GP and from CM5, but the entirety of these texts help formulate
the problem of originality and the other consciousness. In fact, in certain places within the lectures from GP, later
amendments made by Husserl insert terminology relating to originality (mostly originär) to clarify the original
meaning.
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capable and healthier people looking at me, I am conscious of every single pair of eyes. This means
that I have an awareness of not only specific objects in my world, but also of some of those objects
having an awareness of me. I see them seeing me; I have a consciousness of a conscious act that
is not my own. How do I separate my own conscious acts from all of these other acts, my looking
from theirs? Phenomenologically, all of these are given as differing from my own in that my
various consciousnesses are marked with originality and the acts of the other egos are not, but how
are we to understand this originality?
In an appendix from Husserliana XIII concerned with the differences between
psychological and phenomenological origins, Husserl attempts to clarify what is meant
phenomenologically when one asks about the origin of a consciousness. These analyses consider
the originality of the perceived object and the way in which fundamental consciousnesses can be
called original, and Husserl ends with an in-depth consideration of the way in which the question
of originality demands a genetic methodology. In the beginning of the text, Husserl treats
originality as a concept admitting of degrees. An object that is perceived is originally present,
while what is not perceived is unoriginal. 126 Even when originally present, an object must be
perceived imperfectly, such that there are other parts or sides that are intuitable but not originally
perceived. Husserl calls this an original perception in a relative way, because it points to a possible
givenness that is more originary in that it gives more of the object. Thus, Husserl notes that “the
process of perception is more original than the individual perception” (Husserl 1973a, 347).127 It
is this sense of originality 128 that is important for the present task, as “the object is all the more
126

“Die Ursprünglichkeit kann besagen, dass der Gegenstand wahrgenommen ist, im Gegensatz die NichtUrsprünglichkeit, dass er nicht wahrgenommen, nicht originär präsent ist (originär ‘da’)” (Husserl 1973a, 347).
127
My translation of: “Der Wahmehmungsverlauf ist ursprünglicher als die einzelne Wahrnehmung.” Husserl even
notes that complete originality in the case of an external thing includes an open infinity.
128
The second sense of originality as foundational is one that Husserl seems to waiver on within the text, even crossing
out a paragraph dealing with the topic. The third sense, originality in terms of genetic constitution has more to do with
constitution in general than the constitution of the other ego, although it should be noted that the question of the
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originally given, more encompassing, in more sides and parts, the more it comes to actual
perception within the process of perception. And the perception of the object is all the more
originally given, all the more richly given in original fullness, if it brings more of the object to
more original givenness” (Husserl 1973a, 347).129 From this, we can see a possible link between
the directness of a consciousness and its originality, in that what is given more fully and richly as
itself (as opposed to indicated) is given more originally. 130
We can now see how this helps us describe conscious acts. My own conscious acts are
more original than the conscious acts of the other ego, because they are directly experienced by
me. My acts include my psychic perception – the acting through of my acts. The acts of the other
ego are given to me directly as the content of my own acts, but not as an acting, not as the living
of the other ego. Her psychic contents are merely indicated, and thus not given to me in actual
perception. As Husserl notes: “The more properly my own [eigentliche] perception (primordial
presence of the object), all the greater originality” (Husserl 1973a, 347).131 According to this
differentiation, the given consciousnesses (both my own and those that are foreign) distinguish
themselves according to the “fullness of their originality” (Husserl 1973a, 348). My own
experiences bring more to original fullness than my experience of the other ego’s experiencing.
We also see this type or originality at play in CM5. Here, the originality of a consciousness
depends upon the givenness of its fulfillment:
Whatever can become presented, and evidently verified, originally – is something
I am, or else it belongs to me as peculiarly my own. Whatever, by virtue thereof, is
originality of my own experience as opposed to my experience of other egos (and their experiencing) is on his mind
in discussing all three senses of originality.
129
My translation of: “Der Gegenstand ist umso ursprünglicher gegeben, je umfassender, nach je mehr Seiten und
Teilen er im Wahmehmungsprozess zu wirklicher Wahrnehmung kommt. Und die Wahrnehmung vom Gegenstand
ist umso ursprünglicher gebend, umso reicher an Ursprungsfülle, je mehr vom Gegenstand sie zu ursprünglicher
Gegebenheit bringt”. Thank you to Marco Cavallaro for his help with this and other translations.
130
In this appendix, Husserl does treat originality as a concept admitting of degrees.
131
My translation of: “Je mehr eigentliche Wahrnehmung (primordiale Präsenz des Gegenstandes), umso grössere
Ursprünglichkeit.”
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experienced in that founded manner which characterizes a primordially
unfulfillable experience – an experience that does not give something itself
originally but that consistently verifies something indicated – is “other”. (Husserl
1999, 114–115/144)
Husserl contrasts two types of experience here: the first is an experience of something that can be
reduced to my own experiencing, my ownness; the second is an experience of something that
always points beyond it to something indicated. When I fall off of the weight bench, I have a
consciousness of other conscious acts with my action as their object, and these consciousnesses
are not originally mine. My sensation of pain and regret are my own; they are presented to me
without mediation. The seeing me fall, however, is not. I see the other egos see me fall, as acts
accomplished or undertaken, but the acting of them is only indicated. Here Husserl sets up a
distinction between the conscious act of the other ego as experienced by her and that same act as
experienced by me. The living activity of the other ego, her noesis, is an unoriginal consciousness
for me; it is one that I neither possess nor undertake. These unoriginal experiences are unfulfillable
primordially, in that the indicated conscious activity can never be brought to direct givenness by
me; the other ego’s noesis is never directly given to me as a noesis. Yet, these unoriginal
experiences are directly given, in that they are there in person without an intermediary, as Zahavi
described. I see all of the looks, and even the people not looking because they may feel it is poor
gym etiquette or because they were too absorbed in their own workout. In this way, the noesis of
the other ego is the noema of my experience, and her noesis is given indirectly as indicated; her
conscious activity is there for me as the act of the other ego. Thus, there are experiences directly
given to me (the other egos seeing me) that are not originally my experiences, and the experience
of this unoriginal experiencing (me seeing the other ego see me) is itself my original experience. 132

132

We can even discuss the content of the other ego’s conscious act as being both indirectly given to me and directly
available to me: as the object of her seeing, my body is indirectly given to me as that which is seen, but I can take my
body as an object for my own conscious act. In this way, I can make the indirectly given noematic content directly
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From this we can see that the directness of a consciousness will be helpful in determining the
originality of an experience, but it is not sufficient for the determination of originality, which
demands more qualification than the clarification of the givenness of its object.
Husserl offers a better clarification of the appearance of originality in §37 of GP. In my
everyday life, I have a single, unified flow of consciousness that I can scroll through as needed in
order to construct a sequence of events. I know that before I made breakfast this morning, I woke
up, fed the cats, got dressed, and brushed my teeth. I can go back further to falling asleep, preparing
for bed, spending Sunday with my wife at the market, etc. What is more, I can often construct
whole parts of my life in this way, such as that time I met Deron Williams 133 in the airport or when
a security camera at work caught me falling over for no reason. Phenomenologically, every
consciousness has its “temporal halo” or surroundings that are given with it – each now has its
retentive past and protentive future, but also each remembered now has the same (Husserl 2006,
80).134 However, this halo is not always clearly given for various reasons. I do not remember the
events that occurred between my falling over at work and meeting Mr. Williams, and I cannot
quite order them properly in my memory: Did I meet Mr. Williams after the fall and possibly told
him the story? Had the humorous anecdote not yet occurred? Husserl states the problem
phenomenologically: “must [two remembered streams of consciousness] fit into the unity of a
stream of consciousness which, however, is not [in advance] 135 given at all?” (Husserl 2006,

given in a new conscious act, as I could with any indirectly content excluding the other ego’s activity; however, as the
noema of an unoriginal consciousness, it will never be given to me as it was in that unoriginal consciousness. What is
primordially unfulfillable, then, is the conscious act of the other ego as enacted by her and the noematic content of her
act as uniquely fulfilling it.
133
Deron Williams was a professional basketball player who played collegiate basketball at the University of Illinois.
134
For the constitution of this halo, or temporal context, through retention, see (Rodemeyer 2010, 232-233).
135
Husserl added this to the text sometime after 1924.
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81/185).136 The answer reveals a special law of consciousness, and it lies in the present positing of
the two memories:
Two memories each, which belong to the unity of a present moment of
consciousness that joins them together, combine to form a unity of memory, i.e., a
unity of time-consciousness, albeit one that is not intuitively filled, in which the
remembered of the one memory and the remembered of the other memory unite in
the one remembered, in one time, and thus in accordance with this unitary
consciousness, they are necessarily intuitable, being either simultaneous or in
succession. It may be the case that the temporal order is indistinctly apprehended…
But then it is an indeterminateness that harbors within itself determinability…
Consequently, it must be “possible” to clearly and completely awaken a memoryseries and to run through it such that it connects the one memory to the other in
such a way that it really brings about the continuous temporal connection in the
stream of consciousness. Of course, that is a motivated possibility. But this is not
to say that we actually have this memory series at our disposal. (Husserl 2006,
81/185-186)
This long quote offers the law of consciousness by which a stream of consciousness is given as
unified, and thus, as original to me as the I of this unified stream. The remembering of the two
memories in a present consciousness – “an encompassing, synthetic consciousness” – forms a
unity of experience within the present flow of consciousness, a harmonious temporal context. This
unity need not be totally clear, brought to intuition such that I can trace the steps from one memory
to the other. It does not even need to be clarified to the point that I can say which one came first
or that they did not simultaneously happen. 137 Rather, the unity is one of motivated possibility: the
unity is given as intuitable, fillable, determinable. 138 It is motivated by the harmonious temporal

136

Husserl offers a different formulation of the problem as a later (post 1924) addendum: “What would it be like if
we were to gain two memory-continua, each of which having always its disclosable temporal horizon, without it being
the case that in the process of disclosing we would pass over from the one temporal horizon into the other?” (Husserl
2006, 81/185).
137
I can recall that I hung out with my friend on Friday and that I have seen Star Wars: The Last Jedi, but I can be
unclear as to whether I saw that movie with my friend last Friday.
138
Husserl also says: “Here we have a judgment motivated by another judgment, but prior to the judgment the temporal
forms themselves motivate each other. In this sense we can say that even the pervasive unity of the stream of
consciousness is a unity of motivation. In the personal attitude this means that every act of the Ego is subject to the
constant apprehension characterizing it as an act ‘of’ the Ego, as ‘my’ lived experience” (Husserl 1989, 239/228)
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context of my own experiencing. 139 If I recall my encounter with Mr. Williams, it is connected
with the experience of being with a specific girlfriend in a specific airport. When I remember
falling over, I have a consciousness of being in a specific geographic location and with specific
friends. I can order these consciousnesses within my unified stream because I dated that girlfriend
after I worked at the place with those friends. Thus, I can fill in the temporal relation between the
events, even if I cannot completely fill my path from falling over to meeting the hero of Illinois’s
2004 NCAA Tournament Final Four run.
However, a harmonious temporal context is not given in my experience of the other ego’s
conscious act as either simultaneous or successive to my own consciousness. If this were the case,
such a unity would not serve to distinguish between my own stream of consciousness and the other
ego’s, and thus it would not serve to characterize the originality of my experience. To clarify this,
I will utilize an example from Natalie Depraz’s work on joint attention, wherein she and her
daughter watch an acrobatic performance together.140 While both are attentive to the performance,
they are also both attentive to the sharing of the experience. As Depraz writes, “we will expressly
show or hide our fear or our enthusiasm (by a word, by a pressing of the hand), at the sight of the
act” (N. Depraz 2010, 113).141 In watching the acrobatic act with her daughter, there is an

139

Rodemeyer shows how this is both a context of content as well as structure. The structure of retention modifies
retentions “in such a way that the temporal connection from one event to the next can be ascertained in reflection”
(Rodemeyer 2010, 233), while the “passively present content maintained by my retaining and recollecting
consciousness” allow for different types of contexts in my lived experience (Rodemeyer 2010, 248). In the passage
from GP, Husserl seems to be more focused on the structural context, in that I can order my experiences in a memoryseries. However, this also requires a context of content, in that I can place certain memories together based on what is
remembered.
140
I admit that the point of Depraz’s article is to integrate the work on joint-attention in philosophy of mind into the
phenomenological work on intersubjectivity, and thereby supplement the empathetic phenomenological account of
intersubjectivity, which she describes as largely cognitive. Still, Depraz’s example touches on the separation
maintained in a shared experience that Husserl has in mind when speaking of originality. In fact, she brings up this
point as something that Husserlian phenomenology cannot clarify. As the following analysis will show, I think
Husserl’s work on the originality of consciousness allows for this clarification.
141
“nous allons nous manifester expressément (par une parole, par une pression dela main) ou non notre peur, notre
enthousiasme, à la vue du numéro.” All translations are my own, but I owe a great debt to Caroline Pluchon for her
patient assistance.

83

enrichment of the experience when Depraz shares her enthusiasm with her daughter and also when
Depraz shares in her daughter’s “living the spectacle, expressing her anxiety at her sight of the
show or in laughing with her” (N. Depraz 2010, 114).142 In Depraz’s example, then, we have a coconsciousness of a shared event. 143 Depraz has an original consciousness of jointly attending to
the acrobatic act with her daughter. This means that she has her original experience of the acrobatic
act and an original experience of her daughter’s experiencing the act in various ways. In
experiencing her daughter’s excitement while watching the show, and that her daughter is excited
or worried about a specific occurrence within the performance, she has an original experience of
an unoriginal experiencing. There is a living it together, such that she is aware of her daughter’s
emotion and her daughter is aware of sharing it with her mother, but there is no living through the
other ego’s consciousness. Her daughter’s experiences are not given in a unified stream of
consciousness with her own. Depraz’s experiences of the viewing acrobatic act and sharing it with
her daughter, analytically divided while experientially concurrent, are given in a synthetic unity
within a unified stream of consciousness: they belong originally to Depraz. While the focus of
Depraz’s analysis is on the role of the shared object in facilitating the shared lived experience, she
notes that there is an asymmetry of experience here, which Husserl would say comes down to the
original character of the consciousness involved. 144

142

“vivre le spectacle, éprouver à sa vision de l’angoisse ou bien en rire avec lui.” While this certainly enriches the
experience for Depraz, it is interesting that she notes this sharing in a way diminishes the spectacle. This seems to be
because of the diversion of attention from the act alone.
143
“Le façonnement du lien entre nous, entre deux sujets repose bien sur l’expérience d’un seul et même objet ; il y a
bien « mutual awareness », conscience mutuelle de partager un objet, de le vivre ensemble,que cette coopération soit
rationnelle ou émotionnelle” (N. Depraz 2010, 114).
144
Depraz argues that the concept of inter-attention need not result in an asymmetry, although there is still “nonhomogony, [an] irreducible difference of attentional movements towards the other” (non-homogénéité, … différence
irrréductible des mouvements attentionnels vers l’autre) (N. Depraz 2010, 117). I argue that this difference, whether
asymmetrical or not, is on account of the originality of my consciousness and the unoriginality of the consciousness
of the other ego.
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This example of a living together also allows for a clarification of the relationship between
the directness and originality of consciousness. One can have a direct experience of something
unoriginal, as when Depraz has a direct experience of her daughter’s anxiety or when I see others
looking at me. Such experiences are directly given, yet they cannot be united in the experiencing
ego’s living stream of consciousness. 145 I can also have an indirect experience of that which is
original to me, such as when I experience a painting of some strange cat. I have no direct
experience of the painted object, yet the experience of it that I have is original to me.
Phenomenologically, it is important to remember that the directness of an experience depends upon
the givenness of its object, such that if the object gives itself, it is given directly. The originality
of a consciousness is found in its ability to be given in a unified stream of consciousness with my
current now; of course, it must be remembered that this unity is a motivated possibility, and thus
intuitable, if not actually intuitively given.

III.3 The originality and directness of recollection and expectation
After exploring what Husserl means when speaking of originality and directness, I now
look at how he employs these terms in his analyses. To do this, I will work through two modes of
consciousness that Husserl uses as comparisons for empathy, 146 recollection and expectation. Both

145

This difference between my experience and experiences that are not mine is the basis for those who deny the direct
experience of other egos. In their view, that I cannot experience things as the other ego does means I do not experience
other egos at all. However, this inability to experience as the other ego is based on the direct experience I have of the
other ego as experiencing otherwise than myself. It is this primary experience of others that the phenomenological
approach to social cognition wishes to clarify.
146
I will be using empathy because it is the Fremderfahrung most often discussed in Husserl. For Husserl, empathy
is often reserved for the specific act of experiencing this or that other ego, and this act often occurs at the active,
objective level of consciousness. As already discussed in the previous chapter and footnote three above, the
intersubjective experience is not limited to this level of consciousness, nor is it limited to the explicit experience of
this or that other ego. Thus, I read Husserl’s use of Fremderfahrung as referring to the full experience of other egos
in general, that is, their acts, their accomplishments, objects as referring to other egos, and the various experiences of
foreign consciousnesses at multiple levels. In this way, I view empathy as a specific type of Fremderfahrung. I will
proceed under the assumption that the directness and originality at play in empathy will transfer to Fremderfahrung
as a whole, although in the future this will warrant a further investigation.
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recollection and expectation are types of Vergegenwärtigung, just like Fremderfahrung, so that
there is an obvious structural similarity among the three. Vergegenwärtigungen, or representations,147 are acts of consciousness that bring other acts of consciousness, including their
objects, to presence. 148 In this way, recollection brings past consciousnesses and their recollected
objects into my view in the same way that expectation aims at future ones and their expected
objects, albeit as merely possible and still empty. Empathy falls under this category, as its object
is the conscious act of an other ego. Expectation and recollection often function as examples for
Husserl in his attempts to clarify the way in which the other ego is constituted, although he readily
states that they both are imperfect in illustrating empathy. 149 One important difference is that
recollection and expectation belong to my temporal context, while empathy re-presents an act
belonging to an other temporal context. 150 In investigating the ways in which originality and
directness are used in describing these acts, I hope to show the way he uses these terms to
demarcate what is accessible and what is inaccessible.
As discussed above, recollection is an original consciousness with a content that is directly
given. However, Husserl offers recollection as an illustrative example of the way in which the

147

The translation of vergegenwärtigen and its cognates is problematic for the English speaker, because the most
obvious word for it is representation. However, representation is associated with a long history of metaphysical
meaning that is contrary to what Husserl has in mind here. Re-presenting is the best translation, in my opinion, because
the “re” indicates an activity done on top of the original presenting, which is the exact activity the ego is undertaking
in the vergegenwärtigen – it brings it to presence before itself again in some manner.
148
This definition is a literal translation of the German word, which adds the prefix ver-, meaning in this case to enact,
to the noun Gegenwärtigung, which is the act of making something present. A good friend and colleague of mine,
Marco Cavallaro, once defined Vergegenwärtigungen as a conscious act with another conscious act as its object. My
above formulation owes much to Marco’s laconic yet insightful description.
149
“Empathy is no more a consciousness of genuine picturedness than it is a re-remembering and a pre-remembering
or any other kind of remembering” (Husserl 2006, 83/188).
150
Phantasy, another type of Vergegenwärtigung, is interesting in that it belongs to no temporal context, or at least to
a temporal context other than mine or any other ego’s. As Rodemeyer puts it: “Phantasies may have their time, in
other words, but they do not fit into time, i.e., they are not part of the time of perceptual experiences” (Rodemeyer
2010, 244).
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other ego is verified as inaccessible. 151 In Husserl’s example, when I remember something, I bring
it to the present as a modification of my immediate present (Husserl 1999, 115/145). My
remembered experience is not given as present again; rather, it is given as an experience already
experienced. In Fremderfahrung, the other ego is also given as an intentional modification of my
living present, specifically as a living present that I cannot inhabit. Both the verification of this
past and the verification of the other ego progress through harmonious syntheses, albeit of different
sorts: the other ego remains as such so long as it gives itself as an other stream of consciousness
separate from mine, and the past remains the past as long as it retains the intentional modification
of having-previously-been. This is an admittedly odd formulation of recollection, but I think that
Husserl is attempting to show the structure of verification at play in these two types of
Vergegenwärtigung. What is harmonious for Husserl is primarily the content: that lived body over
there is continually given as a lived body, and the remembered restaurant is continually given as a
restaurant. However, the harmoniousness also requires a consistency in the givenness of that
content. Were the other ego to suddenly just be another version of me or were I to suddenly find
myself living last week’s events, there would be a need to reevaluate my constitution of each
stream of consciousness as a particular type of modification of my living present. Thus, we can
see that there is a similar verification of the other ego as there is with my past, as both streams of
consciousness are given as modifications of my now.
The originality and directness of expectation are more similar to recollection than
empathy,152 but in GP Husserl notes that expectation is a much better, although still deficient,

151

This example comes in §52 of CM5 in the paragraph immediately following Husserl’s discussion of the other ego
as accessible through inaccessibility. You can find a similar connection between Fremderfahrung and recollection in
§55 of CM5 and “The Origin of Geometry”, (Husserl 1970, 359-360/370-371). Levinas makes a similar comparison
between the alterity of the other ego and temporal alterity in Time and the Other.
152
In one of the more interesting moments of his analyses, Husserl discusses “rememberings of the future,
rememberings that have the character of anticipations of perceptions…” (Husserl 2001, 469).
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analog for empathy than recollection.153 Cairns argues that the object of an expectation is directly
given, insofar as that object is the expected, which mirrors the direct givenness of the recollected
to recollection. Further, the originality of the expected is not in question, as the stream of
consciousness in which this or that possibility will occur naturally shares a temporal context with
my living present. If I think of multiple possible actions, all of them are original possibilities to
me in that I can undertake them. As I decide upon the preferred course of action and complete it,
all of the previously possible actions are still originally my possibilities, although I did not take
them up. They are given as that which I could have done, and in this way are given as original. To
illustrate, when I know that it is trash night, I plan to ready the trash and take it out to the curb.
However, when I get home, I am hungry and thus make myself dinner first. I still expect to take
out the trash, but the fulfillment of the expectation is now deferred. If my wife gets home and takes
the trash out while I am eating, the expectation of taking the trash out does not become unoriginal
simply because someone else undertook the activity. Rather, it becomes an activity I could have
done, and as such is original to me. My wife’s experience of taking out the trash, including her
exasperation with my aversion to dealing with the garbage on an empty stomach, is not given to
me originally; they are not able to be given in a temporal unity with my stream of consciousness.
That I could have done it is within my temporal context, that is certain, but it is now an activity
that I can no longer enact.154 Thus, it is easy to see that expectation is also an original consciousness
with a directly given object.

153

He also notes the link between expectation (or anticipation) and empathy in that empathy is enveloped with systems
of expectations (Husserl 2006, 160-162/231-233).
154
Lampert notes that possible courses of action do not disappear after they are no longer possible, that is, after I have
undertaken them or they are no longer able to be undertaken by me (Lampert 2012, 30-34), (Lampert 2018, 61-63).
Rather, the expectations and anticipations of previous situations are retained in my memories of them, which I shall
discuss with more depth in Chapter V. For Lampert, this means that these possible courses of action continue alongside
my actual course of action in a virtual manner. For example, the possibility of having taken out the trash and allowing
my wife to relax runs virtually parallel to my choice to instead eat and let her take care of the trash. The remembered
experience of my choice contains with it both possible courses of action: I can take out the trash or I can eat food.
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III.4 The accessibility of Fremderfahrung
I will now explore the way in which Fremderfahrung can be characterized as original and
direct so as to explicate fully the way in which the other ego is given as accessible in its
inaccessibility. First, I experience the other ego in an originally given experience of an unoriginal
experiencing. This tricky formulation, admittedly borrowed from Husserl’s use of the accessibility
of the inaccessible, merely means that I have an experience of the other ego as experiencing, that
is, in her engagement in the world, which is resistant to a synthesis into my temporal stream. There
are two streams of originality at play, then, in every experience of the other ego. On the one had,
I have my original stream of conscious, and in that stream is an experience of an other ego. This
experience is obviously original to me, capable of being situated within my own temporal context.
It is an experience of the other ego’s body as sharing the world with me, experiencing it with me.
The experiencing of her body – her sensations and relating to objects, her living engagement with
the world – is unoriginal to me, yet given all the same. Husserl explains in this way:
what is grasped with actual originariness in this seeing [of someone else] – namely
that corporeality over there, or rather only one aspect of its surface – is the other’s
body [Körper] itself, but seen from my position and from this side. ...[W]hat is
grasped originally is the body of a psyche essentially inaccessible to me originally,
and the two are comprised in the unity of one psychophysical reality. 155 (Husserl
1999, 124/152, translation altered)
Lampert argues that the ability to remain in this memory, to preserve it, implies a delay of the future that has already
occurred (Lampert 2012, 12). In the delay, both possible future are again ahead of me, but I cannot undo the choice
or the consequences of the action. What is interesting, intersubjectively, is that while both the virtual and actual courses
of action are originally my experiences, and thus harmonious within my temporal context, the virtual course of action
is also available to my wife along with my actual one. In fact, the virtual possibility has to be available to her in order
for her to be upset that I did not choose that path.
155
See also: “The appresentation that gives the component of the other ego that is inaccessible originally is combined
with an original presentation (of “her” body [Körper] as part of the nature given as included in my ownness)” (Husserl
1999, 114/143 translation altered). Cairns translates das Unzugängliche as “the component of the other ego that is
inaccessible”, which tempts one to think that Husserl here is already saying that there are parts that are inaccessible to
us and parts that may be accessible. This, however, is not the way in which I am reading Husserl, nor is it helpful to
think of consciousness in such ways. Phenomenologically, consciousness is unified in its activity, such that each act
is a whole, but we can analytically discuss its activity with respect to its object or perhaps its actor. Thus, in what
follows, I am not saying that the other ego is given to me piecemeal with some accessible parts indicating some
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Thus, the other ego’s psyche, the unoriginal experiencing that is inaccessible to me, is given to me
as tied up with my original experience of the other ego’s body. I do not see various bodies and
then posit egos among them; rather, I see lived bodies all around me, surrounded by inanimate
ones. My experience of the other ego originally includes, as experienced by me, the unoriginal
experiencing of those inanimate objects by the other ego, complete with temporal halos that lack
a motivated possibility to be synthesized with my living present. 156 The temporal horizon that
marks originality is a unity of my stream of consciousness as containing the experiences that can
be synthesized within it. The other ego’s experiences have no such motivated possibility, and in
fact come with their own internal motivations, as inner horizons, that cause me to constitute their
temporal halos as separate from mine. The temporal context of the other ego is one that is separate
from my own: her conscious acts are of an other stream of consciousness, and thus not given to
me originally.157
I must next consider the directness at play in my experience of the other ego, as the other
ego is in one way directly there for me, and yet in another is not. As noted above, the body of the
other ego is given to me directly; it is there in front of me, self-given, not indicated or pictured by
anything else. Phenomenologically, the other ego is also there for me, and thus given directly to

inaccessible ones. Rather, the indicated inaccessible parts will be included in the accessible unities in the same way
the various components of my conscious life are included in my unified stream of consciousness.
156
This does not mean, of course, that there is no temporal relation between the two, or that they somehow exist in
separate temporalities. There is the constitution of a shared time, and objective time, but this is an entirely separate
matter.
157
In GP, Husserl offers a wonderful example of this in his discussion of the constitution of the world and my body
within it (Husserl 2006, 6/116). My body acts as the middle point for the world, the zero-point of orientation around
which all other points are constituted. Included in these surrounding points are other egos as surrounding points.
However, these other egos are also given as middle points themselves. In fact, Husserl later edited this passage to note
that these other egos, as middle points, are originarily (originär) given to me as surrounding points. The original
experience of an individual I as the middle point is original only to itself, and the experience of another I as a
surrounding point is my original experience of an other ego’s originality, which is of course experienced as unoriginal.
Husserl discusses this idea with more depth when he speaks of the relation between my “here” and the other’s “there”.
See also CM5 §54 and Ideas II §18f, 41, 50-52.
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me. To say that the psyche of the other ego is only indicated is to fall into the same issues criticized
by the phenomenologists engaged in the debate on social cognition. The other ego is appresented,
but this is not an indication or a picturing. Rather, her body “appresents the other ego, by virtue of
the pairing association with my physical lived body [körperlichen Leib], and with my governing
I, within my primordially constituted nature” (Husserl 1999, 123/151, translation altered). In this
pairing, her body appresents the “other ego’s governing this body... [and] mediately the governing
in the nature that appears to her perception” (Husserl 1999, 123/151, translation altered). Thus,
when I see the body of the other ego, I see it as a Leib, as a psychophysical unity, as ensouled,
governing her own body and engaging with the world, a world which we share as common (Husserl
1999, 123/152).
However, Husserl also states: “through ‘empathy’ I become co-conscious of the alien
psychic life, an alien psychic life that is inaccessible to direct perception as such” (Husserl 2001,
373/240). The inaccessibility of the other ego seems to imply that such a psychic life is merely
indicated. Husserl even uses “indicate” (indizieren) to describe the way in which the Leib of the
other ego gives me the other ego properly on multiple occasions. However, his use of this term
describes the relation between the lived body of the other ego as perceived within my primordial
sphere and the living of the other ego. 158 He even notes that this relation is between the presented
158

Husserl has three terms for indication, Anzeichen (indication), Anzeige (indicative relationship), and indiezeren.
In Logical Investigations, Husserl defines Anzeichen and Anzeige as “circumstance the fact that certain objects or
states of affairs of whose reality someone has actual knowledge indicate to him the reality of certain other objects or
states of affairs, in the sense that his belief in the reality of the one is experience (though not evidently) as motivating
a belief or surmise in the reality of the other” (Husserl 1976, 270). This relationship is closer to the indirect givenness
discussed above, so it is important that Husserl does not use these terms in discussing the indication of the other ego
by her lived body. Rather, Husserl clearly uses indizieren to mean a communal relationship closer to that of
presentation and appresentation, and in CM5, he uses this term only for the relation of the other ego to her lived body.
That which is doing the indicating (indizieren) is always the body of the other ego, specifically taken as a lived body
within the primordial sphere. The indicated is the psychic life of the other ego, or properly speaking, that which lies
outside of my ownness, which must be referred to at a distance. The indicated, das Indiziertes, as the psychic contents
of the other ego, then, is precisely what is inaccessible of the other ego. We see the first use of indizieren when Husserl
discusses the harmonious behavior through which the other ego is verified: “as having a physical side that indicates
(indiziert) something psychic appresentatively” (Husserl 1999, 114/144). Next, we find it in the substantive in the
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body and the appresented other ego. Such a relationship is not an indication in the sense of
indirectly given as described above: the givenness of a thing referred to by another object. To the
contrary, he states that the other ego is not perceived as somehow signaled or represented by its
lived body: “it is not as though the body over there, in my primordial sphere, remained separate
from the animate bodily organism of the other ego, as if that body were something like a signal for
its analogue” (Husserl 1999, 122/151). Rather, “the sensuously seen body is experienced forthwith
as the body of someone else and not as merely an indication [Anziege] of someone else” (Husserl
1999, 121/150).
Here, then, we see the difficulty of clarifying phenomenologically the experience of the
other ego in terms of direct or indirect givenness, which is the same difficulty encountered by
Zahavi, Gallagher, and others supporting the phenomenological position in the debate over social
cognition: The psychic life of the other ego, its enacting of its conscious acts, is given to me only
as indicated; however, the indicating is done by the conscious acts as enacted, the living of the
other ego itself! As Husserl notes: “[Empathy] is an empty making co-present, a re-presentation
[Vergegenwärtigung] of a consciousness that is made co-present and that belongs to the lived-

same discussion: “an experience that does not give something itself originally but that consistently verifies something
indicated (Indidziertes)” (Husserl 1999, 115/144). Husserl uses it to describe the apperception of the other ego’s coconstitution: “Therefore, in this appresentation, the body encountered in the mode ‘there’, as the foreign animate body,
in my monadic sphere, indicates (indiziert) ‘the same’ body in the mode ‘here’, the body that the other experiences in
her monadic sphere” (Husserl 1999, 117/146, translation altered). In §54, Husserl twice uses forms of indizieren: first,
when he discusses the “indicated (indiziertes) systems of appearance” given in the overlapping that occurs in an
associative pairing (Husserl 1999, 118/147), and second when he notes that contents given in higher level empathizing
are “indicated (indizieren) somatically” (Husserl 1999, 120/149). In §55 he discusses the apperceptive transfer of
sense with “the body belonging to my primordial sphere and indicating to me the other Ego” (Husserl 1999, 122/151).
The uses of forms of indizieren, then, are used to indicate the givenness of psychic activity or animation that is given
along with the body of the other ego in appresentation. Even Husserl’s fifth usage, wherein the contents of higher
level acts of empathy are said to be indicated, refers to the conduct of someone who is angry or cheerful; thus, what
is indicated is the other ego’s living activity as the contents of my empathic act. This seems to indicate a technical
difference in his usage of Anziege and Anzeichen as an indication or sign as opposed to his usage of indizieren as a
relationship of co-presentation or co-givenness in the appearance of the other ego akin to the communal relation of
presentation and appresentation. Thank you to Jay Lampert for pointing out the discussion of indication in Logical
Investigations.
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body, a consciousness, however, whose process of bringing to intuition certainly has to embark
upon quite different paths than those peculiar to the non-visible aspects of the thing-like body”
(Husserl 2001, 374/240, translation altered). We have seen that Vergegenwärtigungen are capable
of having their object directly given, as with recollection and expectation, and that further the
directness of a consciousness is not dependent upon the intuition of its object, however different it
may be from normal fulfillment. 159 The only criterion for directness is the self-givenness of the
object, and the other ego gives itself, not as the enacting of this or that consciousness, but as being
alive – as engaging in the world through a lived body. 160
Thus, in my experience of the other ego as an embodied consciousness, directly given to
me originally, I have an experience of the living it does as an embodied consciousness constituting
the world with me:
In the appresented other ego the synthetic systems are the same, with all their
modes of appearance, accordingly with all the possible perceptions and the
noematic contents of these: except that the actual perceptions and the modes of
givenness enacted therein, and also in part the objects actually perceived, are not
the same; rather the objects perceived are precisely those perceivable from there,
and as they are perceivable from there. (Husserl 1999, 123/152)
As an other living, unoriginal stream of consciousness, the other ego is experienced as
experiencing the world with me 161 from her own temporal stream. Her stream of consciousness is
given to me in that it is directly perceived by me as an experience within my original stream of
159

In a set of edits to a colleagues paper, Cairns notes: “To be sure, Husserl uses the term ‘Vergegenwärtigung’ to
characterize the manner of givenness of the other psyche. But Vergegenwärtigung in this sense means direct
awareness, (in this sense direct memory of my past is Vergegenwärtigung) not ‘abbild bewußtsein’” (Cairns 009182).
160
Husserl also talks of what is directly given as being prominent for itself: “…we can only set our eyes on something,
grasp something directly where we have something prominent for itself” (Husserl 2001, 175/129). The prominence of
the other ego is evident in the mere question of its accessibility. This is not a question of ghosts or goblins, whom we
can ask after without knowing their existence, for the existence of the other ego is not in question here. Ghosts are
questioned in terms of their accessibility because it is unknown if they exist to be accessed; other egos are questioned
in terms of their accessibility because we are unsure of how we access what is obviously, prominently there in front
of us.
161
See also: “Any possible empathy is the ‘mirroring’ of each monad in the other, and the possibility of a concordant
constitution of such mirroring depends on the possibility of a concordant constitution of spatial-temporal nature, of an
index for the respective constitutive lived experiences, which index extends into all I’s” (Husserl 2006, 156/229).
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consciousness. I experience the other ego experience the world with me, but I do not directly
experience her conscious activity and her subjective contents. 162 An interesting example of this
comes from my fear of heights. If I see a tree growing precariously out of a cliff or a boulder
perched near the edge, I have no special experience of the object. However, if I see another person
near the edge, I feel the anxiety of being near the height, even if she does not. However, while I
may worry about someone falling over the edge, I cannot feel the wind on her face or the thrill of
hanging over the precipice. The enaction and actuality (Verwirklichkeit and Wirklichkeit) of these
acts are beyond my reach. Even the objects directly given to me in my own consciousness are also
indirectly given as perceived by her. 163 In a wonderful passage from Husserliana XV, Husserl
describes this relation as an intentional penetration:
The “concrete” I (the monad constituted through primordiality) and the concrete (in
the second sense) intersubjectivity as “combined” manifold of the concrete I,
combine as a result of other I’s being given in consciousness with their life, in my
I-consciousness, in my intellectual life, and are given to consciousness in coacceptance and verified as belonging to me and my life in their conscious-life, and
thus are on their side “combined” with me. In this intentional penetration the
contents of the other’s consciousness become accessible for me; my consciousness
is related intentionally to the foreign and by this through and through to that of
which the foreign is conscious, and conversely, by this inversion, this having
consciousness of the other that is related back to me and what I am conscious of
[itself] becomes conscious to me, so that my consciousness circling though this
returns to itself including the foreign. (Husserl 1973c, 76–77)164
162

In Ideas II, Husserl expresses this quite clearly: “In a certain way, I also experience (and there is a self-givenness
here) the other’s lived experiences; i.e., to the extent that the empathy (comprehension) accomplished as one with the
originary experience of the Body is indeed a kind of presentification, one that nevertheless serves to ground the
character of co-existence in the flesh. To that extent, what we have here is thus experience, perception. But this coexistence (“appresence” in the previously fixed sense) does not, in principle, allow itself to be transformed into
immediate originary existence (primal presence). It is characteristic of empathy that it refers to an originary Bodyspirit-consciousness but one I cannot myself accomplish originarily, I who am not the other and who only function,
in regard to him, as a comprehending analagon” (Husserl 1989, 208/198).
163
See also: “Each person has, from the same place in space and with the same lighting, the same view of, for example,
a landscape. But never can the other, at exactly the same time as me (in the originary content of lived experience
attributed to him) have the exact same appearance as I have” (Husserl 1989, 177/169, my emphasis).
164
“Das ‘Konkrete’ Ich (die durch Primordialität konstituierte Monade) und die konkrete (im zweiten Sinn konkrete)
Intersubjektivität als ‘verbunden’ Mannigfaltigkeit der konkreten Ich, verbunden dadurch, dass in meinen
Ichbewusstsein, in meinem intentionalen Leben adere Ich mit ihrem Leben bewusst sing, un in Mitgeltung bewusst
sind und bewährt sind als in ihrem Bewusstseinsleben auf mich und mein Leben bezogen, also ihrerseits mit mir
‘verbunden’. In dieser intentionalen Durchdringung wird für mich das von den Andern Bewusste zugänglich, mein
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With the above understanding of direct and originality as it pertains to Fremderfahrung, I
can now clarify the way in which the other ego is accessible in its inaccessibility. As an
experiencing of the world that is not original for me, the other ego is nevertheless experienced by
me in an original consciousness. What is directly given to me in the original experience of the
other ego is the other ego itself as acting in this world. What is indicated by this other acting in the
world is the enacting of the other ego’s conscious act. Thus, in my experience of the other ego,
what is accessible is my original consciousness of their acting in the world. What is inaccessible
is the enacting of unoriginal conscious acts and the objects of those acts insofar as they are directly
given to an unoriginal consciousness. That the other ego is accessible for me in her acting in the
world, which as an enacting of an unoriginal consciousness is entirely inaccessible to me, makes
the other ego accessible to me only in her inaccessibility. 165

III.5 Another take on Husserl’s notion of accessibility
To close, I will investigate Tanja Staehler’s discussion of inaccessibility in her exploration
of CM5, which is a very different notion that I offer above. 166 In attempting to explain the
inaccessibility of the other ego, Staehler argues that it is like my own experience of my living
present. According to Staehler, the living present (at least at its core) is phenomenologically
Bewusstsein ist intentional bezogen auf das fremde und durch dieses hindruch auf das in diesem Bewusste, und
umgekert, wobei auch diese Umkehrung, dieses auf mich und mein Bewusstes zurückbezogene Bewussthaben des
Anderen mir bewusst wird, so dass mein Bewusstsein im Kreis durch das in ihm sich erschliessende fremde zu sich
selbst zurückkerht, und so evtl. Eines jeden Bewusstsein, wie ich und jeder erkenne kann.” Thank you to Sergio Garcia
for his immense help with this difficult passage, although any mistakes are my own.
165
Cairns offers a wonderful description of this: “But I live through and in my mental processes consciously, and I
can grasp them reflectively; whereas I do not and cannot live through and in yours – I cannot do your perceiving,
remembering, liking, willing -; and therefore I cannot grasp your mental processes reflectively as I can my own. In
short, the minds of others are beyond the horizon of what is strictly presented, or even conceivably presented to
anyone” (Cairns 2007, 321).
166
It should be noted that Staehler’s goal in this text is not to take a deep look at inaccessibility. Rather, she is
investigating the question Husserl is asking in CM5, and she does a wonderful job exploring the various issues at play
in a difficult text. This makes her work invaluable to anyone studying Husserl’s work on intersubjectivity.
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inaccessible to me. She begins with Husserl’s comparison of remembering to Fremderfahrung,
because the “inaccessibility of the other ego might reveal something about the sense in which even
my own past ego is alien to me” (Staehler 2008, 115). Staehler quotes a manuscript in which
Husserl compares the way in which I am in a community with other egos to the way in which I
connect with my past ego in remembering, which again establishes the relation between the way
in which I contact others and the way in which I contact memories, or past egos. 167 However,
taking this relation as evidence of my own past being in some way foreign to me does not mean
that my own past is inaccessible. The foreignness of my past seems much different here than the
inaccessibility of the other ego, in that the past experience is original to me, while the experiences
of the other egos in my community can never be said to be original.
Staehler then argues that the inaccessibility of the other ego is similar to the inaccessibility
at the heart of the living present. The core of the living present, the “pure there” bracketed off from
protention and retention, is an enduring yet ever withdrawing flow of experience. If I reflect upon
the “pure there”, which she equates with the functioning ego, I can only ever access it after the
functioning is complete; my reflection is always too late. In this way, the ego can be said to be
accessible to itself in inaccessibility, albeit one that is only accessible because of this
inaccessibility:
I can never access my transcendental ego as it is functioning, and at the same time,
if there was no flow but static unity at the core of the ego, the ego would be not
accessible at all, i.e., not even accessible as inaccessible. Since the ego as it is
functioning cannot be made an object of reflection, it is characterized by a peculiar
anonymity. Similarly, the other ego is only accessible to me as fundamentally
different from myself and ultimately inaccessible. (Staehler 2008, 115)

167

“In empathy (Einfühlung), in originally understanding them and having them as persons in co-presence, I am in
contact (in Fühlung) as I with the Thou, with the other ego, similarly to the way in which I am in contact with myself
in the difference of remembering, in a community” (Ms. E III 9, S. 84 (1931), quoted from Staehler 2008, 115).
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According to Staehler, the anonymity of my own present leaves only the access of inaccessibility,
and the lived experiences of the other ego, though not quite anonymous, are inaccessible to me in
a similar way.
Staehler seems to argue that my own ego is only accessible to me in recollection as an
intentional modification of the ego of the living present: it is accessible (as recollected) in its
inaccessibility (as the ego of the living present). However, this leads to a significant issue. Any
intentional modification of this inaccessible ego would also only grant an accessibility of the
inaccessibility. Even the other moments of the living present, the retentional and protentional,
would not afford access to the ego. If this holds, there is no manner in which my own ego is ever
accessible to me as accessible.
This seems to contradict Husserl when he says, as quoted above, that the ego is accessible
to itself originally in transcendental self-experience. Further, he describes the ego’s living present
as the core that is accessible. There are indeed indeterminate horizons that are not given in this
living present but rather surround it, 168 but the accessibility of this living present is never called
into question. That which is indeterminate is not necessarily inaccessible, as access seems tied
more to determinability than determination proper. As Husserl says:
though I am continually given to myself originally and can explicate progressively
what is included in my own essence, this explication is carried out largely in acts
of consciousness that are not perceptions of the own-essential moments it
discovers. Thus alone can my stream of subjective processes, the stream in which I
live as the identical Ego, become accessible to me: first of all, in respect of its
actualities, and then in respect of the potentialities that manifestly are likewise
moments of my own essence. (Husserl 1999, 102/133)

168

The givenness of the living present is said to be only adequate in §9 of Cartesian Meditations, which could
problematize transcendental subjectivity as apodictic evidence. See (Carr 1987, 45-69) for a more in-depth treatment
of the apodicticity of transcendental subjectivity in Cartesian Mediations.
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The givenness of my own experience, transcendental or otherwise, in the immediateness of my
own experiencing is precisely the hallmark for accessibility, and we can see that it is based in the
possible or actual experience being originally mine. It is worth questioning whether or not we can
think of the living present as being somehow inaccessible according to the directness of its content,
but this reframes the question. The living present, as an accessible experiencing, is not subject to
directness or indirectness. The object of the living present, be it the object of an imageconsciousness or a remembering, can be directly or indirectly given, according to that
consciousness itself. If, however, I were to take for my object the actual living-through of this
living present – for instance, focusing on my thinking of how to solve this problem – then, as the
living itself, it is given in the conscious act and not referred to by something else.169 It is the living
flow of my actual lived experience rushing ever forward into my various potentialities. Whichever
experiences come to pass, they are given to me and accessible to me, even in acts that are not
perceptive.170

III.5 Conclusion
As a special type of originality used by Husserl to separate other streams of consciousness
from my own, it seems that accessibility is properly only used to describe the givenness of
conscious acts, such that one could not say this or that physical thing is accessible to me. 171 What

169

This seeming problem reminds one of Sartre’s critique of Husserl’s phenomenology in Transcendence of the Ego,
which never seemed to be much of a problem for Husserl. The living present is not missing or unthinkable because it
is only available in reflection. Rather, the living present is very much there, alive for one to engage with spontaneously.
Recollection is not the only access one has to experience; rather, it is merely a way to engage with that past living
present again as modified.
170
There are two further issues here that make Staehler’s interpretation problematic. First, the experience of the other
ego does not entail the delay of reflection. Second, the anonymity of my living present is not paralleled in the
experience of the other ego. The lived experience that is given to me as inaccessible is not the lived experience of no
one but of that one, that other ego.
171
It is also important to note that accessibility is based in originality, such that my awareness of an experience is not
pertinent to its accessibility. That is, an experience can be accessible to me even if my ego does not cast its attentive
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are accessible to me are original experiences, those that are able to be given in a unified stream of
consciousness with my current now. The other ego is given to me directly in an original experience
as an experiencing that is not original, one that I cannot enact. Her enacting of her stream of
experience, as well as her objects as experienced by her, are indicated in the givenness of her ego,
but these can never become originally experienced by me. Thus, the other ego is given as accessible
to me in her inaccessibility, and this is the only way in which the other ego is accessible to me at
all.172

ray in its direction, so long as this unattended-to-experience is original to me. For example, in Lampert’s discussion
of backward synthesis, he is concerned with the possibility of “backward referents which in some sense must be in
consciousness without being present to consciousness” (Lampert 1995, 123). He notes that there are three
consciousnesses that can impact synthesis without the being expressly present to the ego: an ego’s own history, the
experiences of other egos, and cultural-historical experiences. While these grounds of synthesis, as he calls them, are
not within an ego’s awareness necessarily, we cannot call an ego’s own history of experience inaccessible because
they are, by definition, original to that ego.
172
Without this inaccessibility, the other ego would not appear at all. If one were to take the experiences of the other
ego as original, all would be one world soul experiencing everything. A deficient pan-psyche arbitrarily divided into
multiples, there would in reality only be a mono-psyche experiencing itself. Possibly this is the One of Plotinus, but
there seems to be little joy in its self-experience so considered.
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Chapter IV: Verification
With the elucidation of the unique appearance of the other ego as a co-constitution that is
inaccessible, the last characteristic that must be clarified is the unique structure of the verification
of this appearance. In this way, the unique appearance of the other ego can be fully distinguished
from the appearance of other objects. As Husserl notes in CM5, the unique structure of the
“verifiable accessibility of what is originally inaccessible” is an essential characteristic of the
appearance of the other ego (Husserl 1999, 114/144, translation altered). In order to investigate the
structure of verification at play in the appearance of the other ego, I will first discuss the tripartite
structure of verification. I will then go through particular modes of verification in order to show
the continuity of this structure in different acts of consciousness at various levels. These examples,
while not exhaustive, will show specific variations within the structure of verification that are at
play in my experience of the other ego. I will end with an elucidation of the unique structure of
verification of the other ego through a continuous stream of harmonious experiences, which is
revealed to be a necessary component of the appearance of the other ego.

IV.1 The Structure of Verification
Take, for example, a wrapped birthday gift. If I come home on the evening of my birthday
and there is a boxed wrapped in bright red paper, I assume that the gift is uniformly wrapped in
the red paper. In other words, when I see an object such as a gift colored in a certain manner, the
other sides are given as also colored in the same fashion; since the side of my gift that is facing me
has red wrapping paper, then I assume that the sides that I cannot see also have red wrapping paper.
This assumption, of course, is easily verified as I joyously pick up the gift and turn it in my hands
to find it all wrapped in red.
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This example illustrates the basic structure of verification as elucidated by Husserl, because
it shows an experience of something as likely or probably one way or another and a subsequent
experience of the way something actually is in itself. In Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl
says that an experience can be verified in the following manner:
[Simply existing objectivities] must verified by going over to the evidence, the
“categorial intuition”, in which they would be given originaliter as they
“themselves”, verified, cognized as truly and actually existing. Thus, a distinction
arises occasionally, even for the judger, between the supposed objectivities as
supposed – purely as the ones that have become posited in such and such a
categorial form in his actions of judgment, is positum qua positum – and the
corresponding ‘true’ or ‘actual’ objectivities, that is: the categorial formations
accruing in the distinctive phenomenological form of insights, in the judging that
‘gives them-themselves’, step by step, formation by formation. (Husserl 1969,
122/108-109)173
So, in verification, we see a differentiation between a posited experience and the experience of
what is posited as it actually is. We can see how this occurs in the above example: when I see the
gift, I see it as uniformly wrapped in red wrapping paper, even though I have not yet seen all of its
sides. So, when I see one side as wrapped in a certain way, I assume that all of the other sides are
also wrapped in the same way, even though I have yet to see the explicit way in which those sides
are wrapped. Phenomenologically, this is called an empty intention, that is, an intention that lacks
fulfillment. Verification also requires a subsequent experience of the actual something as it is. As
I pick up the gift and turn it in my hands, I see the other sides nicely wrapped in the same red
paper, which offers intuitive fulfillment for my empty intention. As Husserl says in APS,
verification is accomplished in the transition to fulfillment (Husserl 2001, 396/262). In this
transition, “there takes place here an identifying coincidence between, on the one hand, the
objective affair… that was already believed-in previously and, on the other hand, the objective
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For the discussion of verification, I will be focusing on Husserl’s later works, primarily Formal and Transcendental
Logic, Experience and Judgment, and APS. Husserl does also discuss the fulfillment of intentions in chapter three of
the sixth investigation in Logical Investigations (Husserl 1976, 719-748).
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affair now given – as it itself, the fulfilling actuality, in the believing with evidence, the believing
that fulfils the intention aimed at cognition” (Husserl 1969, 123/109).174 In any verification, then,
there are necessarily three components: the empty intention (the to-be-verified), the intuitive
fulfillment (that-which-verifies), and the coincidence of the two (the verifying).
Before exploring these three components, however, we must note two things. (1)
Verification occurs even if what I suppose turns out otherwise; it is possible that as I turn the gift
over in my hands, I see that the backside is actually covered by a square of white wrapping paper,
which the giver had to use because the red ran out (we have all been there). In this instance, the
intention aimed at verification is disappointed (Husserl 1969, 123/109).175 Inherent in the structure
of verification, then, is that my intention can be verified as otherwise-than-intended. As Husserl
notes, this cannot be a complete disappointment, as the intention will at least be partially fulfilled.
That I suppose the gift to be wrapped entirely in red paper results in a disappointed intention.
However, that I suppose that the gift is wrapped (or that it has other sides) is fulfilled just as I had
expected. As Husserl notes, my intended object, the wrapped gift, “still becomes fulfilled in respect
of component positings; but these are supplemented in the affairs themselves to yield the total
positing of a categorial object with which the one previously believed-in ‘conflicts’” (Husserl
1969, 123/109). As I will discuss when looking at the components of verification, this shows that
the coincidence of an empty intention and intuitive fulfillment can be partial or incomplete, and
the degree to which it is fulfilled often determines whether or not the intention is properly verified
or disappointed.

174

In Experience and Judgment, Husserl says that what is experienced in this synthesis is the truth, the state of affairs
itself in a completely fulfilled intention (Husserl 1975, 284).
175
See also (Husserl 1975, 282) and (Husserl 1999, 58/93). Lampert, working with the Logical Investigations, notes
three different ways in which an intention can be frustrated by a fulfilling intuition (Lampert 1995, 144-145).
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(2) The structure of verification operates at different levels of consciousness, and Husserl
distinguishes between three types of verification according to whether the verification occurs at
the passive or active levels176 of consciousness. 177 Husserl uses the term verification (Bewährung)
to denote the coincidence of an empty intention with an intuitive fulfillment at the active level,
while he uses the term confirmation (Bewahrheitung) to denote the verificatory structures at work
in the passive levels of consciousness, that is, the empty intentions, types of intuition, and degrees
of coincidence underlying verification at the active level of the ego (Husserl 2001, 107/66).178 The
differences between the two can be clearly seen if we again consider my gift: when I see the
wrapped gift, I do not actively wonder if it is uniformly wrapped in the beautiful red wrapping
paper. Rather, I supposed it to be so, and as I happen upon its other sides in my interaction with
the gift, this supposition becomes confirmed incidentally through my continuing experience. In
other words, I do not actively question the uniformity of the wrapping paper and investigate the
gift further to see if all sides are wrapped in the same red paper – I am much too curious about the
contents of the gift; rather, the assumption of uniformity is continually fulfilled in my continuing
experience of the gift. Husserl uses confirmation to describe passive forms of verification of this
sort. I can also undertake an active investigation of the gift: I wonder if the gift is a sweater or
maybe some socks. In this case, I have an active positing of a supposed state of affairs that can be
verified through further experiences. As I open the gift, I can see that it is in fact a sweater. My
supposed state of affairs is verified as being actually the case; my supposition that the gift is a
sweater is verified.

176

For the present analysis, I need only to distinguish between active and passive levels.
I leave out Ausweisung as a type of verification because it does not occur as frequently in Husserl’s discussions of
the topic. I believe its usage in the passage from Ideas I cited in the following can be attributed to a focus on the
fulfilling intentions as opposed to the synthetic coincidence of intentions that occurs in verification.
178
Bewährung is, to my knowledge, uniformly translated as “verification.” Bewahrheitung is translated less
consistently, so I will follow Steinbock’s translation of it as “confirmation” in APS.
177
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There is a third form of verification, corroboration (Bestätigung),179 which Husserl
describes as a secondary level of verification. In the case of the gift, I have a continuously
unfolding experience of it as an object in my world. The gift is there before me spatially, wrapped
in red paper, containing some token of affection, likely from my mother, etc. All of these passive
and active intentions form a unified horizon of my experience of the gift. As long as this horizonal
framework is not disappointed in the unfolding of my experiential life (by, say, finding out that
the wrapped red gift is not for me or is actually an alien ship), my experience of the gift as such is
corroborated. Only after further clarifying the three components of verification and investigating
specific types of it can I offer a clear picture of the way in which corroboration unfolds, particularly
in relation to the other ego.
While Husserl has a clear conceptual framework for verification at different levels, it must
be acknowledged that Husserl does not take great pains to rigorously use consistent terminology
in his descriptions, particularly in his usage of verification (Bewährung) and confirmation
(Bewahrheitung) for active and passive acts of verification. In fact, Husserl weaves the different
levels of verification so closely that in one passage from APS, he discusses the process of
confirmation as enacted by the awakened ego, and even states that this process of confirmation has
the ego in “the center as the wakeful radiating center of active striving” (Husserl 2001, 127-128/8485). Steinbock, the translator, even adds a footnote to say that this should be described as a type
of verification and not confirmation; however, I read this as a way in which Husserl is showing
the interrelation of the levels of verification. In his analysis of verification, instead of rigorously
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Steinbock uses “ratification” to translate Bestätigung, and instead uses “corroboration” for Bekräftigung. I feel that
the sense of “corroboration” is closer to the verifying act said to be prior to verification proper, yet removed from
confirmation. This could be because as an American, I first learned of the word “ratify” in terms of amendments to
the constitution, and this process is a deliberative, glacial one that does not equate with the flow of Bestätigung.
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using vocabulary, Husserl often simply offers reminders in the text after various analyses, such as
the following:
But naturally – and we must never forget this – all the talk of verification applying
to such fulfillments in mere passivity is inaccurate. Indeed we are not speaking here
of an active striving and accomplishing that is directed toward a true being which
normatively regulates or measures its intending according to what is given as true
in the self-giving. (Husserl 2001, 136/92)
Such passages, I hold, speak to the uniformity of the verifying structure across levels, which is
consistent throughout Husserl’s analyses of verification in various texts.
Thus, in investigating Husserl’s concept of verification, it is important to recognize both
the differences that demarcate verification at different levels of consciousness and the uniformity
of the structure at each level. For the present analysis, this is all the more important because I am
arguing that the verification of the other ego is a structural component of its appearance; in other
words, the enactment of verification in this manner is only possible for the appearance of the other
ego. In Formal and Transcendental Logic and Experience and Judgment, Husserl discusses
verification at the active level, verification proper, in its relation to the truth value of an assertion
or the actuality or existence of an object. When I verify the giver of the gift and its recipient, I look
at the tag on the gift and see that the gift is for me and the gift is from my mother; in other words,
I make a supposition about the object and verify said supposition through further investigation.
Verification of this sort is not possible in my experience of the other ego, as the givenness of the
other ego as inaccessible prevents such straightforward intuitive fulfillments. Rather, I will show
that the verification of the other ego is a unique form of corroboration. Such a claim can only be
made, however, after clarifying the structure of verification in general.
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IV.2 Empty intention
The first component of the structure of verification that I will investigate is what I have
above called the to-be-verified, that is, the empty intention. An intention can be said to be empty
in so far as it is unfulfilled. 180 For instance, an empty judgment is one not “immediately fulfilled
in experience”, and some remain unfulfillable (Husserl 1975, 278). An anticipation is considered
empty when it has the “potentiality of what is actualized in corresponding intuitions and syntheses
of disclosure” (Husserl 2001, 138/94). In both cases, the emptiness of an intention refers to its
ability to be fulfilled by a coinciding intuition; thus, the emptiness of an intention is its directedness
towards or striving for fulfillment. As Husserl says, an “intention remains an intention so long as
something is still lacking with respect to having the goal-self, that is, with respect to what is to be
reached. It is also clear that every lived-experience (Erlebnis), which is in need of a fulfillment,
can be characterized as an intention” (Husserl 2001, 127/84). Thus, in order to elucidate the role
that the empty intention plays in the structure of verification, the striving of an empty intention
must be clarified.

IV.2.a Striving
Husserl describes two levels of striving corresponding to the distinction between
verification and confirmation, that is, he distinguishes between active and passive striving.
Verification in the active sense involves an active striving of an empty intention toward that which
will fulfill it, that is, toward a coincidence with a fulfilling intention. In the above example of the
gift, it is easy to see the way in which my active empty intentions strive for fulfillment. When I
wonder who the gift is from, there is an intentional reaching for some knowledge that I do not have

180

There are degrees of fulfillment and only in rare, ideal cases can there be a complete fulfillment of an intention.
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and aim to discover. I can open the gift to see what is in it, or I can ask my wife if she knows what
the gift contains. In each of these cases, my ego engages in an activity aimed at an experience of
something that is, at the moment, lacking. This is the sort of striving that aims at cognition,
knowledge, truth, and being, the activity of an ego directed toward satisfying some aim through
its own engagement. 181
In confirmation, at the passive level, the striving is not an egoic striving. In the case of the
gift, my assumption that it is uniformly wrapped is not taken up at the active level. I do not turn it
over in my hands to make sure that it is all wrapped in red paper; rather, I am absorbed by other
questions: Who gave me the gift? What could be in it? Am I sure that the gift is for me? The empty
intentions aimed at the uniformity of the wrapping paper, at the other sides of the objects not
immediately facing me, are not attended to by the ego. Yet, they still aim at fulfillment, and thus
have a striving of their own.
Husserl explains this by examining the way in which striving works in retentions. Properly
speaking, Husserl claims, retentions are not intentional, because they contain within them already
their intended content, merely in a non-intuitive manner (Husserl 2001, 119-120/77, 123/80).182 In
other words, they do not lack the aim of their consciousness, the strived-for, and thus have no
intentional, that is striving, character. However, because they do not have their strived-for
intuitively, a retention can be intentionally awakened:

181

In his discussion of Husserl’s analysis of making a decision, Lampert notes that the ego “strives” for a resolution
when in a state of indecision. However, Lampert argues that the term “striving” is a poor term for this activity of the
ego, particularly due to the historical use of the term in Fichte and Hegel (Lampert 2018, 75). The ego does not strive
toward this or that specific resolution, insofar as the ego does not “strive to make objects present, [because
phenomenologically] objects are given as present” (Lampert 2018, 75). Rather, what is strived for, as Lampert notes,
is the resolution of doubt. His point is that one does not strive for an object to be or to be true, but for the satisfaction
of an unresolved intention. This is the sense in which I am using the term “striving” above; in this sense, the striving
of consciousness is more akin to what Lampert calls a meaning-intention, “an act’s directedness towards objects”
(Lampert 1995, 109).
182
This would, properly speaking, only hold for far retentions as opposed to near retentions. This distinction was noted
in Chapter III and will be further discussed in the following analyses of the types of verification.
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I said that retentions, as they arise in their originality, have no intentional character.
This does not rule out that in certain circumstances and in their own way they can
assume this intentional character later. … Now, how does a retention get this
oriented structure? By a subsequent association, of course… an associative
awakening proceeds from the present toward a retentional past that had already
arisen originally prior to this association and its fading away. (Husserl 2001,
120/77-78)
A retention can be awakened by an association with a present experience such that the retention
becomes emptily oriented toward a renewed intuitive fulfillment; in other words, a retention can
strive again for intuitive fulfillment. We see here, then, a change in the directedness or aim of an
empty intention; properly speaking, we see its activation. 183 A retention that was contented with
its non-intuitive fulfillment is wrested awake, made aware of its emptiness, and seeks further
fulfillment, either in an intuitive remembering or possibly in entirely new intuitions.
Husserl breaks this awakening into two moments: the affect, that which awakens, and the
receptive action in response to the affection, the awakening proper of the conscious act (Husserl
2001, 127/84). As my stream of lived experiences flows into retentions, concatenated together
until they eventually become sedimented experiences, a new experience can awaken a long
forgotten retention (or a recent retention, of course) – as when I see a cat similarly colored to one
from my youth. When this happens, Husserl describes a directed presentation in the background
that affects the ego: “a tendency heads toward the ego” (Husserl 2001, 127/84). In other words,
the ego is inundated, passively, by the experienced world. The tendency directed toward the ego
awakens the retention with a directedness of its own toward what has awakened it. This is a key
distinction between confirmation and verification, as the structural striving of an empty intention
must be distinguished from the active engagement of the striving ego, as Husserl clearly says:
[W]e must clearly differentiate between the direction of the egoic regard, and the
direction in perception itself that already takes place prior to the apprehending
183

Of course, this does not mean that it becomes taken up by the ego in an active consciousness. Rather, Husserl
simply has in mind here the activation of its intentional structure as aiming at fulfillment.
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regard. In one instance, the egoic regard follows the direction in perception itself,
in the other, it does not. (Husserl 2001, 116/74)
Only after the directed presentation awakens the intentional aim, that is, the striving, of a retention,
can the ego turn toward what has awakened it, which results in an intentional striving of the ego:
“the presentation assumes the shape of a grasping in which the egoic regard is directed toward the
object” (Husserl 2001, 127/84). The directedness of a retention (and the perception Husserl
mentions here is passive perception, specifically an awakened retention) is not the same as the
directedness of the ego, the focus of the egoic regard. Yet, in both we see the striving that is proper
to all intentions in their intentional structure, an empty intending that seeks an intuition of the
object itself.

IV.2.b Prefiguration
The striving of the empty intention towards its fulfillment also shows that the empty
intention in some way determines in advance its fulfillment. In the case of the gift, I suppose that
it is uniformly wrapped. Here, of course, we are at the passive level, so this means that I have an
empty intention that supposes without egoic attention that the paper is red on unseen sides as well.
As said above, if that intention is disappointed, it is nevertheless not completely disappointed:
there is still wrapping paper, even if it is a different color, or at the very least there is another side
of the gift, even if it is unwrapped for some reason. In this way, in its striving the empty intention
prefigures the possible intuitive fulfillment that can lead to confirmation or disappointment.
This can be seen at the active level in Husserl’s discussion of the verifiability of any
mathematical judgment; in the case of its validity, such a judgment is necessarily determined in
advance in itself (Husserl 2001, 149/104). So, any mathematical judgment is or is not valid in itself
before we decide upon it, in the judicative empty intention itself; we are just unaware of it until
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we have intuitive verification. This is evident in our everyday experience, because whether or not
I remember the sum of the interior degrees of a triangle, that it is equal to 180° is valid. In other
words, the judgment itself, that the sum of the interior angles of a triangle is equal to 180°, is in
itself verified as true in advance. I do not know this, of course, until I carry out the judgment, that
is, until I experience its coincidence with a fulfilling intuition. Nevertheless, its verification is
determined in advance. The question for the current investigation is whether or not this is the case
for all conscious acts, particularly the case of my experience of the other ego.
Husserl argues that the verification of external objects cannot be possible in advance, as
experiential objects are different from mathematical ones (Husserl 2001, 150/106). As I will
discuss later, this shows that the verification of something is dependent upon what is being verified.
However, there is still a prefiguration of an external object in an empty intention of it, because
objects in the world, and of course the world itself, transcend our immediate experience of it:
Things are constituted in immanent lived-experiences, but are not themselves
[constituted] as a lived-experience, neither as a past lived-experience, nor as a
futural one. They are essentially constituted as intentional unities, as identifiable
unities of actual and possible perception, so that they, extending beyond the current
perceptions, are unities only appearing in them. And they are thereby constituted as
enduring unities reaching via the experienced past and present into a nonexperienced past and present, but also via the experienced past and present into the
future, and reaching into it objectively. The thing is constituted from one side, but
it is more than what I see of it; it has sides that are presently non-visible, but that in
themselves befit it. Likewise, the thing has, in itself, a future, it is in itself not only
with respect to the past and present, regardless of whether the past and present have
been genuinely experienced or are now genuinely experienced; the thing is also
what it will be, in itself, no matter how little I may be familiar with it. In my livedexperience of so-called external perception, such an external existence is
constituted with such a sense-giving of the in-itself. Much is indeterminate here,
partly in the current perceptual thing or thing-complex, partly with respect to its
surroundings, which are constantly co-constituted as a horizon – and yet everything
here is constituted as determinable indeterminacy. A being that can be legitimated,
a true being in itself, lies at the basis of all of this; all error, all illusion has its norm
in a hidden truth, but a truth that is to be attained. (Husserl 2001, 265-266/213-214)
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My experience of an object is not limited to an experience of the object as mere correlate to my
immediate consciousness of it. Rather, I experience the object as having in itself a future, because
it is constituted as a unity of my immediate impression of it in the now and my previous
experiences of it, held in retention or even sedimented and remembered. But it is not as if the unity
is truncated in the now, as if my immediate experience of the object will not endure past the present
moment. Rather, the unity includes its persistence into the future as objective, such that “the futural
course of nature can be legitimated from the standpoint of every experienced present, ultimately,
logically knowable and predictable – it is thus in the objective attitude” (Husserl 2001, 266/214).
In other words, my past experience prefigures and regulates the possible course of my livedexperience and perception. This prefiguring gives a determinate sense to the future, such that it is
in advance able to be verified, but only in a limited and general way, a determinable
indeterminacy.184 This means that we have “norms of verification… originally prefigured ways of
possible verification that the active ego in its freedom can discover and survey” (Husserl 2001,
266/214).
Of course, Husserl does admit that it is possible for these norms of verification, the
objective sense of the future, to be disappointed. 185 However, we do experience the flow of
consciousness as regulated (Husserl 2001, 153/108). And while such regulation does not allow us
to say that the world is determined in advance in the same way as in the case of a mathematical
judgment, the lawful regulation of consciousness does give a sort of verifiability in advance to my
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Lampert discusses this in a similar manner, when he notes that fulfillment has an ideal referent: “To say that
fulfillment has an ideal limit is not to say that all possibilities are known in advance, but rather that there is a demand
in advance that open-ended descriptions be unified, and discontinuities negated for as long as the intended object fails
to be self-evidently present” (Lampert 1995, 170).
185
In an interesting hypothetical claim, he says that my further experience could become so muddled that “the entire
perceptual world-order is destroyed, such that this world as the unity of experience is no longer even maintained, such
that it becomes unstable for consciousness, such that all sense-data lose their apperceptive apprehensions” (Husserl
2001, 151/106). He even asks if any particular external experience could be the last such experience while
consciousness still endures (Husserl 2001, 152/107).
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unfolding experience. 186 This verifiability comes from the repeatability of experience, that we can
“reach beyond the momentary consciousness through rememberings in which we repeatedly come
back to the same presentation and to its same meant object; and in which, on the other hand, we
can repeatedly secure for ourselves and potentially do secure for ourselves the verified self as an
identical self” (Husserl 2001, 155/110) In this way, the fulfillment of what is to come in external
experience is prefigured, and in its successful intuitive coincidence, or disappointed coincidence,
ever new norms of verification are established:
Every genuine verification prescribes a determining rule for the course of
perceptions, of past and future ones. Just because a thing existed does not mean that
we would have to carry out a perception and a progressive legitimation relating to
it; but given that it existed, what is prefigured along with it is something that I could
have seen or must have seen at some time by appropriately running through my
kinaesthetic data; as it is also prefigured that I could see it and the manner in which
I could see it in the future, and the manner in which I could continue to legitimate
it as that existing-being by the appropriate position or movement of my lived-body.
Naturally, this yields the regulation of my perceptual appearances and therefore the
regulation of my current or possible perceptual lived-experiences. (Husserl 2001,
266-267/214-215)

IV.3 Intuition
The striving of the empty intention always has but one aim: the return of the self-giving
experience, even if such an experience disappoints (Husserl 1975, 289). The self-giving experience
of what is intended occurs in an intuition. Thus, Husserl says that an empty intention has the
essential possibility of coming into coincidence with an intuition, 187 of having its striving satisfied,
and in the synthetic coincidence we gain “an evidence-consciousness, a consciousness that exactly
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Lampert argues that the even in the case of an intention aimed at what we might call a determinately determined
content, as in the case of mathematical judgments, there is still a range of possible intuitions: “even in cases where
there is a one-to-one correspondence between meaning and intuition, the meaning must still ‘prescribe’ a range of
possible intuitions ‘in advance’ (even if a range of one)” (Lampert 1995, 134)
187
“Thus, where there is no horizon, where there are no empty intentions, there is no [synthesis of] fulfillment”
(Husserl 2001, 108/68).
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the same [object] that was meant in an empty manner is there in intuition in a genuine way, as the
same [object] actually presented” (Husserl 2001, 114/72). However, Husserl also notes that not all
presentations are self-giving intuitions and not every fulfillment verifies (Husserl 2001, 109/68).
So, before discussing the coincidence of empty intentions and intuitions, I will first discuss the
two types of intuitions that Husserl describes, those that are self-giving and those that are not selfgiving (Husserl 2001, 391/257).
Those intuitions that are self-giving are those that can properly fulfill an empty intention,
that is, an intuition that verifies or confirms. 188 In the example of the gift, it is given to me as
uniformly wrapped in red paper through a continuous flow of intuitions: I have sensible
perceptions of the red paper covering the side that is facing me as I turn it in my hands. I suppose
the gift to be fully wrapped in red paper, and when I perceive other sides that show the gift to be
indeed uniformly wrapped, those perceptive intuitions confirm my empty intentions because they
give the gift itself as wrapped in red paper. In other words, the intuitive experience in which the
aimed-at is given itself are fulfilling intuitions proper. Those that are not self-giving are referred
to as intuitive picturings that “only refer, as it were, beyond themselves, to a self that is not given
in them, to a presenting against which they are measured, a presenting in which the self… would
be given” (Husserl 2001, 391/257). Such intuitions do not fulfill; rather, they offer what Huserl
calls mere filling for the empty intention (Husserl 2001, 122/70). For instance, in phantasy I can
have an intuitive presentation of what is referred to in the picture. 189 Such intuitions are not self-
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“these processes are self-giving for the true and the non-true, …verified being and invalidated being, only in so
far… as the synthesis of fulfillment actually imparts the fullness of the self to the emptiness” (Husserl 2001, 252/201).
189
Husserl chooses to focus his anaylsis of intuitions that are not self-giving on re-presentations
(Vergegenwärtigungen) directed toward the past, present, and future (Husserl 2001, 110-113/68-71). A specific
example that Husserl mentions of intuitive presentations of the co-present, a present re-presentation, is the “copresence of alien psychic life that is given perceptually along with the alien lived-body” (Husserl 2001, 112/70)
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giving, as they do not give the aim of the empty-intention itself. Thus, they do not fulfill but offer
mere filling.

IV.3.a Self-giving as distinct from direct consciousness
It is important that we do not conflate Husserl’s usage of “self-giving” to distinguish the
types of intuition with the directness of consciousness discussed in the previous chapter, even
though the distinctions sound strikingly similar. This is because Husserl seems to be using selfgivenness in a much more restrictive sense when discussing a self-giving intuition. 190 As often
happens in his work, one must be careful to keep distinct the various levels of consciousness at
which Husserl is using terms. Husserl’s analysis of the two types of intuition upon which we are
currently focused occurs primarily in his work on passive synthesis; thus, there are objectivities
and objectlike formations (Gegenständlichkeiten) at play here, but not objects proper. However,
the directness and indirectness of the consciousness of an object is precisely related to the
givenness of an object, a meaning, a sense. This explains why I say that the entire object is directly
given in sensory perception: the object itself is given as having co-present sides, as when I see a
house with various sides, but all of it is given itself. It is different when Husserl speaks of what is
intuited in a co-presentation: the non-visible sides and parts of a house are excluded from a genuine
self-giving intuition (Husserl 2001, 253/202). He even uses the unseen sides of a table as examples
of a “bringing to intuition” that does not fulfill an intention with a self-giving intuition (Husserl
2001, 380/246). Because we are speaking of passively constituted objectivities, it seems that
Husserl is restricting the term “self-givenness” to the immediately given impression of an object
in the impressional present. In this way, what is co-present could not be itself given, as it is not
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This reading is possibly indebted more to Cairns than I am aware, but Husserl’s usage of intuition in the previous
and current chapters seems to accord. In the end, this may be another case of ambiguity in Husserl’s work.
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presented in an intuitive self-giving, which differs from the way one is directly consciousness of
objects at the active level of consciousness. Co-presentations, rememberings, and anticipations
would not be intuitive self-givings in this restricted sense.
However, the distinctions at play in determining a self-giving intuition are not always clear.
As previously mentioned in Chapter III, Husserl describes recollection and anticipation as intuitive
consciousnesses whose content stands before us itself (Husserl 2005, 602/501). However, he also
says that “intuitively pictured expectations, a memory of the future, or even an intuitive
presentification of something present, a memory of the present” cannot fulfill an empty intention
(Husserl 2001, 381/247). Thus, perceptions can fulfill intentions aimed at the future, in that what
is expected is perceived in its coming to pass, and the expected as expected is only a picturing of
what is anticipated and thus not intuitively self-giving. However, Husserl also speaks of intuitive
expectations as giving “something futural in an intuitive presentation,” for instance, when we
“extend the perceptual moment into the future” (Husserl 2001, 111/70). Thus, there is an ambiguity
in the self-givenness of futural intuitive presentations:
The future is the realm of the unfamiliar, and insofar as this is the case, it is initially
not a realm of the in-itself, not a realm of true objectlike formations that are
pregiven to the ego in their truth, but rather a realm of indeterminacy that the ego
occupies with objectlike formations only insofar as it is sure that determining
fulfillment will later constitute an objectlike formation… And yet an expectation
can also constitute an objectlike formation and make the future determinate.
(Husserl 2001, 264/212)
Insofar as the future has not yet come, what is futural is intuitively pictured, in that it cannot be
self-given in an immediate perception. It is only indeterminate and gives nothing of itself for
further determination. On the other hand, insofar as an expectation expects something specific, it
makes the future determinate. What is expected gives itself as something expected; thus, what is
given to a futural consciousness is directly given as something futural itself. In this way,
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expectations are direct consciousnesses, but the something futural does not give itself in the selfgiving of something that can fulfill an empty intention. Thus, in determining what fulfills an empty
intention, we must look at the immediate determinacy of what is given in the intuition.

IV.3.b Overabundant fulfillment
The distinction between self-giving intuitions and intuitions that are not self-giving deals
only with one side of the spectrum of possible intuitions, in that it only distinguishes intuitions that
measure up to my empty intentions from those that fail to meet them adequately. It is also important
to note that there can be an “overabundance” of intuition, as is always the case in sensorial
perception. I can look at the red wrapping paper uniformly covering my gift as I turn it in my hands
and find that it is textured to the touch. Included in my intuitive experience of the gift, then, is
confirmation of my empty intentions aimed at the uniformity of the wrapping paper and a further
fulfillment of its tactile sensation. Thus, there are components of the perceptual experience that
exceed my expectation, because in a fulfilling intuition there is a closer determination of what is
given:
What occurs here beyond what is prefigured, beyond what is determinately
expected, we characterize not merely as filling, but rather as determining more
closely. As such, the latter has the character of fulfillment. What first comes on the
scene as coinciding with the prefigured element is a primary fulfillment. But the
overabundance that intuition supplies is also a fulfilling, a secondary one, insofar
as it is given as belonging to the object itself which is intended there and is now
given in intuition as itself, precisely fulfilling the intention. (Husserl 2001, 122/7980)
What is merely filling for an empty intention does not further determine the intended because it
does not give what belongs to the intuited itself. Rather, because my expectations and copresentations of a thing do not remain merely empty in their coincidence with intuition, what is
not expected particularly, that is, what is not generally prefigured, is merely filled in so that I have
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a complete intuition.191 Thus, what exceeds the aim of an empty intention in intuitive fulfillment
is also a fulfilling, in that it belongs to what was emptily intended. Such intuitive fulfillment offers
verification of a particular empty intention and secondary fulfillments that point to a secondary
level of verification, which will be further discussed when exploring collaboration below. 192

IV.4 Coincidence
The final component of verification is the coincidence of the empty intention and the
intuition that fulfills it, that is, the satisfaction of the intention in the relaxation of its striving when
its goal is reached (Husserl 2001, 127/84). As with the two types of intuition, there are two types
of coinciding; the satisfaction of the striving accomplished by reaching the intended thing itself is
to be distinguished from the coincidence of an empty intention with an intuition that is not selfgiving, which Husserl describes as “merely filling.” 193 Thus, Husserl distinguishes fulfilling
coincidence from mere clarification or disclosure, that is, he distinguishes between coincidences
of empty intentions and fulfilling intuitions and coincidences of empty intentions and mere
filling.194 For example, when I suppose the gift to be uniformly wrapped in red paper and I have a
fulfilling intuition of it as uniformly wrapped in red paper, the empty intentions involved in my
supposition coincide with fulfilling intuitions of the gift itself. The coinciding synthesis of the
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It should be noted that this filling is not actively attended to, such that I do not need to color in the bus, fully
describe the driver, etc., in order to have intuitive coincidence with my anticipation of the bus. This all happens at the
level of passivity, which I will more closely examine in the following section.
192
Lampert notes that this can cause a reinterpretation of the intention just as much as a frustration of the intention
(Lampert 1995, 146).
193
In contrast these two types of fulfillment, which I take from APS, Lampert finds four types of fulfillment in Logical
Investigations (Lampert 1995, 126-195). I will not be able in the present study to account for the differences in
approach that lead to these two accounts of fulfillment; however, there does appear to be an interesting common thread
in Husserl’s work on the fulfillment that runs from his early work to at least his interest in passive synthesis.
194
It should be remembered that Husserl describes emptiness as the potentiality of what can be actualized in
corresponding intuitions and syntheses of disclosure, using forms of Enthüllung for both terms. The clarification of
the difference between these two leads to an understanding of the level of corroboration prior to verification (Husserl
2001, 139/94).
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empty intention and the fulfilling intuition is, here at the passive level, a confirmation of my
supposition. In the same way, if I wonder if the gift is from my mother and learn from its tag that
this is indeed the case, the coincidence of my empty intention and the fu lfilling intuition is a
verification at the active level. In the ideal case of verification across all levels, then, an empty
intention coincides with a fulfilling (self-giving) intuition.
Of course, it often occurs that my empty intention does not coincide with a self-giving
intuition; instead, my empty intention can coincide with an intuition that is not self-giving. For
instance, if my wife tells me that the gift is a sweater before I open it, my empty intentions coincide
only with pictured intuitions of the sweater: I imagine that it is green and woolen. Husserl describes
the coincidence of the empty intention of the expectation with the re-presented futural intuitions
as merely clarifying or disclosive, because they do not give the sweater itself in a self-giving
intuition. In fact, because my expectation can only be general, in that I have no experience of the
actual sweater, only what can be generally foreseen about the sweater (that it has sleeves, is made
of a fabric, has some sort of color or pattern) can be properly said to fill the empty intention: “only
[such components] achieve an actual coinciding” with my expectations (Husserl 2001, 122/79).
There are varying components of the expectation that align with the actual state of affairs, which
in this example, is a determinate indeterminacy. Thus, Husserl distinguishes between the
verification of the entire state of affairs, the specific relations of the objectivities intended, and the
accompanying components of those objectivities and relations that are still fulfilled partially.
Because intuition gives a complete picture, the rest of what is intuited is mere filling: that the
sweater is green and cotton, for instance; all of this is not given in a self-giving intuition because
of the futural nature of the intuition, but I cannot have an intuition of a sweater lacking color and
fabric, even if the sweater is indeterminate. This description of what is expected shows the way in
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which an intuition does not fulfill the empty intention, properly speaking, because what is given
intuitively as expected is only given as pictured, as referring to an itself that is not itself given
within my experience. On the other hand, I can have an actual experience of the sweater when I
unwrap the gift; it has a determinate color and fabric. The actual arrival of the expected object
fulfills the expectation, and, when what is expected appears as expected, Husserl calls this
coincidence a genuine verification (Husserl 2001, 122/79).

IV.5 Degrees of fulfillment
This demonstrates that the coincidence of an empty intention and an intuition can admit of
degrees of fulfillment, particularly in the case of confirmation. While we speak of a confirmation
as a fulfilling synthesis, and Husserl says that passive empty intentions can be fulfilled, there is
always a further push in confirmation that runs from the partial indeterminacy of what is intuitively
expected (its prefiguration) into the ideal limit of full intuitive clarity. When I suppose the gift to
be uniformly wrapped, this passive supposition aims at a uniform covering of the box in the same
color and material. Such a supposition is confirmed through my interaction with the gift, but such
confirmation is never said to be fulfilled completely for two reasons. First, in my interaction with
the gift, I only have given to me in intuitive self-giveness the side of it that is immediately facing
me. The empty intentions aimed at the uniformity of the other sides are, properly speaking, not
fulfilled by self-giving intuitions. In this way, the process of confirmation is always partially
incomplete. Second, the complete fulfillment of my supposition of the gift as uniformly wrapped
would take an active directedness on the part of the ego to attend to all of the various sides in a
synthetic act of consciousness. In other words, I would have to verify its wrapping, which would
require an active positing and investigation into the state of affairs of the posited. Thus, we can
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say that the fulfillment of verification is the acquisition of knowledge, which means that
verification has a character of finitude: a certain proposition is verified either as true or false in the
coincidence of an empty intention and a fulfilling intuition. This would be the ideal limit of clarity,
but it is only ideal. Even the active search for knowledge or truth leads to further questions and
investigations.195
Thus, the striving of an empty intention only ideally comes to full satisfaction, and Husserl
particularly notes that confirmation does not offer a full relaxation of the striving. 196 Thus, the
striving of an empty intention is more properly a tendency toward satisfaction that always pursues
further clarity. In his genetic analysis of confirmation, we find that its indeterminacy causes
passive empty intentions to be “a process of bringing something concealed to light, a process of
bringing it to the clarity of self-giving” that requires a continued progression to newer, richer, and
clearer intuitive coincidings (Husserl 2001, 252-253/201). The satisfaction of confirmation, then,
is always relative to the individual empty intention, because at the same time this satisfaction also
leaves undetermined other aspects of the fulfilling intuition that give rise to further empty
intentions, awakens further tendencies:
[C]onfirmation can only become relativized precisely because of this essential
relation to a tendentious intention; this is the case even though at any moment there
is already, in a good sense, a fulfillment in it. It is not simply an issue of a synthetic
unity of presentations for itself, but also a synthetic unity which concerns the
striving that traverses the presentations. (Husserl 2001, 127/84)
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Lampert distinguishes such a pursuit of knowledge from decision making, because a decision does not start from
the disjunction of truth and falsehood (Lampert 2018, 58-59). When aiming at the truth, one aims at evidence, and the
material of the verification, as Lampert would call it, is evidently true or false. The material of a decision, however,
is evidently neither, as all possibilities seem potentially real and potentially truthful. This potentiality is maintained
even in the possibilities not chosen, as Lampert argues that one can always unmake a decision and attempt to decide
it otherwise.
196
Lampert argues that “for Husserl all meanings have to be open-ended synthesizing acts always in the midst of
playing out their implicit possibilities” (Lampert 1995, 89).
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This has two interesting consequences for the structure of verification as a whole. First, as the
active level of verification is built up on the passive level of confirmation, 197 even when the egoic
regard accompanies the striving of an intention, there are drives to further and closer
determinations. This is why Husserl says that the striving for knowledge is not “an isolated
intending, but rather, if we want to have the normal concept of knowing in the logical sense, we
must conceive of the epistemic striving in connection with a habitual consistency that does not
break off and is not arrested in a single act, and does not break off when the knower sleeps”
(Husserl 2001, 129/85).198 Second, and more important for the project concerned with the
appearance of the other ego, the fulfilling lived experience, the coincidence of an empty intention
and corresponding intuition, can itself contain an empty intention striving for fulfillment. In other
words, part of the fulfillment of an empty intention includes to some degree a further emptiness
that carries forward the striving of the intention. This is what makes the process of confirmation
tendentious. All lived experiences can be intentional, as already established, but every lived
experience can also be fulfilling in so far as they offer relative fulfillment to a prior empty intention
(Husserl 2001, 127/84). This is evident in the discussion of inner and outer horizons:
[E]very external perception harbors its inner and outer horizons, regardless [of] the
extent to which perception has the character of self-giving; this is to say, it is a
consciousness that simultaneously points beyond its own content. In its fullness it
simultaneously points into an emptiness that would only now convey a new
perception. (Husserl 2001, 108/67, my emphasis)
The fulfillment of an empty intention by an intuition that gives the object itself still carries with it
further horizons of possible determination. Thus, the process of verification at the passive and
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“[T]he primary tasks becomes elucidating the founding level of the passive syntheses of ‘verification’ lying at the
basis of all active verification” (Husserl 2001, 112/70).
198
The habitual consistency needed to gain knowledge sounds like the vocational consistency described in Formal
and Transcendental Logic: “the division of a whole life into periods (vocational hours, days, so forth) that are
separated and yet connected internally by intentional synthesis, and appertain to a habitual ‘vocational interest’”
(Husserl 1969, 124/110).
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active levels is a constitutive part of the infinite nature of consciousness, and in turn, the infinite
phenomenological project.

IV.6 Specific cases of verification
The structure of verification at all levels involves an empty intention able to be intuitively
filled, and the intuition corresponding to that intention can either be a picturing intuition that
clarifies with mere filler or a properly fulfilling intuition of self-giving. Verification occurs
positively or negatively, that is, as fulfillment or disappointment, in the coincidence of the empty
intention and intuition. The verifiability of any intention is in some way determined in advance,
completely for mathematical intentions and the like, but only in a partial, determinable manner for
external perceptions. This demonstrates that the way in which the structure of verification is
evinced varies depending upon the content being verified, which is why it is important to elucidate
the unique manner of verification at play in the appearance of the other ego. In discussing the
coincidence of the evidential and non-evidential acts in Ideas I, Husserl notes that the way in which
“the process looks, or can look, is predelineated by the essence of the kinds of positing in question,
or else by the essence of the posita in the particular case in their fulfillment. For every genus of
posita the forms of essentially possible verification must be made clear phenomenologically”
(Husserl 1983, 336/291, my emphasis).199 This is also discussed in Formal and Transcendental
Logic when Husserl distinguishes between perfect, proper, and improper types of verification
(Husserl 1969, 123-124/109-110). The perfect case of verification is one in which what “offers
itself to the judger as something itself-given and existent or true is subject to no reservations, no
anticipative presumptions whose possible fulfillment (in further syntactically annexable

199

That the content of a consciousness has a bearing on the structure of that consciousness has long been discussed
by Rodemeyer. This, then, seems to be just another case of her being right.
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evidences) would decide whether the ostensibly true is the definitively true” (Husserl 1969,
123/110). There are, of course, varying manners in which the itself-given gives itself. Thus, we
can speak of proper or improper verification according to the degree to which the intentional
synthesis is “effected by an intuition that gives something-itself” (Husserl 1969, 123-124/110). In
so far as objects of varying types give themselves in varying intuitions, we must elucidate the
structures of verification at play in the particular syntheses corresponding to the particular
intuitions. In the following, then, I will look into specific instances of verification in order to show
that the above structure of verification pertains to all types of intuition across all levels of
consciousness. Finally, I will show the way in which this structure is at play in my experience of
the other ego.

IV.6.a Knowledge and judicative positings
Husserl usually describes verification at the active level in terms of judicative positings
and synthetic conscious acts aiming at the truth of a proposition or existence of an object. In this
sense, the act of verification is a synthetic conscious act that makes something evident. 200 For
instance, in Ideas I, Husserl describes the verification of what is posited as occurring in the
coincidence of acts with “the same sense and positum, but of different rational values” (Husserl
1983, 336/291). He offers as an example the verification (using the verb bestätigen) of a nonevidential act through its coincidence with an evidential act, through which the positum is verified
(bewährt). For example, my actual experience can be said to provide verification for my
expectations, as when I expect the sweater to be green. As Husserl states, “the possibility coincides
with actuality… Actual experience…provides an actual validation (Ausweisung) of positings
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For instance, Husserl says that reason, as a necessary transcendental structure, “refers to possibilities of verification,
and verification refers to making evident and having as evident” (Husserl 1999, 57/92).
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bearing upon something real, let us say, validation of the positing of the factual existence of events
belonging to Nature” (Husserl 1983, 337/292).201 This is what Husserl calls in Formal and
Transcendental Logic a successful verification (Husserl 1969, 123/109). In my expectation that
the sweater is green, there is a synthesis between the expected object (the green color of the
sweater) and the actually experienced object now given, fulfilling the aim of the intention with an
experience that gives originally (Husserl 1969, 122-123/109). In this way, verification at the active
level leads to knowledge:
Knowledge is the consequence of the ‘agreement’ between an empty anticipatory
belief, in particular a predicative belief (empty, or not genuinely intuitive), and the
corresponding experience which gives at first hand the object of this belief – the
object judged in the predication – as the experience of its self-evident givenness –
an agreement in which the anticipatory belief comes to synthetic coincidence with
the belief from experience and is fulfilled in it. From another perspective: there is
agreement between the mere judgment, between what is posited with such and such
a predicative sense, and the experience of this sense in the mode of ‘it itself.’
(Husserl 1975, 283)
Here Husserl identifies the three components that are at play in verification: (1) an empty
anticipatory belief about some state of affairs, which he generally calls an empty intention, (2) an
intuitive experience of that state of affairs, an intuition, and (3) the coincidence of the two in a
fulfilling synthesis.

IV.6.b Phantasy
Husserl discusses an interesting type of verification when discussing the phantasy involved
in observing an object of art. When I see a statue or an actor, there is a double apperception, such
that I see the thing portrayed (the depicted image, the character) and the thing portraying (the statue
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Of course, this sort of possibility is a motivated one, as Husserl points out just before this statement. It is not an
empty possibility, in that an expectation of the arrival of the bus is based in memory and cultural knowledge such that
I would be surprised if a horse and carriage arrived as opposed to a regular city bus.
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as a hunk of rock or the person pretending to be someone else). We can immerse ourselves in one
or the other, but in doing so, we exclude the one in which we do not immerse ourselves. In one
apperception (the one in which we are immersed) we find a “nexus, in which [the intentions] are
able to run their course without inhibition; when we immerse ourselves in these intentions
themselves

(and

disregard

the

counterapperception),

they

are

in

harmony;”

the

counterapperception, the one which is excluded, has “a portion of the intentional nexus that lacks
this advantage, that intuitively is in harmony in itself… but that then comes to a boundary at which
further intentions read into the sphere of the second apperception” (Husserl 2005, 613-614/512).
The first does not tolerate being “reached into”, because it has “an unbroken consciousness of
actuality (as harmonious agreement of intentional components)” (Husserl 2005, 614/513).
However, the counterapperception remains there as an “annoyance” to the prevailing apperception.
So, as I continue to experience the statue as a depiction of Venus or the character in a film as
Batman, the counterapperception remains without upsetting the harmonious experience of the
depiction or character. This is because in the case of phantasy, “harmonious fulfilling of the
intentions… does not need to be a pure fulfilling” (Husserl 2005, 614/503). Thus, the verification
of a phantasied object such as these requires the tension of the dual apperception, even in its proper
form. Yet, the uniform structure of verification is still at play, and we can see the varying degrees
of coincidence at which an empty intention can be fulfilled by an intuition in a verifying
experience.

IV.6.c Retention and Recollection
The way in which this structure unfolds at the passive layer is easily seen in the
confirmation of retention and in the modification of strivings aimed at confirming into strivings
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aimed at verification. In order to demonstrate this type of verification, I will first briefly describe
retention. Retention is the consciousness of that which has just been, when that which was
experienced just now is retained as having just been experienced. For instance, when I hear a
sentence being spoken, I retain the sounds and meanings uttered as the experience progresses.
Obviously, a sentence is not experienced all at once – it unfolds temporally. Yet, when I hear the
end of the sentence, I do not have to actively recollect the beginning. Rather, the sounds and
meanings of what has just been are retained consciously as part of my current experience. Even
hearing a word, such as “onomatopoeia,” is only possible if the initial sounds (the “on-oh” sound,
in this example) are retained as the final sounds occur. In terms of empty intentions and intuitions,
Husserl says that “corresponding to every intuition is an empty presentation insofar as an intuition
never disappears without a trace after is has elapsed. We are ‘still’ conscious of what it had intuited,
now in a non-intuitive way” (Husserl 2001, 114/72).
Rodemeyer shows that Husserl actually utilizes two forms of retention: near and far. Near
retention holds on to the specific intentional relation between my consciousness and an object; in
other words, it allows me to experience a melody or a sentence by holding onto the particular
phases occurring within my experience of these objects. I retain the notes just heard or the sounds
just uttered, which allows for an experience of a complete melody or multisyllabic word and
sentences. In addition to the individual relations retained in their particularity by near retention
(the immediately previous notes or utterances), far retention holds onto “these phases in their
relation to each other, as modifying and interlocking with each other as a unified whole, even after
their experiences are no longer in my present, active consciousness. In addition, far retention
retains the contents of these experiences in a minimal fashion, as ‘sleeping’ but passively present”
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(Rodemeyer 2006, 89).202 With far retention, then, we see that my past experiences slip into my
sedimented memory. We have historical memories of events, places, people, and other factual
information. These memories are not constantly at the forefront, of course, but they are still there
for me. I do not think of all of the gifts that my mother gave me, but I can recall them when
something reminds me of them. In the above discussion of the awakening of a retention, then,
Husserl was discussing the reactivation of an intention sedimented in far retention. Such a retention
that can be reactivated is no longer attended to, that is, it is buried in my past experiences, my
personal history.
In the confirmation of retentions, we find the processes of fulfillment and clarification
comingled together. In other words, the confirmation of a retention includes the partial intuitive
fulfillment of an empty intention alongside mere intuitive filler. This is because the intuition that
merely clarifies a retention is not able to be characterized in terms of a pure picturing (Husserl
2001, 123/80). As Husserl says:
through an intuitive remembering we become intuitively clear about what was only
emptily intended precisely in the empty retention. Surely, the synthesis then
accomplishes a sense-clarifying process of bringing to intuition. …But we can say
and must say no less that this synthesis simultaneously has the character of a
confirming synthesis. The empty retention – which as reawakened should actually
already be characterized as a remembering, though as a non-intuitive one – is
confirmed by a coinciding with the appropriate intuitive remembering. Insofar as it
is an empty memory-intention it is fulfilled in the specific sense: In a rememberingintuition the object itself is placed before the empty memory-intention, and it is
before us as the very object that the memory-intention had merely intended. Hence,
clarifying and fulfilling confirmations are not to be separated here; here every
synthesis of bringing to intuition must accomplish both a priori. (Husserl 2001,
123/80-81)
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Rodemeyer shows that far retention must be kept separate from recollection because, as we will see, types of objects
or my experience of things as belonging to a type does not require an act of reproductive memory: I do not have to
remember all of the peanuts I have eaten, or even a specific peanut, in order to be able to eat a peanut right now
(Rodemeyer 2006, 78-96, particularly 84). The same cannot be said for lobster, as my Midwestern roots are most on
display when faced with a crustacean.
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Thus, we can see that the intuitive filling of retentions does not have the clear distinction between
clarifying and fulfilling as in expectation, because the intuition is neither fully a picturing nor fully
intuited; rather, what is remembered is given as the remembered itself in an intuition of the
remembered object. So, the verification structure is easily seen here. There is an empty intention
in the form of an empty retention, or a non-intuitive remembering, which Husserl says prefigures
its content in a general manner, as all empty intentions do (Husserl 2001, 124/81). A remembering
intuition gives the object itself, it “brings the past directly to intuition as [the past] itself” (Husserl
2001, 124/81). This intuition is not a picturing, at least not purely, because the past itself is always
given. Of course, the past, as having been long forgotten or juxtaposed with other similar past
things remembered, is never wholly remembered. Thus, Husserl says that for remembering, “a
purely fulfilling confirmation is an ideal limit-case” (Husserl 2001, 125/82). There are always
indeterminate components that I did not pick up on or attend to at the time. This is why the
coinciding of the two is both a clarifying and a fulfilling.
For instance, if I remember a cat from my youth, what is prefigured in the empty intention
of the remembering act is fulfilled by my intuitive remembering of my cat herself, which Husserl
describes as a fulfilling intuition. Of course, this is an act of recollection, but in my remembering,
there are retentions of my cat’s coloration and features that are not actively attended to. These
empty retentions are, in the same way, aimed at the memorial intuition of my cat, and are confirmed
in the coinciding of the two. However, the memorial intuition is incomplete in many ways: I
remember her fur as being golden brown with hints of black and grey, but I cannot recall the color
of her paws. This means that my memorial intuition is in part a picturing, as her paws are filled in
with indeterminate color. In this way, the memorial intuition is partially mere filler, but a memory
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intuition cannot purely be a picturing because, again, what was previously experienced is still
intuited (Husserl 2001, 124/81).
Of course, the picturing described in retention is not necessarily an active picturing
requiring the engagement of the ego, and this also shows the difference between the confirmation
of retention and the verification of recollection (Husserl 2001, 125/82). When I actively try to
remember the color of my cat’s paws in a recollection, I cannot just picture her paws uncolored or
indeterminately colored. Rather, I have to phantasize the color of her paws in an intuitive picturing
that does not fulfill the striving of my empty intention and, consequently, disappoints. On the other
hand, in the passive act of confirmation, before my egoic regard directs itself toward the color of
her paws, this picturing has “the merely distinctive character of filler that does not fulfill, as
opposed to the actually fulfilling filler that is given in and for itself as belonging to the directly
reproduced past: It is given as past in the mode of ‘itself’” (Husserl 2001, 125/82). The passive
“picturing” that occurs in retention, or properly speaking in the intuitive remembering of the
passive sphere, is unclear, and unclarity is simply the intuitively unfulfilled emptiness (Husserl
2001, 125/82). As with an active picturing, it is colored in some way, but there need be no specific
determination here. Instead, what is “pictured” is an indeterminacy, an unknown color of some
sort. In this way, retentions are prefigurings just like all other empty presentations (Husserl 2001,
124/81). The memory of my cat is confirmed by the remembered cat herself, which fulfills the
empty intention, and the unclear color of her paws is merely filled indeterminately. In the structure
of confirmation at play in retention, then, we see the indeterminacy possible in the coincidence of
an empty intention and fulfilling intuition. Of course, as noted above, there is a sense of this
indeterminacy in all intuitive perceptions, in that each perception points to further horizons of
fulfillment. This indeterminacy is carried forward through the passive sense of striving, which is
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the “tendentiousness” of empty intentions described above (Husserl 2001, 126/83).203 As noted
above, the continuing indeterminacy, which is nevertheless determinate in some manner, causes
Husserl to identify a secondary level of verification, corroboration.

IV.6.d Corroboration
Also sedimented in far retention are unities of meaning, senses, that is, “the unified
experience of an object. My experience of this chair now, for instance, becomes its own unity,
fading into past consciousness as I move into another room or concentrate on another object”
(Rodemeyer 2006, 83). When I hear a melody, I retain the previous tones in my near retention as
particular phases and constitute a melody or song in the synthesis of these phases. However, I also
recognize the melody as a punk rock song being played on a guitar because I retain the unified
sense of the sound of a guitar and the three-chord progression of a classic punk song from previous
experiences. In order to recognize a punk song, I do not have to recall the previous experiences, of
course; rather, I immediately constitute it as such: “Here I am not recalling a specific event related
to the present; rather I am expecting a general similarity now based upon experience(s) in the past”
(Rodemeyer 2006, 93).204 These “general memories,” as Rodemeyer calls them, are at play in the
third type of verification, which Husserl describes as a secondary level of verification. Parallel to
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See also (Husserl 1973a, 355-356).
This is not to say that I always have a retained sense that is applicable to my experiences in the same way. For
instance, I can hear a rhythm and be unsure whether it is a salsa or a tango (I apologize to Vlad for having not yet
learned the difference). We should also note here that I can retain senses that inform an experience partially, as when
I hear a foreign language and understand that someone is trying to communicate with me but not know what language
they are using. I can understand that it is a Germanic language from some of the familiar sounds, but I cannot
distinguish whether it is Dutch, Flemish, or some local German dialect with which I am unfamiliar. Here we also have
an interesting parallel with Cairns’s discussion of sense-transfer, as when I hear certain sounds coming from someone
else, even if that someone else is an animal or infant, as communication (Cairns 2007). I passively associate the intent
to express meaning through audible sounds with whatever audible sounds are produced by someone else until the
point in which I experience their audible productions as not communicating. Even if I do not come to understand what
is being communicated, I experience the sounds as unintelligible and not accidental. Were a sufficiently alien
consciousness to attempt to communicate with me having already grasped that I communicate by creating audible
tones, it is likely that all sounds emanating from me would be taken as expressing some sort of intelligibility.
204
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the processes of verification and confirmation is the ongoing harmonious unfolding of the
experienced world, which usually is discussed with the term corroboration (Bestätigung). The
corroboration of experience seems to be less clearly delineated by Husserl than verification.
Consciousness at its most basic, temporal level is composed of numerous empty intentions
at every moment, particularly protentions looking forward to what is to come (with their general
prefiguring) in my immediate experience that then slip back into retentions. As we move up the
levels of conscious life, there are empty intentions everywhere to be found as well, as
consciousness is spatially and temporally horizonal. When I direct my attention at any object, as
when I am opening my gift, I perceive its shape, color, and other features. However, I do not attend
to every component. For instance, as I am opening the present, I do not pay attention to the packing
stuff inside of the box. The sweater is wrapped in some sort of parchment paper with a pattern on
it, but I am too excited by the gift of the sweater to pay it much mind. The empty intention aimed
at the parchment paper (what color it is, that the pattern is a name and not a symbol or logo, etc.)
is never attended to; I do not notice the parchment, I do not follow the aim of that intentional path,
and I do not strive for its fulfillment. In the same way, when I have an awakened retention, there
are horizonal empty intentions that surround the remembered content. As discussed in Chapter III,
when I remember an event, it is situated as sharing the same temporal context as the rest of my
experiences, even if that temporal context cannot be completely or even partially intuited. When I
remember meeting Deron Williams, there are horizonal intentions emptily directed at what came
before and what came after. They are not fulfilled, and some may not be able to be fulfilled
adequately, but they surround my memories nonetheless. Thus, in the passive activity of the ego,
there is a constant flow of empty intentions, many of which are ignored, fade, and never impact
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the ego.205 Husserl calls this a “level of corroboration (Bestätigung) that lies prior to verifying the
self” (Husserl 2001, 139/94, translation altered). We have already discussed this in Husserl’s
mention of secondary verifications, and we even find it operative in acts of verification that search
for truth, as the synthesis of coincidence that yields truth occurs genetically in the uninterrupted
verification of experience by experience, which Husserl calls unbroken corroboration (bruchlosen
Bestätigung) (Husserl 1975, 284). Thus, within the flow of consciousness there is a continual
structure of verification that keeps consciousness unified: “in its course of development, receptive
experience is in continuous self-correction on the ground of the certainty of experience which
pervades it, partial cancellations constantly occur” (Husserl 1975, 276). So we must now explore
the corroboration of experience, which he places “alongside the verification of the self that we
treat as the lowest level of the phenomena as evidence” (Husserl 2001, 143/99).
Husserl first discusses corroboration in terms of an awakened retention, specifically the
way in which an intentional reaching-back (rückstrahlende Vorstellungen, presentations radiatingback into the past) is already in a certain sense fulfilled when the past is emptily awakened (Husserl
2001, 139/94). When we have “anticipating presentations that refer to our past,” even before we
have fulfillment proper in an intuitive-remembering, there is a certain corroborative fulfillment of
the intention (Husserl 2001, 139/95). The intentional reaching-back accords with my awakened
retention; there is a general character which both share. Of course, this accordance is not a
fulfillment proper, but Husserl maintains that it is also different from a picturing clarification that
does not fulfill (Husserl 2001, 139/95).206 This is because the corroboration of an intention takes
place precisely on the horizon: “[the] self-giving of the whole, what makes up for example the
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The ones that impact the ego are what lead to questions of verification, as discussed above.
At this point, Husserl inserts a footnote wondering about the corroboration of empathies in the development of
expression, and how this relates to intuitive empathies. This, of course, is the focus of the current chapter, although I
do not know that I will ever clarify what counts as an intuitive empathy.
206
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entire perception as a perception, is not only determined by what in it is genuinely a perception;
rather, it is also determined by the anticipatory intentions that are concordantly harmonizing and
also sense-giving” (Husserl 2001, 139/95, emphasis added).207 In the verifying act, built upon the
synthesis of confirmation there are horizonal intentions that are constantly “fulfilled” in their
concordance with other intentions and even other experiences. In the example of the gift, no matter
the color of the wrapping paper or the contents of the gift, there is a concordance of the basic
structure of an experience of opening a gift. There is a wrapping over a box, within which there is
something or other. When I pick up the box, its weight remains consistent throughout my handling
of it, and the interior of the box is an appropriate size in relation to the exterior. The contents of
the box are not impossibly large to be contained within the gift, nor do they change in weight or
consistency, such that when I move the box this way or that, it does not at one moment make a
splash while at the other moment make a ringing sound. Were I to open the box to find that it
contained a liquid without any prior indication, such as a sloshing sound when moved or a soggy
exterior, doubt would arise, and my egoic regard would already be on the path to questions of
verification. But I do not verify all of these things in my active experience; rather – and here we
see what distinguishes corroboration from the normal structure of verification – these horizonal
empty intentions “fulfill” each other. Corroboration, as a secondary verification, refers to purely
empty intentions interacting with each other, that is, intentions fulfilling intentions in a nonintuitive manner:
Intendings can accord with intendings, even where they are not fulfilled. Through
the arrival of intendings that accord with a given intending, the latter can get the
character of ratifying intention, and of a stronger and stronger ratifying one without
having to speak of an original confirmation or of a process of making evident.
207

Husserl specifically equates horizons of perception with empty intentions in discussing corroboration: “The
‘horizons’ of perceptions are another name for empty intentions (intentions in our clarified and precise sense) that are
integrally cohesive and that are actualized in the progression of perception in and through different orientations”
(Husserl 2001, 144/99)
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Likewise, empty intendings can contend with other intendings and can give rise to
an irresolvable doubt, then the conflict can be resolved in the form of reawakened
certainties that negate one of the horns of the dilemma and ratify the other. (Husserl
2001, 143/99)
It has already been established that an intentional experience can fulfill another empty intention,
in so far as fulfillment is necessarily relative. In corroboration, empty intentions “fulfill” other
empty intentions in that they “jibe” with each other (an sich wohl passen) (Husserl 2001, 144/100).
They can, of course, also conflict with one another, and in this way consciousness is constantly
correcting itself, harmonizing itself.
In addition to keeping consciousness cohesive, the corroborative intentions are also sensegiving. As already discussed, in an empty intention there is a prefiguring of intuitive experience
that generally delineates what can come to givenness. In confirmation and verification, there are
degrees to which this intuitive fulfillment can coincide with the prefiguring empty intention. As
we have said, this is a matter of the indeterminacy of an intuition that points to further intuitive
fulfillment in other experiences – the continual, infinite striving of consciousness. With this
understanding of corroboration, we now understand the general prefiguring of experiences, the
way in which these corroborative intentions are sense-giving. In Husserl’s example, if one is in a
room looking at a stereoscope, there are corroborative intentions that give the image as an illusion:
while his eyes see the image of a waterfall, his hand is resting on the table, his face feels no breeze,
his ears hear no water, etc. The nexus of his horizonal intentions, the manifold empty intentions in
his various sensible fields, is discordant: “Something does not jibe, and the perception is now
broken, modalized; it takes on the character of an illusion, and in this case it simultaneously takes
on the character of an impressional likeness of a Swiss waterfall” (Husserl 2001, 145/100). In the
same way, Husserl notes that when several intendings into the future are connected in a unity of
sense, a harmony of what is intended in the future, then we have corroboration, a concordance in
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the mode of belief, which is necessary for the acquisition of knowledge (Husserl 2001, 392/258).
The lack of this harmony of intentions is what occasions the higher order questions of verification
described above, and the harmony and sense-giving of corroboration allows for the genesis of
verification to occur.

IV.7 The unique structure of verification of the other ego
With the structure of verification elucidated and its various types demarcated in the
previous sections, we now have the tools to discuss the role that verification plays in the
appearance of the other ego. Of course, the verification of the other ego is structurally the same as
any other verification, but Husserl universally notes that it is unusual or atypical. In Husserliana
XV, he says that the other ego requires “a peculiar manner of verification [merkwürdige Weise der
Bewährung]” (Husserl 1973c, 87).208 Again in the Crisis he says that, “in me, ‘another I’ achieves
ontic validity as co-present [kompräsent] with his own ways of being self-evidently verified, which
are obviously quite different from those of a ‘sense’-perception” (Husserl 1970, 185). Finally, in
Ideas I, when talking about how an imperfect evidence leads to the pursuit of verification, he says:
not every imperfect evidence prescribes a course of fulfillment which terminates in
a corresponding originary evidence, in an evidence of the same sense; on the
contrary, such an originary verification, so to speak, is necessarily excluded by
certain sorts of evidence. That holds, e.g., for retrospective memory and, in a certain
way, for any remembering whatever, and likewise essentially for empathy…
(Husserl 1983, 336/291-292)
Here Husserl divides verification into two types, originary and non-originary, and for nonoriginary verification he offers remembering and empathy as examples. Originary, as used in this
passage, has the sense of the immediate impression, of the origination of an intuition, which means
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For a discussion of the atypicality of verification in empathy in relation to Schutz and Cairns, see (Barber 2013,
326).
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that both remembering and empathy are fulfilled by evidence that is not immediately given in the
now. With remembering, we have shown that there is a coincidence with a fulfilling intuition,
specifically in an intuitive-remembering, but what is intuited is given as remembered, not
immediately present. In the same way, the fulfillment of my experience of the other ego is of an
other ego’s co-constitution, which is incapable of being given to me as immediately present. Of
course, after discussing the originality of consciousness as the unified temporal context shared by
my experiences, we can make a further distinction between these two non-originary verifications.
The intuition that fulfills an empty memorial intention is an original experience, though it cannot
be originary as remembered. However, the intuition that would fulfill the empty intention verifying
my experience of the other ego is of a non-original experience. So, how does a non-originary
verification work when the intuitive fulfillment is also not original?
This is where the inaccessibility of the other ego comes into play, as in one sense the other
ego has been said to be self-giving in that it is directly perceived. However, in the other sense of
self-giving as what intuitively fulfills an empty intention, the other ego as an inaccessible stream
of consciousness is precisely unable to come to intuitive fullness in my stream of consciousness. 209
I again refer to the passage from APS, wherein Husserl lays out our current problem:
[Empathy] is an empty making co-present, a re-presentation [Vergegenwärtigung]
of a consciousness that is made co-present and that belongs to the lived-body, a
consciousness, however, whose process of bringing to intuition certainly has to
embark upon quite different paths than those peculiar to the non-visible aspects of
the thing-like body. (Husserl 2001, 374/240, translation altered)
Again, we see that the experience of an other ego (either described as Einfühlung or
Fremderfahrung) is an empty intention whose intuitive fulfillment is unusual. However, this quote
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Again, we see a difficulty similar to distinguishing directness and originality. It is important to keep this in mind
going forward.
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at least provides us with the content of the intuition: a consciousness that belongs to a lived-body.
Now that we have the what of the intuition, we can take a look at the how:
[T]he Other’s animate body and his governing Ego are given in the manner that
characterizes a unitary transcending experience. Every experience points to further
experiences that would fulfill and verify the appresented horizons, which include,
in the form of non-intuitive anticipations, potentially verifiable syntheses of
harmonious further experience. Regarding experience of someone else, it is clear
that its fulfilling verifying continuation can ensue only by means of new
appresentations that proceed in a synthetically harmonious fashion, and only by
virtue of the manner in which these appresentations owe their existence-value to
their motivational connexion with the changing presentations proper, within my
ownness, that continually appertain to them. (Husserl 1999, 114/143-144)
In my experience of the other ego, which is a direct experience, I am given a unitary phenomenon,
the embodied other ego. While the body of the other ego is obviously intuited as giving itself, the
other ego proper, its consciously living as a governing ego, is not intuited in the same selfgivenness, as was discussed in my treatment of originality. However, they are given as one, a s the
other ego itself. In the case of the sense perception of a non-egoic object, such as a house, the
object can go through further determinations as verifications of the empty intentions
accompanying my perception of the house. So, when I see the house, I have empty intentions of
its unseen sides, of the inside, etc. These empty intentions can be intuitively fulfilled in further
synthetic coincidences as I move around the house or step inside of it. In this way, the direct
perception of the house is further enriched; it comes to a fuller determination in the ongoing
process of verification. The verification of the other ego, however, cannot proceed through further
determinations in this manner, precisely because no further determinations would yield a stream
of consciousness that is accessible to me. Were these further determinations to uncover an
accessible consciousness, my experience would be of my own ego and not a foreign one. Instead,
the other ego is verified only by means of new appresentations, i.e. new empty intentions, that
continue harmoniously. Further, these appresentations owe their existence-value, and one could
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say the entire prefiguration of their intended fulfillment, to my previous and ongoing experience.
To put it plainly, the verification of the other ego does not occur in the straight-forward manner of
an empty intention that coincides with a self-giving fulfilling intuition, even partially. Rather, the
verification of the other ego occurs in a continuing harmonious synthesis with further empty
intentions. In other words, the verification of the other ego proceeds in the manner of a
corroboration. Husserl says as much himself: “The perception of others has a dual fulfillment
structure, which is simultaneously two stages of fulfillment. In the first, an intuition remains
incomplete; in the second this intuition encounters an empty understanding that is progressively
corroborating itself” (Husserl 1973c, 86). We have already seen that an intention can be fulfilled
by another empty intention, as in the case of corroboration, so that the incomplete intuition of the
other ego (or an empty intention as we have called it) is fulfilled through its encounter with a
further empty intention of the other ego. My experience of the other ego, then, is verified through
a continual succession of empty intentions corroborating their predecessors. In CM5, Husserl
offers a description of how this corroboration unfolds:
The experienced animate organism of another continues to prove itself as actually
an animate organism, solely in its changing but incessantly harmonious ‘behavior’
[Gebaren].210 Such harmonious behavior (as having a physical side that indicates
something psychic appresentatively) must present itself fulfillingly in original
experience, and do so throughout the continuous change in behavior [Gebarens]
from phase to phase. The organism becomes experienced as a pseudo-organism,
precisely if there is something discordant about its behavior. (Husserl 1999,
114/144)
My experience of the other ego is verified so long as her behavior is “incessantly harmonious.”
The moment her body no longer acts as an animated body, that is, the moment that “she” becomes
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The translation of the term Gebaren (in italics in the text) is slightly misleading, in that Verhalt is generally used
for behavior in the academic sense. Gebaren is generally used for comportment, so Husserl seems to be distancing
himself from a behaviorist model by using this alternative term for the manner in which the other ego presents its
egoic activity.
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not a “she” but an “it,” is the moment that the empty intention is fulfilled in an annulling intuition.
My empty intention of her egoic life is cancelled; her co-constitution becomes experienced as
mechanical movement, as no constitution at all. In robotics, when a machine designed to mimic
human behavior is found out to be merely “acting” human, it is called the “uncanny valley” from
Masahiro Mori’s famous essay of the same name (Mori 2012, 98). Mori notes that when we
experience something that was taken to be another person or part of another person as not actually
a person, the affinity or familiarity we have with that object quickly changes from positive to
negative, creating a mathematical valley of the uncanny. Mori’s essay particularly focuses on
movement, which is a more specific example of Husserl’s broader point: if I take the object of my
experience as an other ego and suddenly it behaves in a manner that is contrary to the behavior of
an other ego (either by movement, sound, tactile sensations, etc.), then the harmonious experience
verifying the appearance of the other ego is broken; my intersubjective experience becomes
uncorroborated, and I experience the object as a pseudo-ego.
As stated when first discussing corroboration, the syntheses that yield truth occur in the
uninterrupted verification of experience by experience, that is, unbroken corroboration. What is
different about the verification of the appearance of the other ego is that the intuitive experience
of the other ego is, primarily, an emptily fulfilling coincidence. The harmonious syntheses in which
the other ego is fulfilled are harmonious syntheses of concordant further intentions. While I can
have intuitive fulfillment of the body of the other ego as a lived body that is physically there, its
activity as a lived body, its behavior [Gebaren], is only given in appresentations of the egoic
activity. This egoic activity is directly given, of course, in the unitary experience of the lived body
of the other ego. Further, the intuitive fulfillment of the empty intentions of the other ego is not
filled in a mere picturing. The fulfillment of the empty intention aimed at the other ego comes

139

solely in my continuous experience of her, in my continuing orientation toward the other ego as
an other ego:
The others are acceptance formations that are accrued within my self-contained
transcendental life according to a determinate motivation within me, habitually my
own production, habitually accepted, in my transcendental life repeatedly
identifiable, synthetically verifiable through renewed experience. 211 (Husserl
1973c, 38)
Thus, the verification of the other ego is more properly understood as the continual
corroboration of the experience of the other ego: someone is given to me as an other ego through
an expression of her conscious activity, that is, her co-constitution, and each new expression of
this activity must be harmonious with the preceding one (Husserl 1973c, 87). Of course, one can
imagine a case in which my horizonal intentions are able to become the focus of my thematic
investigations, thus modifying the consciousness into an active verification. However, this cannot
be the case with the other ego, because it is only in the corroboration of the horizonal appearance
of the other ego that such a totality is inaccessible. Anything further and her appearance as an other
ego is lost in a transformation into accessibility, into an original stream of constitution.

IV.8 Conclusion
The structure of verification has been shown to have three components across the various
levels of consciousness: an empty intention, a fulfilling intuition, and a coinciding of the empty
intention with the fulfilling intention. I have clarified three different levels of verification, with the
active level properly being called verification, confirmation occurring at the passive level, and a
third level of corroboration bridging the two in what Husserl calls a “secondary verification.” In
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“Die Anderen sind in mir, in meinem in sich geschlossenen transzendentalen Leben in bestimmter Motivation
erwachsene Geltungsgebilde, habituell mir eigener Erwerb, habituell in Geltung, in meinem transzendentalen Leben,
immer wieder identifizierbar, durch erneuerte Erfahrung sythetisch bewährbar.”
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confirmation there is a determinable indeterminacy in the intuitive fulfillment that causes the
striving toward confirmation to always be incomplete in some manner. While the striving of these
empty intentions can be attended to by the ego actively, and thus become verifications, the flow of
experience is permeated by the manifold horizonal intentions that unify consciousness, that is,
through the harmonious corroboration of my experience. In corroboration, the horizonal empty
intentions strive toward a fulfillment that is properly found in other empty intentions. This
fulfillment of my empty intentions with subsequent harmonious intentions describes the unique
way in which the other ego is verified in her appearance as an inaccessible co-constitution.
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Chapter V: Cashing In
After exploring the three components of the sense of the other ego, I would like to end by
asking a question that, in my opinion, is the most important issue in the phenomenological analysis
of intersubjectivity: how does the sense of the other ego originate? Does one need to experience
someone else concretely prior to constituting the sense of the other ego? It is quite clear that the
sense of the other ego does not just arise like the sense of a table or some other ordinary spatial
object, so how does it become constituted? Such questions were of interest to Husserl in his later
years,212 though his work on the issue is only captured in manuscripts. As discussed in Chapter II,
however, he does not offer a clear answer on the issue; rather, he seems to support different sides
at varying times. 213 It is even possible that the answer to this question lies outside of the grasp of
phenomenology. The generation of the structures of consciousness may not be given, or giveable,
to the meditating consciousness itself. If this is the case, one would have to look into child
development and infant psychology in order to answer some questions. Phenomenologically,
however, one can only look at the structures of consciousness given in my experience. 214 The
question then becomes, do the structures of consciousness account for the generation of the sense
of the other ego? One reason for Husserl’s vacillation on the topic, I think, is the difference
between a static and genetic approach to the question, and both methods seem to be employed
when Husserl speaks of the sense of the other ego. So, in this final chapter, I will explore this
question of the origination of the sense of the ego, beginning with a short discussion of the question
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A large section of Husserliana 42 is dedicated to the questions of birth and death, particularly how they relate to
the constitution of sense and intersubjectivity.
213
See Chapter II (page 57) for a discussion of some positions held on this issue in the secondary literature.
214
Lampert argues that phenomenology must rely on experiences that may lie “too far back in the past to be present
as the content of any actual experience – we do not experience empty substances or sense-data despite the fact that
experience ultimately, genuinely, and successfully, refers back to them” (Lampert 1995, 120-121). Thus, I understand
his analysis of backward synthesis in Husserl to mean that the grounding of the structures of consciousness can lie in
originary experiences incapable of even being reproduced.
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considered statically. Next, I will look at Rodemeyer’s work on the structures at play in the genetic
constitution of the sense of the other ego. She argues that the structure of consciousness has an
openness to the other ego that can only be fully constituted in a concrete encounter with the other
ego. I end with a discussion of the way in which the sense of the other ego is given structurally in
my very constitution of the world, but this sense is only fully constituted in the concrete experience
of the other ego because of the unique verification at play in intersubjective experience.

V.1 Static phenomenological consideration of the origination of the sense of the other ego
Considering the way in which the question appears statically offers some possible insight
into Husserl’s equivocation on the generation of the sense of the other ego, and doing so will offer
some guidelines for the eventual genetic analysis. If we look at the description of the appearance
of the other ego statically, the co-constitution and inaccessibility inherent in the sense of the other
ego seem to be given independently of a concrete intersubjective experience. First, as discussed in
Chapter II, my experience of the world as there for more than just me is, already, the experience
of the co-constitution of the other ego. When I see any object as an object, as having other unseen
aspects that are co-given to me along with my current aspect, the co-given aspects are given as
belonging to another constituting consciousness.215 Consequently, in my experience of objects, the
other ego appears to me in her constitutive contribution to my constituting consciousness: my
experience of the world as objective is only possible because my perspective of an object is given
with infinite co-given perspectives incapable of being my own. In other words, within my
experience of the world, the other ego appears to me in her constitutive accomplishment. This
means that my very constitution of the world as objective is, simultaneously, my experience of
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Remember that Zahavi notes that in order for there to be a perspective on something, there must be some perceiver
of the perspective.
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another center of co-constitution, which is the first component of the sense of the other ego. If this
were not the case, then I would not experience the world as objective. Thus, the at least one
component of the sense of the other ego is already given in my constitution of the world insofar as
I constitute anything objectively.
Second, the above discussion of co-constitution also means that in my constitution of the
world, I am given an inaccessible stream of constitution, the basis for the “co” in co-constitution.
As discussed in Chapter III, my experience of the inaccessibility of the other ego means that I have
an original experience of an unoriginal experiencing. This unoriginal experience is directly given
to me, but the enaction of that experience and what is experienced in it (unoriginally) are only
indicated, that is, indirectly given to me. In my experience of the other ego, the indirectly given
can never come to direct givenness; if it did, the unoriginal experiencing of the other ego would
become originally my experience, and such an experience would transform from Fremderfahrung
into mere self-experience. Inaccessibility, then, serves to demarcate my consciousness from that
of the other ego, not limit her givenness to me. As Zahavi and Rodemeyer argue, the coexistence
of the co-given perspectives that are not my own with my current perspective means that they
cannot possibly be my experiences. Because concurrent perspectives are given as incapable of
being simultaneously mine, 216 my experience of the world also includes the distinction between
accessible and inaccessible perspectives. Thus, we can say that, insofar as I cannot have concurrent
experiences of the same thing from different perspectives, the constituting activity of the other ego
(in fact, a plurality of other egos) is at play in my constitution of the world. This means that the
structure of my experience of the world includes the activity of an inaccessible co-constitution.
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Such that even God would see objects as adumbrated, Husserl says in Ideas I, as noted in Chapter II (page 61).
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Statically speaking, two components of the sense of the other ego accompany all of my
experience independently of any actual, concrete experience of this or that other ego. As such, in
the structures of experience, which are available to any meditating consciousness, I am given the
structural sense of the other ego. By “structural sense”, I mean that the way in which an other ego
must appear is already given in the structure of my general constituting experience. To put it
differently, within consciousness there is a structural orientation towards other egos in my very
constitution of the world, what Zahavi and Rodemeyer discuss as a structural openness, and this
openness is not dependent upon any concrete experience of the other ego. In fact, one could argue
that the structural openness of consciousness to intersubjective experience is what allows for
intersubjective experience at all. However, we still have not answered our question; the sense of
an inaccessible co-constitution structurally given in my general constituting experience does not
give the full sense of the other ego, because it does not account for the unique verification
necessary for the appearance of the other ego. In order to account for the full appearance of the
other ego, then, I will look the genetic analysis of the origination of the sense of the other ego.

V.2 Genetic phenomenological consideration of the origination of the sense of the other ego
Since the structural sense of the other ego disclosed by the static analysis does not account
for the unique sense of verification that occurs in the appearance of the other ego, we are still left
without an answer to our question: must I experience an other ego concretely in order to constitute
the sense of the other ego? However, after undertaking the static analysis, we know that the
structural sense of the other ego still requires the unique verification for the full constitution of the
sense of the other ego. Thus, the question becomes: does the concrete experience of the other ego
give me the unique verification necessary for the full sense of the other ego? In order to answer
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that question, I turn to Rodemeyer’s genetic analysis of intersubjective experience. As discussed
in Chapter II, Rodemeyer, like Zahavi, convincingly argues that in the self-temporalizing activity
of consciousness there is already a constitutive contribution from the other ego. In that brief
discussion, I focused solely on the way in which the sense of co-constitution is retained as a general
memory. Now I will focus on her discussion of the sense constitution through retention and
protention.217

V.2.a Protention and the structural openness of consciousness to intersubjectivity
Protention is the structure of consciousness oriented toward the “not yet”, and along with
retention and the primal impression, forms the basis for the standard interpretation of Husserl’s
analyses of the living present. As the present is never just an isolated now, consciousness retains
what has “just been” in retentional processes, while what is “not yet” is looked forward to by
protentional processes, which reach out beyond the immediately present of the primal impression.
Of course, what is actually “now” in primal impressions was previously protended and becomes
retained through retentional modifications as temporalizing consciousness unfolds experience,
that is, as time simply passes. Thus, while the structure of retention hangs on to what has just been
immediately experienced in the primal impression, Rodemeyer describes the activity of protention
as “constitut[ing] ‘ahead’ of what is immediately actual, bringing experiences into constituting
consciousness and relating them to a constituted temporality” (Rodemeyer 2006, 137).218
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Rodemeyer’s analysis also includes an in-depth analysis of association, apperception, appresentation, and
affectivity in her elucidation of this structure. However, my current focus on the generation of the sense of the other
ego requires a concentration on retention and protention. I explore affectivity further down.
218
The phrase, “bringing experiences into constituting consciousness” seems to imply that experiences are out there
waiting to be collected by protention, and while I might argue that experience occurs in the constituting of what is
given, protention does seem to act like a collector in this manner, as long as one remembers the constant activity of
consciousness in organizing and orienting, that is, constituting these experiences.
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This standard interpretation of Husserl’s conception of the living present is complicated,
Rodemeyer argues, by his analysis of protention in Husserliana XXXIII. In this analysis, Husserl
moves away from a tripartite structure of the living present, wherein experiences move from the
protended into the primal impression and finally to the retained, to a more nuanced interrelation of
protention and retention (Rodemeyer 2006, 141-143). Instead of incorporating a particular
momentary now at which there is a primordial impression of this or that object (a discrete now of
experience similar to an Aristotelian conception of time), Husserl speaks of fulfilled retentions and
fulfilled protentions overlapping one another. The living present, then, is composed of overlapping
retentions and protentions that function in what Rodemeyer calls a “zone of actualization” or “zone
of fulfillment” wherein what is protentionally or retentionally strived for comes to fulfillment. In
order to clarify the way in which this overlapping occurs within the unfolding of my experience,
an example is helpful. For instance, I see my cat walking across the room, and in doing so, I also
see where he is coming from and where he is likely going. In this experience, as my cat walks
across the floor, I retain my experience of his prior positions. This is what allows me to experience
my cat as moving, as his previous positions are retentionally modified and carried along with my
experience of his current one. However, as he walks across the floor, there are various protentions
accompanying the experiences as well. Primarily, I expect him to continue on his path, but I also
see that he might stop and play with the toy in front of him or maybe turn and walk to me. As my
experience of his movement unfolds, the protentions that accompanied my previous experiences
of his movement also become themselves retentionally modified. As my cat continues on his path
past the toy and away from me, that he could have stopped at the toy or turned to me are retained
with my actual experiences of his movement. Further, within these (now retained) protentions are
the retentions that condition them. What we see here, then, are the interaction of protention and
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retention and the influence they have on each other. The retentions of my cat’s previous positions
cause me to protend a certain path, but the previously protended paths or activities of my cat, both
realized and disappointed, also become retained. Thus, within the living present, retentions
motivate protentions, and protentions motivate retentions, although it is important to note that, it
is not the forms of protention and retention that motivate each other, but the contents of these
intentions that motivate (Rodemeyer 2006, 142).219
Husserl, Rodemeyer notes, describes this overlap of retention and protention
mathematically by talking of maximizing and emptying their fulfillment (Rodemeyer 2006, 145146). As protention moves towards fulfillment, it is maximized; in this example, as my cat finally
settles on the couch cushion farthest from me and falls asleep, the “not yet” of the experience
becomes an “already experienced,” so that the protention becomes fulfilled. Retention, on the other
hand, becomes emptied, as the fulfillment of what has “just past” gradually gives way to further
fulfillments of “what came to be.” While Rodemeyer problematizes the mathematization of this
process, she admits that it allows for one to see how the living present can contract and expand
depending on the experience. More importantly, Husserl’s analysis shows that “[w]ithout
protention, there is no real fulfillment; without retention of the fulfilled protention, there is no
recognition of this fulfillment” (Rodemeyer 2006, 146). In later analyses, Husserl amends his
mathematical model slightly by making it three dimensional instead of two. Protentions, then, rise
toward actualization while retentions sink away from it (Rodemeyer 2006, 149).
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This again aligns with the previous analysis of verification because what is verified in fulfilling synthesis is not the
empty intention as an act of consciousness but its striving toward a specific content; this, as Husserl says, is what is
relaxed in fulfillment. Thus, what is corroborated in harmonious accordance with other empty intentions is not the
empty intention itself but its prefigured striving toward fulfillment, even if that fulfillment is deferred. It is again the
prefiguration of the empty intention, that is, the specific contents that are emptily intended, that is harmonized in
corroboration.
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From this, one can easily see how my experiences occur within the zone of fulfillment
generated in the overlapping of retentions and protentions. 220 Rodemeyer argues that the zone of
fulfillment would have “very little meaning without the directedness of the flow and the
expectation or openness which precedes actualization. Protention gives the zone of fulfillment both
its sense and its frame” (Rodemeyer 2006, 150). Protention, then, is not a blank consciousness
waiting for fulfillment; rather, it is a prefiguring of what is to come. In fact, protention is what
keeps consciousness open to more than just itself. Without protention’s orientation to what is
beyond that which has already been experienced, consciousness would be unable to experience
other aspects of objects or any appresentation at all (Rodemeyer 2006, 150-151). Thus, Rodemeyer
calls protention the “primary source of meaning for the now-phase. …[It] makes it possible for me
to intend objects as wholes, and this, in turn allows for meaning to exist in my experience”
(Rodemeyer 2006, 152).
In this functionality we can see the way in which protention plays a role in intersubjectivity,
but in order to clarify this role, Rodemeyer first distinguishes between near and far protention. 221
According to Rodemeyer, “near protention would act as the ‘immediate’ protending activity based
on the current constitution of the living present” (Rodemeyer 2006, 161). In the above example of
my cat, near protention aims at the next position he is likely to occupy in his walk across the room.
Thus, while it looks like he is going to eat or play with a toy across the room, such a reasoned, or
even habitual, inference is not what is aimed at in near protention; rather, near protention looks
ahead to the next step he takes, the next movement of a leg or turn of his head; in other words,
220

Rodemeyer notes that the way in which the zone of fulfillment is conceived changes in Husserl’s shift from the
two dimensional to the three dimensional model. The following considerations come from her conclusions using the
three dimensional model.
221
Here Rodemeyer is going beyond Husserl’s phenomenological analyses, as far protention is never discussed by
Husserl. Rodemeyer relies on her own phenomenological analyses to explore far protention, but she bases the work
on Husserl’s analyses of “passive synthesis, association, and appresentation in my relation to other subjects,” and his
implicit distinction between near and far retention (Rodemeyer 2006, 161).
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near protention aims at the harmonious continuation of his movement, or at an appropriate
cessation of it, because near protention is open to what is “immediate.” In other words, near
protention is open to the unfolding of experience. We can contrast this with far protention, which
Rodemeyer describes in the following manner:
a more extended anticipation in the living present and [not based] only upon current
constitution but also on typifications that are sedimented through passive synthesis.
Far protention would thus be only partially based on current, originary experience,
and it would be involved in current constitution through its protention of general
types and habits (in conjunction with far retention). (Rodemeyer 2006, 161)
Far protention, then, would anticipate the cat’s path to the food bowl, because my familiarity with
his eating times tells me that, since it is 5:00 p.m., he is going to head to his food bowl to wait for
me to feed him. When he begins to walk toward the kitchen around this time, I do not have to
check the clock or actively search for the reason for his movement. Rather, because he always
walks to his bowl at this time and these experiences have sedimented into my habitual memory,
far retention, I simply know he is walking over to his food an hour early, as is his way.
We again see the overlapping of retention and protention in my constituting experience.
Sedimented experiences become generalized and retained in far retention and are applied through
far protention to the constitution of what has not yet come to experience. 222 In this way, as I have
stated above, my futural intentions (in this case protentions, but also expectations) are prefigured
by sedimented senses: my general memories of types within far retention. That is, there are general
and specific types of experience according to which my future experiences are constituted.223 Even
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In APS, Husserl asserts that all intending into the future is motivated belief (Husserl 2001, 392/258).
Of course, this does not mean that I cannot have a novel experience, as the prefiguration is always incomplete in
its general typification. In fact, this novelty of the future contributes to the development and enrichment of my
habituality, because these sedimented experiences that develop and modify my general memories in far retention are,
originally, protentions aimed at specific types of experience.
223
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near protentions are prefigured to some degree by what is retained in the originary, current
experience.
Rodemeyer uses the distinction between far protention and near protention to clarify her
description of the appearance of the other ego. First, she explains Husserl’s analysis of pairing in
CM5 through the activity of far retention and far protention:
I automatically pair [the body of the other ego] with my own through an association
based in my own passive synthesis of my body and a far protention that takes me
beyond myself. In this pairing, a further association is made: My own selfexperience in passive synthesis, of the fact that my lived body is always connected
to my consciousness, is extended to this other body. This takes place through
passive synthesis in far retention and through further activity of far protention, as I
extend my self-experience of my body-consciousness to the other person,
appresenting a consciousness for her. In other words, because I have always known
my body to be linked to my consciousness, and because that body over there is
similar to mine, I am able to appresent a consciousness related to that body there.
(Rodemeyer 2006, 162-163)224
In the pairing of my lived body with the lived body of the other, the passive association is possible
only because of a sedimented sense of my own embodied consciousness that prefigures a far
protention that aims at the other ego’s body. The sense of my own lived body as the center of
constitution gives my experience a frame, as Rodemeyer puts it in describing the work of
protention, such that any other experience of a lived body is given a sense as similar. In other
words, my habitual experience of my own embodied consciousness means that any experience of
a body that is like my own, to some degree in appearance or movement, 225 results in the
constitution of a foreign embodied consciousness. Rodemeyer calls this a passive-associative
empathy, because it is prior to any reproductive empathic activity that posits that other ego over
there, particularly as having some sort of state of mind or particular thematic aim. We can see,
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See also (Rodemeyer 2006, 121).
The degree of this similarity varies, but it requires its own study in order to move forward with any practical
implementation of this work.
225
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then, that Rodemeyer is making a similar distinction between passive-associative empathy and
reproductive empathy as she made between reproductive memory and far retention, which was
discussed in the previous chapter. This distinction, based in passages from Husserl’s
manuscripts,226 is phenomenologically fleshed out thanks to the clarification of far protention.
This allows Rodemeyer to argue that there is an intersubjective structural component to
consciousness, but she must be careful to avoid some of the problems that she finds in Husserl’s
work. She starts from the phenomenological problem of the other ego’s givenness, noting that
because the other ego “will never and can never be direct, we phenomenologists will forever
remain somewhat frustrated on this topic” (Rodemeyer 2006, 163). Rodemeyer’s usage of the term
“direct” in this passage is not technical in the sense outlined in Chapter III, nor does it accord with
the usual phenomenological sense in the contemporary literature on social cognition. 227 Rather,
what Rodemeyer seems to be noting is the problem of inaccessibility, at least to some degree. I
will read this in light of my previous analyses, as it does seem to accord with her concern. Thus, I
take her question to be the following: If the other ego is given to me as inaccessible, in what way
can this sense be given to me fully? 228 Her answer requires two parts: (1) the structural openness
of consciousness, and (2) the concrete experience of the other ego’s lived body.
The first part of her answer comes from her work on protention: “Because [temporalizing
consciousness] both constitutes my ‘sphere of ownness’ (as the structure of the present) and,
protentionally, founds my openness toward much that is not mine, this structural link to
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For a full discussion of the three types of empathy that Rodemeyer identifies in Husserl’s writings, see (Rodemeyer
2006, 115-124).
227
This discussion had not occurred at the time of her work in this book, and having discussed this issue with
Rodemeyer, I know her to now be on the side of the phenomenologists in the debates on social cognition. That is, she
argues that we do have direct consciousness of other egos.
228
Rodemeyer also discusses the critique that my experience of my own body is nothing like my experience of other
bodies. I take this as an acknowledgement of the asymmetry between my own embodied experience and my experience
of another ego’s embodied experience, and it speaks to the difficulty in linking my own experience as accessible to
the other ego’s experience as inaccessible, albeit tangentially.
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intersubjectivity rests in the structure of temporalizing consciousness” (Rodemeyer 2006, 165).
Within the very structure of consciousness, I am open, because of protention, to that which is not
me.229 But this is not all, as the interrelation of protention and retention means that my prior
intersubjective experiences sediment in far retention and “inform the far protention of current
intersubjective existence. And my openness in far protention will make this synthesis possible”
(Rodemeyer 2006, 165). Here, then, we can see that my consciousness is structurally open to the
other ego, and that my previous intersubjective experience prefigures future intersubjective
experience. Thus, the protentional component of temporalizing consciousness shows that
consciousness is inherently open to other egos, that is, structurally intersubjective. Rodemeyer
describes this in a similar manner to Zahavi:
But given this, how can the world give itself to me as having multiple perspectives
at once when I only have one perspective at a time? The answer, we discovered, is
twofold: First, we can only recognize multiple perspectives if consciousness is able
to go beyond the immediate moment at hand, and it does this through the active
living present. Then, these other, absent profiles… indicate perspectives that could
be had by other subjects, and further, horizons of meaning not originally constituted
by me. In other words, while I might be able to have other profiles as I move into
them later (or earlier), the coexistence of unlimited absent profiles with this present
one here reveals not only the transcendence of objects as perceived, but also the
transcendence of their meaning. Both of these types of transcendences indicate,
furthermore, the presence of objects and meanings for others, beyond my
perspective. In addition, I see that my own consciousness is able to access these
meanings, even though they exceed my own experiences. (Rodemeyer 2006, 185186)
As Rodemeyer describes, the activity of other consciousnesses is included within my own
experience of the world because my experience of the world includes perspectives and meanings
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“First, I can only consider a perspective or emotion other than my own on the basis of a protentional activity. Even
if this is still not another subject in my eyes, I require the protentional aspect of temporalizing consciousness to exceed
my position and consider another. Second, through the very activity of extending consciousness beyond its own realm,
I am forced to recognize something other than myself, and I am open to this on the basis of protention” (Rodemeyer
2006, 192).
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that exceed my own experience. Importantly, Rodemeyer notes that this description occurs at the
level of consciousness in which the ego is not fully constituted:
The level of inner time-consciousness could be understood as a pre-temporal
transcendental field made up only of the flow of experiences. ‘I’ would not exist
here, nor would anyone else. An examination of this level, however, reveals not
only the activities of retention and protention but also the constitution of this flow
as experiences through an individual perspective. Thus, while my person may not
be apparent at this level, the individual perspectives of a person are. (Rodemeyer
2006, 185)
At the level of inner time consciousness, in the activity of retention and protention, there is not yet
a constitution of my ego within my own consciousness. What is present are constituting activities
(temporalizing, properly speaking) that are perspectival, and importantly, unified in that
perspective. As Zahavi notes, any perspective of something is given as such a perspective for a
perceiver. In other words, at the level of retention and protention the centering of consciousness is
already given. The sense of constitution, then, as centered, and thus as embodied, 230 is already at
play at the level of inner time consciousness. At this level, since protention is open to what is not
included in experience, other perspectives must also be given: perspectives I do not have,
perspectives that could become unified with the current perspectival unity. 231 Therefore, we can
say that before I am able to have an experience of myself proper, I already have the structural
accomplishment of co-constitution. Rodemeyer calls these “indications of intersubjective
meanings,” which are “recognized through the openness of consciousness to other profiles beyond
the one directly before it” (Rodemeyer 2006, 186). She also makes sure to exclude the possibility
that these other perspectives and meanings are potential or imaginary, as Zahavi does in his
analysis of co-constitution. Just as discussed in the above static analysis, this means that in her
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See Chapter II (Pages 36-47).
Husserl does have an interesting passage in CM5 wherein he talks about the foreign consciousnesses in me
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analysis of temporalizing consciousness, Rodemeyer also shows that the inaccessibility of these
perspectives is a structural component of my consciousness.
At this point, it is evident that the structural openness to the other ego described in
Rodemeyer’s genetic analysis means that, within the structure of my own experience, I am given
the co-constitution and inaccessibility of the other ego. In her genetic analysis, then, Rodemeyer
shows the same structural sense uncovered in the static analysis, and she also acknowledges its
incompleteness. This is because this structural openness is only an openness in what she would
call the form 232 of consciousness. Such an openness does not supply the content of a consciousness,
so the constitution of the sense of the other ego requires fulfillment by some sort of intuitive
content. Thus, the structural openness of consciousness to alterity is, for Rodemeyer, insufficient
for the constitution of the sense of the other ego (Rodemeyer 2006, 166). She argues that the
appearance of the other ego requires, “both a structural openness to that recognition [of the other
ego], i.e. protention, and a primordial foundation of intersubjectivity, i.e., some type of primordial
experience on the basis of which I can recognize the other” (Rodemeyer 2006, 165). The structural
analysis of protention has shown the structural openness to the other ego, but there still must be a
“primordial experience” to complete the constitution of the other ego. This is the reason that
Rodemeyer focuses on affectivity at the end of her analysis.
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Rodemeyer often finds it useful to understand Husserl’s analyses in terms of form and content, and she does so in
her written works and in lectures and conversations. As an example of this strategy in action, see her critique of David
Carr’s interpretation of temporalizing consciousness (Rodemeyer 2006, 124). In this way, she can draw out Husserl’s
concentration on the conscious activity itself or the aim of a consciousness itself, which often become muddied in
Husserl’s writings and in one’s own phenomenological reflections. I draw attention to this fact not as a critique,
because such a system (which I believe she learned from Klaus Held) is extremely useful; rather, noting that her
argument is using this stratagem helps one understand her position more clearly.
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V.2.b Affectivity
Rodemeyer uses Husserl’s work in APS to discuss affectivity, so she understands
affectivity to be, generally, the “draw that an object has upon me which causes me to turn my
attention toward it and to intend it” (Rodemeyer 2006, 156). Prior to taking up an object in an
attentive intentional act, objects call to me, draw me in, pull my gaze toward them. Affectivity,
then, functions like an invitation from an object for me to attend to it. 233 From this standard
Husserlian conception of affectivity, there are two points about Rodemeyer’s analysis that, I
believe, are important for the following discussion of the other ego’s primally instituting affection
of my ego.
First, she notes that association, far retention, and protention are all interrelated with
affection, but she does not clarify between near and far protention in this analysis. She does note
that, because of the relation between far retention and far protention in affection, “I can only
recognize objects based upon my familiarity with their types, and even my familiarity with sensory
experience in general is necessary; protention connects a consciousness of past experiences with
an openness to what is coming” (Rodemeyer 2006, 158). For instance, because I have a lack of
familiarity with car engines, when I look under the hood of my car, I see metal and grime and a lot
of things that meld together into one thing: my engine. I do not see, for instance, an alternator or a
distributor cap because they all look like indeterminate parts of an engine to me. These objects,
then, do not affect me in the same way as things with which I am familiar, because I have no
conceptual or experiential framework that would allow me to distinguish them. However, they are
there for me as physical objects, as objects of wonder or even anxiety. My being affected by things
with which I have no familiarity does not depend upon the prefiguration of sedimented types, so
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Of course, the invitation of affectivity is not the co-intending of an other ego. Rather, Husserl describes it as the
pull of the object on my consciousness (Husserl 2001, 196/148).
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we know that it must occur in near protention. 234 In Rodemeyer’s description of the appearance of
the other, we see an example of this: “[o]ur ‘fusion’ with the other is immediate and related to
temporalizing consciousness in near protention through proto-empathy” (Rodemeyer 2006, 170).
From the use of the term “immediate,” we can already understand that Rodemeyer is thinking of
near protention. In this proto-empathy, which she also calls primordial empathy, that occurs in
near protention, the other ego affects me through her own activity (of co-constitution as described
in Chapter II). Here the structural sense of the other ego is cashed in, such that what affects me
becomes associated with a sedimented sense of embodied constitution in passive-associative
empathy, which occurs in the overlap of far retention and far protention. This passive association,
then, can become a thematic experience of the other ego in a reproductive act of empathy.
Therefore, in near protention, we see a structural openness to alterity through the affectivity of the
other ego, and in this structural openness allows for a primally instituting affection, is so far as I
am open to the affection of objects with which I have no familiarity, as in the case with the above
example of the engine components. It is important to bear in mind that both near and far protention
are at play in affectivity, such that near and far protention might align with primal institution and
habitual affection.
Second, Rodemeyer notes that “affectivity can also play a part in appresentation—not in
making appresentations possible, but in calling me to realize these appresentations, to make them
presentations. …[It] pulls me to move beyond what is currently presented” (Rodemeyer 2006,
158). What is appresented, she argues, calls me to explore beyond what is presented in a particular
aspect, and she calls this allure of the other sides and my movement toward them a ‘transformed
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One could speak of a general type of physical object, but it is likely this sort of prefiguration of protention occurs
in the overlap of near retention and near protention. Near protention reaches out to the immediately given, and near
retention holds onto what has immediately been given so that the two latter prefigures the other to reach out for what
is harmonious, consistent.
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affectivity.” It is in affectivity, then, that what is appresented calls to me, even if what calls to me
cannot become properly presented.
With these two points in mind, I turn to how the other ego affects me. First, Rodemeyer’s
analysis begins with the primordially reduced experience of the body of an other ego, which is the
same departure as in Husserl’s analysis in CM5:
Another human body appears before me, and looks at me. In this reduced realm, I
cannot assume the existence of another consciousness, but I acknowledge, and must
address, how this other body affects me. When the other subject looks at me, I feel
pulled toward it, even if I take it only as a body. I am called to consider its
perspective in comparison to my own. I am pulled to feel the emotions related
through its expressions. I am provoked to consider how I appear from that
perspective. (Rodemeyer 2006, 191-192)
Here we have a description of a familiar experience treated in a phenomenologically familiar way.
I see another body and am called by the expression of its egoic activity; for instance, I see pain in
her grimace, or I am called to see the way that my shirt would appear from her perspective. As
discussed in the previous chapters, this is the appearance of the other ego’s co-constitution as
located within another lived body, specifically the co-constituting activity of the other ego. Next,
Rodemeyer describes this process as a combination of the structural openness and originary
experience. My structural openness is filled in, as it were, by the affective pull of the appearance
of the other ego, which she describes in the following:
[T]he pull I feel, for example, when I see the pain on another’s face, does not
necessarily arise through a constituted similarity between that body and my own.
Thus this emotive pull must have some other source than the similarity of our
bodies. It is at this point that we recognize the affective pull of the other’s
constituting consciousness… I can be pulled by the very recognition of the other as
sharing my constitution of the world, the recognition that the body over there
contains an activity that takes the absoluteness of my “zero-point of orientation”
away from me. I recognize a similarity between her constituting activity and my
own, and constitute her as another subject similar to myself. This is made possible
because of the interconnected activity of retention and protention in constituting
consciousness. Retention brings my own experience of myself as active
consciousness connected with this body, in passive synthesis, into my protending
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activity which is taking me beyond my immediate present into the horizons of the
other subject. In this way, retention and protention are essential to the
phenomenologically reduced experience of another subject, and they also show
how this experience is made possible. (Rodemeyer 2006, 192)
In Husserl’s example in CM5, what affects me first is the experience of the other ego’s body. I see
another body in the world, and this other body becomes associated with my own body according
to its similar appearance. However, in Rodemeyer’s description, she recognizes that this need not
be the case, as I can be (and often am) affected by something other than the other ego’s body. What
affects me in the appearance of the other ego, and by that, I mean that what calls me to her as an
other ego, is her constituting consciousness.
It is important to remember that this affection occurs through protention, as Rodemeyer
shows that the other ego can affect me due to the structural openness of protention to that which
is beyond my own consciousness, and I would like to show that there are two levels of
intersubjective affectivity at work in her analysis. First, there is the affectivity that occurs in far
protention, which awakens a general memory in far retention of intersubjective experience. In the
phenomenologically reduced state from Rodemeyer’s above passage, my retained sense of my own
embodied constituting activity is awakened, and reaches out with my protentional activity. It is
also easy to see how my previous intersubjective experiences, sedimented and retained in far
retention, would be awakened in the affective pull of the other ego’s constituting activity. In other
words, in the affective pull of the other ego on far protention, my general memories of an
inaccessible co-constitution retained in far retention are brought forth, prefiguring my far
protentional activity. However, the question at hand concerns the generation of this sense, and here
Rodemeyer’s analysis allows for a more primal experience.
Underlying this level of far retention and far protention is a second level of
intersubjectivity, which I argue, properly inaugurates the generation of the sense of the other
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ego.235 If we think of the above experience as one of primal institution, that is, an inaugurating
experience of the other ego, 236 then the sedimented sense of my previous intersubjective
experience does not come into play, because I have no prior experience of the other ego to have
been sedimented in far retention. It could also argued that my own sense of embodied constitution
would still be at play, which is what Husserl does in CM5, but this does not seem to be what
Rodemeyer discusses in the above passage. Rather, the affective call comes to my consciousness
from the other ego’s constituting activity immediately in primordial empathy, that is, in the
structural openness of near protention to the other ego. Only after this affection can we talk about
the association of what affects with me a retained sense.
Thus, at the affective level of near retention and near protention, we can look at the way
something affects me without my prior experiential memory coming into play. What are at play
are the structures of consciousness, particularly the structures described above that give rise to the
structural sense of the other ego, such that I am open to the appearance of the other ego. My
constituting experience, in which the structural sense of the other ego is always operative, is
retained in near retention as my conscious life unfolds. In other words, I am open to the appearance
of co-constitution, which is obviously a part of protentional activity, insofar as protention is open
to the appresented sides and their affective call to me. I am also open to the appearance of the
inaccessible, because these co-given sides are given precisely as incapable of being mine. The
structural sense of the other ego, then, is held in near retention along with the currently constituted
(and still being constituted) experience. In this way, the structural sense of the other ego prefigures
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This is important to discuss, I feel, because it moves away from the reliance on the sense of my own constituting
activity in the generation of the sense of the other ego.
236
Admittedly, this is not Rodemeyer’s aim with the passage, as she is focusing on her assertion that protention and
retention are at play in the intersubjective experience.
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near protention. In other words, the openness of near protention to the other ego occurs according
to the prefiguration of the structural sense of the other ego in near retention. 237

V.2.c Cashing in
In protention, particularly near protention, we see the structural sense of the other ego at
work in the structural openness of consciousness. However, as Rodemeyer notes, the structural
openness of consciousness to the other ego is insufficient for the constitution of her sense. This
aligns with the above static analysis of the generation of the sense of the other ego, because the
structural sense lacks the unique verification necessary in the full constitution of the sense of the
other ego. Rodemeyer’s solution to this issue lies in the primordial experience of the other ego,
which I take to be a concrete experience of the other ego’s lived body. According to Rodemeyer ,
I must at some point have an experience of the lived body of the other ego in order to recognize
the intersubjective horizons of consciousness, even if it is not required in all of my subsequent
experiences of other egos. Thus, while she would accept that I can experience Sartre’s “look”
without any other ego actually observing me, Rodemeyer argues that without the prior experience
of an embodied other ego looking at me, the experience of “the look,” or any other intersubjective
experience, is impossible (Rodemeyer 2006, 186-187). Therefore, I take Rodemeyer’s position to
be that the constituting consciousness of the other ego is unable to affect me without a primally
instituting experience of her lived body. In other words, without the embodied other ego having
affected me originarily in near protention at some point in my conscious life, there is no sense of
the other ego that becomes sedimented through retentional modifications into my general
memories. Without such sedimentation, far protention cannot be prefigured by far retention in
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Of course, near protention is structurally open to whatever comes to experience, but the structural sense of the other
ego accompanies all near protention insofar as the structure of experience precisely is intersubjective in this way.
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order to contribute to intersubjective experience. Thus, Rodemeyer clearly holds that the
constitution of the sense of the other ego is possible, at least in the fullest sense, only after my
concrete experience of the lived body of the other ego.238
The primally instituting experience of the embodied other ego in Rodemeyer’s analysis can
be described, then, as fleshing out the structural openness to intersubjectivity found in the
protentional component of temporalizing consciousness. Without the concrete experience of the
embodied other ego, there is no sense given to my consciousness to be constituted as the other ego;
that is, without the concrete experience of the other ego’s lived body, the form of intersubjective
openness is devoid of the content that gives it its full sense. Her argument offers an interesting
comparison to Zahavi’s position, because he argues that the concrete experiences of other egos do
not underlie the possibility of the constitution of objectivity, “but they can 'redeem' it, in the sense
of 'cashing it in' in experiential evidence” (Zahavi 2001, 35). In fact, as noted in Chapter II, he
argues that, “others are not originally present for me and familiar to me as objects of a particular
intentionality, but rather as co-functioning in all intentionality; as a co-present, the foreign present
precedes the explicit experience of, and encounter with, others” (Zahavi 2001, 57). Thus, it seems
that for Zahavi, other egos are given to me primarily in their constitutive contribution to my
constituting consciousness; in other words, the other ego is given to me in the structural sense of
an inaccessible co-constituting described above. 239 It must be noted that, on the one hand, though
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Rodemeyer does place the prominence of the lived body on par with her constituting activity in my experience of
the other ego, and notes that she cannot unequivocally state that the lived body of the other ego must be experienced
prior to an experience of her consciousness: “The living body of the other subject, we can suggest, is not secondary to
her consciousness in my apprehension of an intersubjective structure, rather, they are somewhat inter-dependent—but
an in depth analysis establishing this suggestion must be left for another project” (Rodemeyer 2006, 187).
239
It could be objected that the focus on the origination of the sense of the ego in my consciousness is a dangerous
orientation that risks eliminating the alterity of the other. I disagree, however, insofar as the genetic phenomenological
project aims as elucidating the constitution of sense, and this constitution of sense occurs within my own
consciousness, even though (or only because) the other ego plays a founding role in any sense constitution. Zahavi
seems to agree: “It must be emphasized that the reference to ‘everyone’ only seems to represent a shift in direction
toward a meta-subjective standpoint. For as we have previously stated (Ch. I.4), intersubjectivity can only be
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he mentions the necessity of the experience of the primal other, he does not describe it. On the
other hand, he does argue that the intersubjective structure of consciousness, which I have equated
with the structural sense of the other ego, must be prior to the concrete experience of other egos
(Zahavi 2001, 56-57). 240 Therefore, I take Zahavi’s position to be contrary to Rodemeyer’s on the
issue, as Rodemeyer is insistent that the other ego appear to me in a concrete, embodied manner
in order to fully flesh out the sense of the other ego. And yet, both Rodemeyer and Zahavi share
the view that the structural intersubjective openness of consciousness is “cashed in” by a concrete
intersubjective experience.
How, then, can one account for the difference in these two positions, and what does it say
about the origination of the sense of the other ego? As Zahavi does not offer further analysis of
what it means to “cash in” the structural sense of the other ego, I will return to Rodemeyer’s
analysis of affectivity in order to see how “cashing in” allows for the verification of the other ego.
To review: Rodemeyer argues that, while my constituting consciousness is open to more than itself
(futural and intersubjective horizons), without the experience of an actual embodied coconstituting other ego, I cannot constitute the full sense of the other ego. This primally instituting
experience occurs through affectivity, particularly my being affected by the other ego in near
protention. I have argued that the near protentional activity open to the other ego is prefigured by
the structural sense of the other ego given in my constituting consciousness. The structural sense,
then, is cashed in by the primally instituting experience of the other ego affecting me in near

manifested within each individual conscious life, just as what is performed by transcendental intersubjectivity is only
manifested in the performance of the individual subject; hence the term ‘everyone’ refers to everyone who is or can
be appresented within my subjectivity” (Zahavi 2001, 221).
240
He argues that the concrete experience of others (presumably the experience of their lived bodies as well), is
possible only with the structural openness of consciousness to others, which he calls open intersubjectivity. He even
goes so far as to say that the thematization of open intersubjectivity is potentially possible only after the concrete
experience of other egos, but the concrete experience of the other ego is only thematically possible because of the
structure of open intersubjectivity.
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protention. What remains to be shown, however, is that the appearance of the other ego in this way
allows for the verification of the other ego as described in Chapter IV.

V.2.d Verification
I contend that, insofar as my affection by the other ego is the affection by an inaccessible
co-constitution, which it must be as outlined in Chapters II and III, the verification of this
experience must unfold in the manner described in Chapter IV. The verification of my experience
of the other ego unfolds as follows: The affection by what is inaccessible in the experience of the
other ego points to the enacting of a constitution that is not originally mine. So, I am affected by
the enacted co-constitution, which continually appresents a constituting activity that I cannot live
through. Of course, this enacting is incapable of being given to me directly, but it nevertheless
affects me continually in the same manner so long as I am experiencing the other ego, as this is
the essence of such an experience. The continual affecting of my ego by this inaccessible coconstituting, the continual call of the enacting of a constitution that cannot be my own, which is
always aimed at in near protention (and eventually, after the activity of far retention, far
protention), is the unique verification of the appearance of the other ego. The prefiguration of near
protention by the structural sense of the other ego retained in near retention cannot become
satisfied in the manner of other near protentional strivings, such as the continued persistence of an
object or the coloration of a physical thing. Yet, my protentional activity strives for this
inaccessible co-constituting in my very being affected by the activity of the other ego, and it will
continue to do so as long as I am affected by the other ego. In my being affected by the other ego
in near protention, then, we see the structural sense of the other ego cashed in, insofar as the full
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sense of the other ego is only given in the unique ongoing verification of the inaccessible coconstitution in harmonious syntheses.
The above description of the affectivity of the other ego in near protention accounts for the
primal institution of the full sense of the other ego, because there is no requirement for a
sedimented sense outside of what is structurally given in my experience of the world. Instead, what
is required for the constitution of the full sense of the other ego is the primally instituting concrete
experience of the other ego, which cashes in the structural sense of the other ego given in my
objective constitution of the world. The only question that remains to be investigated is whether
this primal institution must be an experience of the embodied presence of the other ego, as
Rodemeyer asserts, or, on the other hand, the primal institution of the sense of the other ego does
not require her embodied presence, as seemingly held by Zahavi (and Sartre). As I have argued,
and Rodemeyer’s analysis agrees, what affects me in the primally instituting experience of the
other ego is her co-constituting activity, and the verification of this activity that occurs in my
concrete experience of the other ego is what allows for the constitution of the full sense of the
other ego. So, the question becomes, does the verification of the other ego require the appearance
of her lived body?
On the one hand, insofar as the co-constitution of the other ego is part of the structural
sense of the other ego, such that the world is given to me as referring to an inaccessible coconstitution, and the appearance of co-constitution is always already the appearance of an
embodied center of constitution, as argued in Chapter II, it would seem that the embodiment of the
other ego is at the very least implied, if not itself given, in the structural sense of the other ego. If
this holds, the concrete experience of the other ego needed to cash in the full sense of the other
ego need not be embodied. On the other hand, however, there is no possible verification of the
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other ego in the structural sense, because there is no continuing affective pull of the appresented
inaccessible co-constituting of the other ego. As shown above, this continuing affective pull is
what gives rise to the verifying syntheses in which the full sense of the other ego is constituted; in
other words, without the experience of cashing in of the structural sense of the other ego, there is
no constitution of the full sense of the other ego. This cashing in can only occur in the concrete
experience of the other ego, and only if there is a presentation given to motivate the appresentation.
In my experience of the world as co-constituted, the structural sense of the other ego is at play, but
what is presented offers no affective call of the possible inaccessible co-constitutions
accompanying the co-given sides. I do not experience the co-given sides as motivating me to
corroborate the possible co-constituting activities; rather, the co-given sides give me the structure
of intersubjective constitution. The affective call that motivates the verifying syntheses only occurs
in the concrete experience itself, and first in the primally instituting experience of the other ego’s
embodied presence. Because the co-constituted world cannot motivate these verifying syntheses,
it is only in the experience of an embodied co-constituting that the verifying syntheses can occur.
Only after the primal institution of the full sense of the other ego, in the experience that cashes in
the structural sense of the other ego in verifying syntheses, can the full sense of the other ego
become sedimented in far retention. Therefore, the full constitution of the sense of the other ego
requires the concrete experience of the embodied presence of the other ego.
The generation of the full sense of the other ego, then, occurs in the primally instituting
concrete experience of the other ego’s lived body that cashes in the structural sense of the other
ego that is found in my constituting experience. In the continually harmonious verification of my
being-affected by the embodied constituting activity of the other ego, the sense of an inaccessible
co-constitution becomes fully constituted. The sedimentation of such experiences, then, gives rise
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to general memories that prefigure my future intersubjective experiences. Thus, prior to my
experience of a concrete ego, I have the structural sense of an inaccessible co-constitution, but the
structural sense is only cashed in through my verification of the concrete experience of the other
ego’s embodied inaccessibility. Since the sense of the other ego as described in the previous
chapters requires this unique process of verification, it is only in the experience that cashes in the
structural sense of the other ego that her sense can be fully constituted.

*********************

The co-constitution of other egos operative in the constituting activity of consciousness is
a part of transcendental consciousness, which we can call transcendental intersubjectivity. In the
givenness of this co-constitution, its inaccessibility is evident in the simultaneity of my constituting
and the co-constituting of the co-given sides. In this way, the structural sense of the other ego is
given to me in my experience of the world. However, only in the concrete experience of the other
ego can I verify this sense. It is only in the primally instituting experience of the other ego’s lived
body, affecting me in near protention, that I experience a harmonious concurrence of empty
intentions aimed at the constitutive enacting of the other ego. This empty intention remains
unfulfilled, and in its unfulfilled state becomes sedimented in my consciousness, such that it is
continually associated with the sense “other ego.” Thus, while the structure of consciousness is
open to appearance of the other ego, in that it includes the accomplishment of an inaccessible coconstitution, it is only in the verification of the affective call of what appears as inaccessible that
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the sense of the other ego can be cashed in, and thus fully constituted. Therefore, in order for the
full sense of the other ego to be constituted, there must be a concrete experience of the other ego. 241

241

In phenomenological psychology, Zeno Van Duppen argues that there are intersubjective diseases, particularly
schizophrenia (Van Duppen 2017). The notion that the schizophrenic is capable of objective constitution, specifically
recognizing that the world is there for others as well as for them, but has difficulty in concrete interactions with other
egos, seems to affirm that the intersubjective constitution of objectivity is possible without the concrete experience of
others.
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Chapter VI: Conclusion
In this work I have investigated Husserl’s analyses of the appearance of the other ego in
order to elucidate the essential components of such an appearance. These three components, coconstitution, inaccessibility, and a unique process of verification, are necessary for the constitution
of the full sense of the ego. I will review each of them individually.
(1) Co-constitution: The other ego appears first and foremost in her co-constitution, which,
as outlined in Chapter II, is given to me in two ways: in my experience of the world as coconstituted by others and in my experience of her active engagement in the world. First, Husserl
emphasizes the appearance of the world as there for more than just me, as shared. In the appearance
of the world as such, the other ego is experienced in her constitutive accomplishment: I experience
objects as constituted by more than just me, as given to other constituting activities of
consciousness in addition to my own. Second, these other constituting consciousnesses are given
as centers of constituting activity. I experience the world as constituted by other egos and oriented
around the bodily center of that constitution. In other words, just as the world is oriented around
the “here” of my constituting activity, so does the other ego appear as a “there”, which is a “here”
for her, around which the world is also organized. In this way, the other ego appears in her coconstituting the world and in the world as co-constituted by her. The clarification of this two-fold
sense of co-constitution allows for a description of the transcendental sense of co-constitution at
play in my constituting consciousness. Following Zahavi’s analysis of Husserl’s concept of open
intersubjectivity, I argued that the sense of the other ego as a co-constitution is operative in my
objective constitution of the world. This means that, within my very experience of the world, the
other ego’s constitutive contribution is already at work. Thus, in my experience of the objective
world, the co-constitution of the other ego appears.

169

(2) Inaccessibility: What distinguishes my stream of constitution from the stream of
constitution of the other ego, her stream of co-constitution, is accessibility. My experiences, my
constituting activity, are given to me as accessible, and the co-constituting of the other ego appears
to me as inaccessible. In Chapter III, I argued that accessibility is, phenomenologically speaking,
a special type of originality, which is best understood in relation to Husserl’s distinction between
direct and indirect givenness. Husserl says that a phenomenon is given directly to consciousness
when it gives itself; in other words, something is given directly to me when its appearance is not
mediated. This means that a phenomenon is given indirectly when it is not itself given; rather, an
indirectly given phenomenon is given through something else. Husserl uses the example of my
experience of a painting: the painting itself is given directly, and the painted cat, insofar as it is
merely the image of a cat, is also given directly. The actual cat itself is also given in my experience
of the painting, because the painting refers to it, but it is only indicated by the painting, and thus
is indirectly given. This is important in the discussion of the appearance of the other ego in her
inaccessibility, because Husserl says multiple times that the other ego is directly given. However,
he also says that I cannot have a direct perception of the other consciousness. I argue that Husserl’s
distinction means that I have a direct experience of the accomplishment of the other ego’s
constituting consciousness, but I experience her conscious activity solely as enacted. What is not
directly given to me, because it is only indicated, is the enacting of this conscious activity. Thus,
the other ego is directly given to me in her co-constitution, but the enacting of this co-constitution
is indirectly given to me. That the other ego’s enacting of her constituting consciousness cannot
be directly given to me comes down to originality. My consciousness is given to me as original
because it has a unified temporal context: my experiences are given such that they belong to me
and can be ordered as temporally related within my experience. The consciousness of the other
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ego, that is, the enacting of her co-constitution, is structurally incapable of being given in such a
unified temporal context. Because her experiences have a different temporal context than my own,
they are unoriginal. While I do have a direct and original experience of her consciousness, it can
only accord with my unified temporal context insofar as it is an experience of her enacted
conscious activity. The enacting of her consciousness indicated in my direct experience of her
conscious activity cannot be unified with my temporal context. Thus, the other ego appears in her
inaccessibility, because if the enacting of her consciousness were directly given to me, or if her
experience were given as unified with my temporal context, that is, originally my experience, then
her consciousness would simply be a mode of my own consciousness, as is the case for my past
and possible future consciousnesses. Thus, the sense of the other ego as a co-constitution must
always appear to me as inaccessible.
3) Verification: The final component of the sense of the other ego is the unique process of
verification through which the inaccessible co-constitution comes to its full givenness. In Chapter
IV, I argued that Husserl has a tripartite structure of verification: an empty intention comes to a
coincidence with an intuition, which can be fulfilling, disappointing, or somewhere in between. I
then demonstrated that this tripartite structure is operative at all levels and in all of the various
ways in which the process of verification occurs. This is important because, for Husserl, the way
in which the process of verification plays out depends upon the content being verified and the level
of consciousness at which this process occurs. I specifically focused on the unique type of
verification that Husserl calls corroboration (Bestätigung), or a secondary verification, because
this horizonal verification occurs on the periphery of experience. As I attend to this or that object,
my continuing experience is given to me as unified because the horizon of my stream of
consciousness is harmonious. Accompanying my experiences, then, are empty intentions aimed at
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the horizon of my experiences – the background noises, the colors and lighting, the emotions and
embodied sensations of living in the world. These empty intentions are largely ignored, such that
I do not attend to their strivings. However, were I to suddenly have a change in my horizonal
experience, the corroboration of said experience would be broken. 242 The process of verification
in corroboration is unique because the corroborating empty intentions need not coincide with
fulfilling intuitions proper; rather, the empty intentions of corroboration coincide with empty
intentions aimed at the same sort of fulfillment. Thus, the unity of my experience arises in the
continuing corroboration of what is strived for in horizonal empty intentions. This same sort of
verification is at play in the appearance of the other ego, because the intuitive fulfillment of the
other ego cannot arise in the same way as what is strived for in other verifying syntheses, such as
judgment verifications. Rather, the inaccessible co-constituting of the other ego is always verified
in the continuously harmonious appearance of what can only be intended emptily. In this way, the
verification of the other ego is a horizonal corroboration of my intersubjective experience. I cannot
verify the appearance of the other ego through an intuitively fulfilling synthesis, which is obvious
from the analysis of inaccessibility. But, through continuously harmonious intersubjective
experience, the appearance of the other ego becomes verified in the corroboration of the empty
intentions aimed at her inaccessibility.
These three components, then, give the full sense of the other ego as an inaccessible coconstitution uniquely verified in harmonious syntheses. In Chapter V, I asked how this sense arises.
Specifically, I wanted to know whether or not one must have a concrete experience of the other
ego’s embodied presence in order to constitute the full sense of the other ego. In order to answer
this question, I first looked at the static analysis of the sense of the other ego, which showed that,
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The continual interruption to the corroboration of my experience is what allows Descartes to discount the dream
hypothesis in the sixth meditation.
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within my own constituting consciousness, there is what I call a “structural sense” of the other ego.
Because my own stream of constitution includes the constitutive accomplishment of the other ego,
the components of co-constitution and inaccessibility are given within the structure of my
experience of the world. However, after exploring Rodemeyer’s genetic analysis of the generation
of the sense of the other ego, I argued that this structural sense is insufficient for the constitution
of the full sense of the other ego because it lacks the unique process of verification. The verification
necessary for the full constitution of the sense of the other ego arises only after my being affected
by the inaccessible co-constitution of the other ego in a concrete experience of her lived body.
Such an experience cashes in the structural sense of the other ego by unfolding the corroborating
intentions that occur in the verification of intersubjective experience. Without this verification, the
structural sense of the other ego cannot be fully constituted as such and remains merely a structural
component of my own consciousness. Therefore, the constitution of the full sense of the other ego
occurs only when a concrete experience of the other ego cashes in the structural sense of the other
ego.
To close, I would like to note that the analyses in this work have been focused on my
experience of other egos that are human, but this should not be understood as an argument that the
appearance of the other ego as an inaccessible co-constitution uniquely verified in harmonious
syntheses is restricted to human egos. Leaving aside the difficult question of defining what it means
to be human (or how I am to know that someone is a human and not an alien in disguise), it is
obvious in my daily life that my experience of other streams of constitution is not limited to human
constitution. Any person who has hiked a trail in bear country understands this explicitly, as one
sees the trail and the surrounding woods as also constituted by bears. The same is true for pet
owners, who experience their homes as also experienced by their pets. In my home, for example,

173

one cannot leave folded laundry on the couch, because it is (obviously) the perfect spot for a cat
to nap. Of course, one could argue that animals have varying capacities of consciousness or
conscious abilities, but in doing so, one has already admitted to the experience of animal
consciousness. The point of this work was not to classify other ego according but to describe the
way in which they are constituted, which I have done. Thus, the next step of this project must be
to broaden the ways in which we experience inaccessible streams of co-constitution, such that we
do not limit our experience of other egos artificially.
In order to accomplish this, I propose utilizing the notion of affective hesitation described
by Alia Al-Saji. She argues that one can use moments of affective hesitation to interrupt habitual
manners of constitution, and she focuses specifically on racialized perception. Al-Saji argues that
“racialization proceeds not only through unconscious perceptual habits, but also through
habituated and socialized affects that inextricably color and configure perception” (Al-Saji 2014,
140). In order to develop antiracists strategies that can undo these constitutive habits, Al-Saji
utilizes Bergson’s notion of hesitation in conjunction with a phenomenological analysis of
affectivity (similar to Rodemeyer’s work in Chapter V) in order to offer a possible strategy for the
interruption and reevaluation of habitualized constitution, which she calls affective hesitation (AlSaji 2014, 143). Affect, she argues, “takes the place of, and hence delays, habitual action; it also
prefigures the delayed habit, making it visible as an anticipated future among others in the world”
(Al-Saji 2014, 143).243 So, the hope for Al-Saji is that one can use the hesitation that arises in
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Lampert’s phenomenological discussion of a delay is also interesting here. He argues that, for Husserl, in order to
preserve a memory, one must delay the oncoming of the successive experiences that follow what is remembered
(Lampert 2012, 33). What he calls a delay, then, functions in a similar manner to Al-Saji’s notion of hesitation, only
hesitation delays the current moment.
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affectivity to, at the very least, make visible the habitualized structures of constitution involved in
racialized perception, and eventually then to undo these structures. 244
I propose that the affective hesitation proposed by Al-Saji can also work to elucidate the
various ways in which the structural sense of the other ego is cashed in. In the same way that AlSaji shows that racializing perception is habitualized and rigid, I argue that the previous analysis
of the genesis of the sense of the other ego and the way in which this sense is sedimented in far
retention shows that my constitution of other egos also becomes habitualized and rigid.
Specifically, one must analyze the different ways in which my being-affected by the other ego are
cashed in, not just in the primal institution but every time in which the structural sense is cashed
in by an intuitive giving of the embodied presence of an other ego.
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This would apply to the

constitution of animal consciousness, such that the way in which humans interact with animals and
our shared environment would be reshaped by a renewed analysis of the animal community of
which we are a part. 246 It would also help in the evaluation of extra-terrestrial life and artificial
intelligence, as the habitual ways in which one encounters other egos may limit our ability to
recognize patterns of constitution arising from truly alien or artificially created consciousnesses.
Of course, such considerations would require further research into biology and algorithmic
processes, but the phenomenological sense of the other ego described in the current work gives a
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Of course, her notion of affective hesitation is itself not capable of undoing habitualized constitution. It can only
offer an opening for such work to occur (Al-Saji 2014, 160).
245
Provisionally, one could identify at least four categories: (1) The cashing in of the experience of other egos like
mine; (2) The cashing in of the experience of other egos deemed deficient from mine in some manner (of course, the
ethical complications of this category must be laid bare); (3) The cashing in of the experience of other egos that are
not ignore (such as plants for most of us); (4) The cashing in of the experience of other egos that exceed mine (such
as the encounter with the divine).
246
One obvious train of thought would lead to the cessation of the farming of animals for food, either by their meat or
by other animal products. However, such a cessation is not an obvious train of thought, as there are many examples
of harmonious communal living between animals and humans in which animals are still a main source of food. Of
course, these examples are open to interpretation, but it is a discussion that could be occasioned by a more conscious
awareness of the ways in which the experience of animals cash in the structural sense of the other ego.
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framework for approaching such issues. The aim of such a project would be to offer a
phenomenological ethics that starts from the appearance of the other ego as fully realizing my
constituting activity by cashing in my intersubjective structures of conscious, that is, from the
experience of a concretely experienced other ego. Of course, such a project is only possible after
having clarified the phenomenological appearance of the other ego as an inaccessible coconstitution uniquely verified in harmonious syntheses.
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